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This research examines the Korean state’s position in the development of its cultural 
industries. In contrast to doctrines of neoliberal globalization that demand that the state 
minimize its presence in industrial development and emphasize the market’s 
management of cultural products, the state maintains its position in the cultural 
industries as their products are effective tools for the state to govern the population and 
exert influence overseas. Despite pressures from major market players, many states 
have reconfigured their roles and positions in cultural industries as major stakeholders.  
Based on interviews with policymakers and cultural workers and analysis of policy 
documents, this study finds that the Korean state has been an important stakeholder in 
developing the cultural industries. In collaboration with the nation’s leading 
conglomerates, it played significant roles in developing cultural businesses. Depending 
on each administration’s political inclination and economic conditions, it has employed 
both neoliberal measures and state-interventionist methods to make cultural businesses 
competitive in the global market—from establishing a mega-size public organization that 
provided direct supports for every stage of cultural production to entrusting market 
players to manage the state’s budget for supporting cultural businesses. This reflects the 
legacies of the Korean developmental state in which the state mobilizes and allocates 
resources to develop the economy.  
The Korean state continues utilizing cultural products and their global popularity to 
accomplish its political and economic missions, from strengthening its soft power to 
increasing the number of exports. The state’s emphasis on the utility of cultural products 
provoked criticism of the approach as hyper-instrumentalist from many cultural workers, 
who saw such policies as characteristic of short-termism practices and as ‘window 
dressing’ for political and bureaucratic clout. Such an instrumentalist approach saw the 
government suppress creators in industries if they criticized its political agenda.  
The findings of this study also explore how the state continues its involvement in the 
cultural industries alongside the drivers of private capital and global market forces. By 
collaborating, managing, and even suppressing cultural production and goods, the state 
persists in its participation in the management of cultural industries.  
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Chapter 1.  
 
Introduction 
In October 2018, the South Korean (henceforth Korea) president Moon Jae-in 
participated in a four-day state visit to France. During his visit, the Office of the President 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted the ‘Korea-France Friendship Concert: Echoes 
of Korean Music’ at Théâtre le 13ème Art in Paris. While a few Korean and French 
musicians performed, including traditional music (Gukak in Korean) performers from the 
National Gukak Center, the most anticipated performance of the night was the closing 
finale by BTS (Bangtan Sonyeondan, Bangtan Boys in English), a seven-member 
Korean idol group whose songs have swept major music charts in many countries. Their 
performance of their two then most recent hit songs, ‘DNA’ and ‘Idol’, attracted political 
figures from both Korea and France as well as fans from across France and Europe, 
who were eager to see these Korean pop music (K-pop) idols perform in person. While 
BTS’ participation was a highly publicized event, it was later revealed that they were not 
paid by the Korean state at all.  
The Moon administration’s utilization of cultural products as a means of 
promoting its political events can be found elsewhere. In 2018, the administration 
planned to hold a concert in Pyongyang as part of promoting a détente atmosphere 
among the inter-Korean relationship with North Korea, and asked Red Velvet, a five-
member K-pop girl group, to join the concert. Despite Red Velvet’s label SM 
Entertainment’s initial decline due to pre-existing schedules, four of the five members 
ended up participating in the concert after the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism 
(MCST)’s repeated their request for the group to perform (Lee SR, 2018, March 30). In 
relation to the Moon administration’s bridging attempts with North Korea through popular 
culture, a member of the National Assembly affiliated with the ruling party insisted that 
BTS would also perform in Pyongyang in 2019 to celebrate the first anniversary of Moon 
and Kim Jong-un’s summit without prior consultation with Big Hit, BTS’ label company. 
While his suggestions were interpreted as a politician viewing celebrities as tools to 
satisfy the administration’s political needs and faced harsh criticism, such state-led 
2 
cultural events implied the state’s viewpoint of culture as an instrument of accomplishing 
the state’s goals (Choi, 2019, January 10; Yang, 2019, January 14).1 
Mobilizing Korean pop artists in state-led events is not a recent phenomenon. 
The nation’s former presidents, such as Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak, often 
visited foreign countries with singers, actors, and actresses as part of branding the 
nation, and celebrities were frequently asked to participate in government events. For 
instance, Song Joong-ki, a Korean actor, attended the 2016 opening ceremony of K-
Style Hub alongside Park Geun-hye to endorse the exhibition and experience center for 
tourists designed to promote Korean culture, (Kim, 2016, April 11). Kim Jae-joong, a 
Korean singer who was a member of boy group TVXQ, attended Lee Myung-bak’s state 
visit to Turkey in 2012. With Lee, Kim attended several cultural events including meeting 
with Turkish students learning Korean at Ankara University. During Lee’s visit, Kim also 
hosted a fan meeting that was sold out within 30 minutes (Park, 2012, February 7). Most 
of all, for the past two decades, leaders, politicians, and government officials have 
enjoyed using the term ‘Korean Wave’ in public—which refers to “the sudden rise of 
Korean popular culture and its dissemination in Asian countries (Jin, 2016, 4)” as an 
outcome of the development of cultural industries and the growth of exportation of 
cultural products—to inspire self-confidence among the population, highlight the cultural 
sector’s contributions to the national economy, of which exports are predominantly led 
by manufacturing businesses, and to promote the nation to the world (Kang, 2014). 
The Korean state’s mobilization of its cultural industries as means of 
accomplishing its political and economic goals shows how the state revisits its positions 
in the cultural realm and continues to instrumentalize its culture which had become 
increasingly globalized (Kim Y., 2013; Jin, 2016). Studying the complex relationship 
between the Korean state and cultural industries is important because it sheds lights on 
the dynamics and efficacies of the state’s cultural industry policies in the era of 
globalization, where elements of the cultural industries are subject to market logics that 
often seem contradictory to the state’s interventions and argue for its retreat from 
culture. By analyzing the roles of the Korean state in its cultural industries which have 
 
1 In effect, Tak pointed out, artists who took part in official events could not receive effective 
timeline guarantees from the government, and as a result needed to clear their schedules for 
days if they were asked to partake in presidential international trips (Roh Moo-hyun Jaedan, 
2019, June 24). 
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become more transnational and Westernized, the study investigates the power dynamics 
of the state and globalization in its cultural industries. 
1.1. The Korean Wave: Globalization of Korean Cultural 
Industries 
In general, the spread of the nation’s cultural products overseas began in the 
mid-1990s.2 Many television series, films, and pop idols had gained significant popularity 
in many countries in East Asia—including China, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam—and 
become a major cultural genre in several local markets. After establishing diplomatic ties 
with China in 1992, a few Korean television series such as Jealousy (1992) and What Is 
Love All About? (1991) were exported to the Chinese market in 1993 and 1995, 
respectively. In particular, What Is Love All About? was aired by CCTV (China Central 
Television) in 1997 and received the second highest rating in the nation's prime-time 
television history (Shim, 2008; McPhall, 2014).3 In addition, Chinese radio stations 
began introducing Korean popular music on a regular basis. Simultaneously, a number 
of Chinese and Taiwanese media began to use the term ‘Korean Wave’ repeatedly to 
explain the growing popularity of Korean popular music in the region. In the early 2000s, 
several K-pop idols such as H.O.T, S.E.S, and Fin.K.L began to have concerts in China 
and Southeast Asia. In Japan, Korean female singer BoA topped the Japanese Oricon 
Chart, the most prominent music chart in Japan, for the first time as a foreign singer. 
Furthermore, Winter Sonata (2002), a Korean television melodrama series, recorded the 
highest viewing rate in the history of NHK’s non-historic drama programming and caused 
 
2 Before the mid-1990s, there were few Korean films and popular music that gained popularity 
overseas. For instance, NHK (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai), the Japanese public broadcaster, invited 
Cho Yong-pil, Kye Eun-sook, Kim Yonja, and Patty Kim to its annual Kōhaku Uta Gassen (紅白歌
合戦), the broadcaster’s annual New Year’s Eve program in 1989 (Kim SM., 2018). In addition to 
this, several Korean films received awards in major international film festivals. However, this was 
not common, and it would be difficult to consider these examples as indicative of a cultural 
phenomenon. 
3 In relation to this, Yoon (2016) explains that the Korean Overseas Information Service (KOIS), 
an affiliation of the Ministry of Culture with a goal to promote Korean culture overseas, played a 
decisive role in exporting What Is Love All About? to China. In 1992, KOIS secretly delivered a 
Betamax video of the series in a diplomatic pouch to a Korean Consulate in Hong Kong to lobby 
Asia Television (ATV), a Hong Kong television broadcaster, to air the series. ATV broadcasted 
the series twice a week and the show became a remarkable hit, which resulted in CCTV’s 
consideration toward importing the series.  
4 
a sensation in Japanese society (Mōri, 2008; Yoon, 2016).4 The popularity of Winter 
Sonata triggered Japanese media to import Korean television series for years after the 
show’s success. Following this, Jewel in the Palace (2003–2004), a historical television 
drama, was exported to more than 90 countries and recorded the highest viewing rate in 
many countries including China, Iran, Romania, and Sri Lanka (Cho, October 13, 2013).  
Meanwhile, as Korean popular music established a solid foothold in many Asian 
countries as a major pop culture genre in the early-2000s, and producers sought to 
pioneer more overseas markets in the late-2000s and 2010s. In the late-2000s and 
early-2010s, many K-Pop idols such as 2NE1, Big Bang, CNBLUE, Girl’s Generation, 
SHINee, Super Junior, and TVXQ and released their albums in Japan, dominating local 
music charts, and went on concert tours in East Asian cities. In 2009, the song Nobody 
performed by K-Pop girl group Wonder Girls topped charts in many East Asian markets, 
while the music video recorded over 100 million views on YouTube and was ranked at 
76th in the Billboard Hot 100 chart—marking the first time a K-Pop idol and Korean 
singer entered the Billboard chart. Finally, Korean singer PSY’s Gangnam Style went 
viral in 2012 and topped the music charts of many countries including France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom. Thanks to social media, which functioned as the main platform 
for delivering performances of K-Pop idols worldwide, K-Pop became more popular in 
other regions including Europe and Latin America, laying the groundwork for the current 
success of several K-Pop idols such as BTS, Monsta X, and Blackpink in the late-2010s 
to present. 
Likewise, Korean television consolidated its presence in the region. For instance, 
Temptation of Wife (2008), a highly watched Korean soap opera with an average viewer 
 
4 NHK first broadcasted this Korean melodrama through their satellite channel called NHK BS. 
While the viewership rate was 1.1% on average, its main characters, Bae Yong-joon and Choi Ji-
woo, caused a sensation in Japan. When Bae visited Japan to promote the series in April 2003, 
more than 5,000 fans gathered at Tokyo International Airport to welcome him, ten times more 
than of fans of David Beckham during his visit to Japan. Following this event, NHK decided to re-
broadcast this Korean melodrama through its main terrestrial channel at nighttime (11:30 pm), 
and this attracted more than 20% of the viewership. Given that audience ratings during primetime 
were 10% in average, Winter Sonata’s record was remarkable. As well, NHK sold more than 1.2 
copies of a novelized version of the drama and 330,000 sets of digital versatile discs (DVD) in the 
market (Mōri, 2008). Most of all, Japanese middle-age women were drawn to the male 
character’s soft and romantic masculinity, which was a contrast to Japanese traditional strong 
masculinity, which was dubbed ‘Yonsama (ヨン様) Syndrome’ after Bae Yoon-Joon’s nickname 
‘Yonsama’ (Chae, 2014).  
5 
rating of about 26%, garnered great popularity in many East Asian countries. It received 
an average viewer rating of more than 80% in Mongolia, and it was remade in several 
countries including China and the Philippines. In addition to this, Running Man (2010-
present), a television variety show, also became popular in China and Hong Kong. The 
popularity of Korean television in the Asian market laid a foundation for producers to 
expand into markets outside of East Asia. In 2017, US broadcaster ABC adapted The 
Good Doctor (2013), a Korean medical drama television series. In that same year, it also 
broadcast Somewhere Between (2017), which was a remake of God’s Gift: 14 Days 
(2014), a Korean thriller drama television series.  
 Additionally, Korean film products also saw increasing popularity in overseas 
markets. For instance, the action film Shiri (1999) and the mystery thriller film Joint 
Security Area (2000) earned more than 15 million USD and 10 million USD in the 
Japanese box office in 2000 and 2001 respectively (Joo, 2011). The success of Korean 
films in the market paved the way for the increasing export of Korean cultural products to 
Japan (Jin, 2016). In addition to this, other films such as the comedy-action film My Wife 
Is a Gangster (2001) and the romantic comedy My Sassy Girl (2001) became popular in 
several Asian markets. Meanwhile, Im Kwon-taek’s Painted Fire (2002) and Park Chan-
wook’s Oldboy (2003) won the Best Director Award and the Grand Prix at the 2003 and 
2004 Cannes Festival respectively. Oldboy and several other Korean genre films won 
high praise from critics and achieved commercial success in some Western markets, 
including Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Besides, Hollywood studios 
acquired the remake rights to some Korean films such as A Tale of Two Sisters (2003), 
a horror-drama film based on a Korean traditional folktale (Jung, 2011).  
The Korean film industry experienced a recession in the mid-2000s due to a 
series of state deregulations in the market—notably the reduction of the screen quota on 
domestic films in theatres from 146 days to 73 days per year due to the free trade 
agreement with the US. This caused an oversupply of Hollywood films in the market and 
the retreat of market share of domestic films. Meanwhile, an overflow of comedy and 
gangster movies from domestic producers incurred a growth slowdown of the film 
industry as well (Jin, 2019a). Despite ups and downs in the industry, Korean blockbuster 
films continued attracting foreign audiences in the 2010s. In particular, the drama film 
Masquerade (2012) and Korean action horror film Train to Busan (2016) both grossed 
more than 10 million USD from foreign box offices respectively. Masquerade earned 
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more than 3 million USD in Japan while Train to Busan had box office profits from 
Thailand (2.1 million USD), France (1.95 million USD), Brazil (1.45 million USD), and 
Mexico (1.16 million USD) (Boxofficemojo, n.d.a.; Boxofficemojo, n.d.b.). Finally, several 
Korean films such as Kim Ki-duk’s Pietà (2012) and Bong Joon-ho’s Parasite (2019) won 
high praise from critics and received grand prizes at the Venice Film Festival in 2013 
(Leone d’Oro, Pietà), Cannes Film Festival (Palme d’Or, 2019, Parasite), and the 
Academy Awards (Academy Award for Best Picture, 2020, Parasite). In addition to its 
critical acclaim. Parasite’s commercial success saw earnings of approximately 185 
million USD across overseas markets, a historical moment for the nation’s film industry 
(Boxofficemojo, n.d.c.) Needless to say, the growing international profile of Korean films 
became, and has continued to be, one of the mainstays of the Korean Wave.  
Regarding the distribution of Korean cultural products, it is worth noting that 
digital technologies—including the development of high-speed wireless Internet 
networks, smartphones, and other mobile devices—have been crucial to the Korean 
Wave. Most of all, they laid the groundwork for diversifying genres. For instance, 
audiences’ habits of consuming cultural products through smartphones triggered the 
development of smartphone and web-based cultural genres such as web-dramas and 
webtoons—whose formats, including timeline and graphics, are customized to the 
screen size and use of smartphones (Kang, 2017).5 In particular, the growth of Korean 
webtoons, which refer to serialized online cartoon strips which format and genre 
characteristics are strongly influenced by Manhwa (Korean comics and print cartoons), 
became another growth engine for the cultural industries, swiftly becoming the second-
largest cultural export (Korea Creative Content Agency, 2020). In effect, Line Webtoon 
(currently WEBTOON), a webtoon publishing platform, expanded its market to Japan, 
Latin America, and the United States. Considering that many webtoons such as Along 
with the Gods (2010–2012) and Inside Men (2010) have been dramatized and 
cinematized as original content, the impacts of the webtoon business are far-reaching in 
cultural production.  
 
5 Web-dramas are serialized dramas released on online platforms in which episodes are 
produced as 15–20-minute length episodes (Kang, 2017). Webtoon refers to a type of serialized 
digital comic strips that are produced and distributed through online platforms. Thanks to a high 
penetration rate of smart devices in the nation, they have become distinctive cultural genres.  
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Digital technologies and new platforms also provided new opportunities to 
producers of existing cultural genres such as films and television. The entry of Netflix 
into the production and distribution of Korean films and television series has become 
another force for widening the market base. For instance, Kingdom (2019), a Netflix 
original horror-thriller television series, received critical acclaim from audiences and 
critics and was chosen as one of the best TV shows of 2020 by the New York Times 
(Poniewozik, Hale & Lyons, December 1, 2020). Netflix also became beneficial for 
Korean broadcasters to distribute their television series globally and recoup production 
costs. In addition, the nation’s Internet infrastructure contributed to online video games 
and mobile games becoming the largest export in the nation’s cultural industries, 
accounting for nearly 70% (6.98 billion USD) of total cultural export (Korea Creative 
Content Agency, 2020). Other digital technologies such as visual effects and three-
dimensional graphics contributed to the nation’s animation industry, which had served as 
subcontractors of major animation studios in Hollywood, to develop its original 
animations such as Ocon’s Pororo the Little Penguin (2003–2017) and Pinkfong’s Baby 
Shark (2016-).  
Furthermore, the advent of social media—a medium wherein ‘ordinary’ people 
could generate and share content with other users and facilitate social interaction unlike 
traditional media where only producers have the exclusive right to produce and distribute 
content (Murthy, 2012)— was pivotal to expand the Korean Wave (Jung, 2015; Jin, 
2017). For instance, many K-Pop labels utilized social media platforms to promote their 
idols and communicate with their fans by releasing new music videos of K-Pop idols on 
YouTube, uploading daily life of celebrities on their Instagram, V Live, and Twitter 
accounts, and hosting live chats with fans. Such viral marketing strategies were key 
success factors in making the industry popular worldwide. In relation to this, the role of 
social media is important to fandom as they not only provide access to K-Pop content 
but also formulate fan practices that are vital to consuming and disseminating Korean 
pop music (McLaren & Jin, 2020). Alongside K-Pop, fan activities on social media 
become more important in consuming Korean films, television programs, and video 
games—all of which are major cultural exports (Jin, 2016). In this regard, much of the 
current flow of the Korean Wave could be understood as a digital and social media 
phenomenon (Yoon, 2020).  
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In this regard, the consequences of the Internet and digital technologies brought 
to Korean cultural industries are significant. The rise of digital technologies and platforms 
changed both the cultural forms of exports and the major regions where Korean cultural 
products were being consumed (Jin, 2016). New cultural forms such as online and 
mobile games and animation became the main exports of industries.6 The Internet and 
digital platforms provided more opportunities for domestic producers to promote their 
content worldwide, which contributed to expanding the market from East Asia into 
Europe and the Americas (Jin, 2016). Indeed, much of BTS’ worldwide success is owed 
more than in part to promotional strategies through different social media, including 
YouTube, and Twitter which contributed to listeners’ access and interest in countries 
around the world. Not surprisingly, such changes in the cultural industries also reshaped 
the nature of the Korean Wave. As more Korean cultural products caused a sensation 
through digital platforms, the Korean Wave became a major non-Western cultural force 
in the global cultural industries.  
As the Korean Wave has become a global cultural phenomenon, Korean cultural 
products began to develop more transnational characteristics to attract global audiences 
(Kim Y., 2013; Jin, 2016). For instance, Korean television series often portrayed urban 
and consumerist lifestyles in metropolitan cities as a way of appealing to Asian 
audiences while characters and storylines continued to adopt traditional cultural values 
such as family values (Lin & Tong, 2008). Meanwhile, the Korean music industry 
increasingly blended elements of Western pop genres into its music, resulting in industry 
characteristics including a mix of English and Korean in its lyrics, participations of foreign 
composers in producing K-pop music, and K-pop musicians’ collaboration with foreign 
artists (Ryoo & Jin, 2018).  
In relation to this, a recent trend has seen increasing collaboration between 
foreign producers and distributors in the creation and dissemination of cultural products, 
which has contributed to increasing the transnational characteristics of these products 
(Kim J. O., 2018a). Indeed, major K-Pop labels regularly partner with foreign composers 
 
6 During the last five years (2013–2017), games (both online and mobile) made up more than 50 
percent of export revenues of the nation’s cultural industries (55 percent in 2013, 56 percent in 
2014 and 2015, 54 percent in 2016, and 67 percent in 2017), followed by character businesses 
(7.5 percent in 2017). In contrast, films only consisted 0.5 percent of total exports in the same 
year (Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism, 2019a).  
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and choreographers to co-produce albums for their idols while also continuing recruiting 
foreign trainees. Additionally, Netflix’s presence in television production becomes 
another crucial example with regards to funding and distributing Korean content (Kim, 
2021). That said, as more foreign cultural creators, distributors, investors, and audiences 
become involved in the production of Korean cultural products, the globalization of 
Korean cultural products furthers various characteristics of both inbound and outbound 
globalization.7 
Along with other factors—such as the state’s direct and indirect interventions in 
cultural industries to promote Korean popular culture, the entire production chain and 
outcomes of the Korean cultural industries has become global and transnational, with 
neoliberal logics that argue for an interpretation of culture through its market values. 
However, such changes towards globalization raise questions surrounding the 
reinterpretation of culture in policy contexts. 
1.2. Understanding the Meaning of Culture in Policy 
Contexts 
In policy contexts, culture has been understood as “the whole complex of 
distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional features that characterize a 
society or a social group (The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), 1982, 41)”. This definition is built on two pillars—based on an 
aesthetic and an anthropological perspective (Miller & Yúdice, 2002). On one hand, 
culture is understood as outputs of artistic creativity in which evaluations are conducted 
with tastes of different social groups. On the other hand, anthropological perspectives 
see culture as “expressions of shared values and experiences (Throsby, 2010, 2)” which 
sets parameters for “distinct systems or structures of beliefs, practices, signification, and 
meaning that have an autonomous logic or coherence of their own (Garner, 2016, 53)”. 
In relation to this, culture and its elements, such as customs, history, language, and 
 
7 In this context, inbound globalization is generally understood as globalization triggered by an 
influx of external stakeholders and pressures that results in an opening of the domestic market. 
Conversely, outbound globalization means an expansion of domestic stakeholders to foreign 
markets (Kim S., 2013).       
10 
religion, have been used as indicators of lifestyles and rituals of people that distinguish 
themselves from others (Garner, 2016).  
Throughout history, culture has been indispensable for the state to create a 
collective psyche of a population that distinguishes the population from others and 
inspires allegiance to the state. Then, it is considered a useful tool to govern state 
members through providing a ‘proper’ way of life and historical perspective, lifestyle, 
ethics, etc. (Miller & Yúdice, 2002). Given that culture is understood as creating the 
symbolism of political relationships that exist in a society in policy contexts, many states 
consider culture as a constitutional obligation to protect and manage as an element of 
citizenship, which provides legitimation for state intervention in this domain (Yúdice, 
2003; Paquette, 2019).  
In relation to culture, the state designs and implements various policies, which 
refer to “all processes, formal and informal, where actors with different degrees of power 
and autonomy (Raboy & Padovani, 2010, 160)”, to (re)establish the relationship between 
the state and cultural production through creating certain popular culture, enhancing 
their international prestige, and protecting domestic cultural goods and services from 
foreign influences, etc. (Lebovics, 2011). To make culture sustainable, states mobilize 
cultural institutions and heritage to work on reproducing and propagating collective 
identities and uniting the population, as well as implementing various types of 
assistance, financial support, labour and trade policies, and regulations to promote the 
development of domestic cultural goods (Throsby, 2010; Paquette, 2019). 
Much of cultural production is commercialized and marketized as capital 
becomes the main patron of cultural works, replacing the state’s position. However, 
culture becomes more important for policymakers as it is deeply involved in “everything 
in our social life—from economic value and state power to social and political practices 
and the very structure of the psyche itself—can be said to have become ‘cultural’ 
(Jameson, 1991, 48)”. In this regard, the value-judgement process of cultural works has 
been outweighed by their external values, mostly economic profitability, rather than their 
artistic and aesthetic values (Yúdice, 2003; Banks, 2017; Fung, 2018). Granted, such a 
tendency is an outcome of neoliberalization that is heavily influenced by globalization 
driven by transnational capital. 
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The state’s approach to culture with an instrumentalist viewpoint becomes more 
intensive in relation to neoliberal reforms that require the state to withdraw from 
managing society. As the state is forced to withdraw itself from various social projects, 
cultural resources are understood as substitutes to solve different problems in the public 
sector alongside market logics (Yúdice, 2003). In addition to this, recent emphases on 
the economic potentials of culture and artistic creativity in the market encourage the 
state to further utilize culture against its artistic and aesthetic origins, despite the 
criticism that the economic value of culture in the market has not been adequately 
calculated to legitimize the state’s promotion of marketizing culture (Hesmondhalgh & 
Pratt, 2005; Belfiore, 2009). In this regard, cultural policies become increasingly 
underpinned by culture’s extrinsic values such as its contribution to the economy and 
other political and social efficacies rather than its intrinsic values of promoting artistic 
creativity (Raboy & Padovani, 2010; Throsby, 2010). Despite ongoing marketization and 
globalization of culture, the state’s position should not be underestimated, as the 
aesthetic quality of cultural works and their political and social values have been 
determined by state apparatuses that have explicit and implicit mandates to establish 
cultural norms. Through various policy methods such as financing, labour regulation, 
legal and institutional frameworks, and trade barriers, the state continues to intervene in 
its cultural industries to instrumentalize them for the sake of its political-economic 
missions in the era of neoliberal globalization.  
1.3. Key Theoretical Concepts: Neoliberal Globalization, the 
State, and Cultural Industries 
For decades, globalization and neoliberalism have been long-time objects of 
debate as they influence numerous groups worldwide. In general, neoliberalism refers to 
a set of political-economic, social, and cultural forces and ideas which puts competition 
of the market system as the main impetus of social life (Wilson, 2018). In a neoliberal 
world, the state relinquishes public infrastructures since they adhered to bureaucratic 
ideas and increased dependency on its institutions, which would result in impeding 
individual liberties that should be driven by free markets. As long as the promotion of an 
individual’s property rights became a driving force of neoliberalism, the capitalist market 
system would mean more than a mere arena where goods are exchanged, and their 
values are determined. Instead, it would become the basis for every aspect of society to 
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promote individualism driven by market freedoms. Following this argument, the state 
moved to promote marketizing public resources, deregulating industries and managed 
social welfare with economic logics. This fostered the financialization of economy that 
would let the financial system be run by private capital which would control the economic 
system (Harvey, 2016).  
As neoliberalism and its tenets became hegemonic, all elements in society, 
including culture, were compelled to calculate the gains and losses of market values and 
to seize a competitive edge over others so that they survive in the endless competition 
(Neyland, Ehrenstein & Milyaeva, 2019). Given that culture meant “a general process of 
intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development” and “the works and practices of 
intellectual and especially artistic activity (Williams, 1976, 80)”, the impacts of neoliberal 
discourse on the cultural domain entail significant changes to both culture itself as well 
as state authorities that sponsored culture as major patrons. For culture, where intrinsic 
values were determined by their artistic creativity and symbolic values that would 
represent distinctive social characteristics, emphasizing its monetary value with the 
market mechanisms would devalue artistic and social values—which differentiated the 
value chain of cultural industries from other businesses and legitimized the state’s 
interventions (Yúdice, 2003; Mansell & Raboy, 2011).  
Since ideas of neoliberalism penetrated policy contexts and became embedded 
in policy planning and implementation, policymakers of cultural policies had to prove how 
the state’s supports for artists and entrepreneurs would benefit the market. As a 
response, instead of providing “institutional supports that channel both aesthetic 
creativity and collective ways of life—a bridge between two registers (Miller & Yúdice, 
2002, 1)”, they argued in favour of culture’s efficacy in various socioeconomic projects 
such as urban regeneration, literacy campaigns, and different social inclusion programs 
which the state had previously managed with its public funds (Aherene, 2009; Kong, 
2014). Most of all, the state publicly expressed a new perspective where elements of 
culture would be major resources for generating new economic systems which would 
represent a new phase of capitalist development, along with buying and selling cultural 
experiences (Flew, 2012). Then, cultural policies had to prioritize the economic 
potentials of recipients with market dynamics, which resulted in policies that reflected 
interests from private stakeholders rather than drawing from the symbolic values of art 
and culture itself. In this regard, traditional roles of the state as a patron of culture 
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seemed to be weakened along with its retreat from the public sector, and its roles were 
replaced by industrial and commercial logics of the market. The conjuncture with 
neoliberalism and its related policies and practices brought along further 
instrumentalization of culture (Yúdice, 2003; Banks, 2017).  
Meanwhile, globalization, which refers to “the widening, deepening and speeding 
up of worldwide interconnectedness, in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the 
cultural to the criminal, the financial, to the spiritual (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 
1999, 2)”, also challenged the state’s sovereignty and power in society. Thanks to the 
development of digital communication technologies and a growing interpenetration of 
capital, globalization disregards borders between nations and replaces their distinctive 
identities with transnational and cosmopolitan consciousness and dialogues (Kellner, 
2002; Pieterse, 2015). Along with the rise of a single market economy and a single 
production chain of goods and services, globalization is often understood as an 
irresistible and irreversible phenomenon and restructuring of global order (Negri & Hardt, 
2000).  
Driven by the increase of interconnectedness in economy, trade, and migration 
worldwide, advocates of globalization highlight the importance of multinational 
corporations, international organizations, and transnational cultural groups that take on 
key roles in governing both the economy and society and serve as main players and 
global forces (Griva & Chryssochoou, 2015). Indeed, the impacts of globalization on 
individual nation-states have been unprecedented in many ways. Driven by the success 
of modernized countries equipped with advanced culture, political-economic and social 
systems, and technologies, globalization is understood by theorists and activists as an 
opportunity to modernize less-developed countries in the form of imitating the West 
through developing economies and enhancing human capital through education 
(Martinelli, 2005; Holton, 2016; Jin, 2020a). Furthermore, it becomes evident that 
multinational corporations and financial capital in industries and markets have become 
more important in many national economies. Based on the notion that the economy acts 
as “the prime mover of social and cultural change (Ampuja, 2004, 68)”, the presence of 
such social institutions signifies both the integration of the global economic system and 
the concentration of economic and cultural power in the hands of US-based 
conglomerates. This raises concern surrounding the intensification of existing structural 
asymmetries between advanced countries and less-developed countries, and the 
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consolidation of the vested interests of a few wealthy countries and their capital (Held & 
McGrew, 2007; Piketty, 2014).  
As globalization and its building blocks, including transnational corporations and 
international organizations, became more prominent in the market and politics, many 
have argued that it would challenge the fundamentals of nation-states and erode their 
power. In detail, the growing dominance of capital-intensive industries in the global 
economy, and many private enterprises in finance, industry and trade began to 
transform the economic domain as transborder space. In this space, the rule of property 
rights would outweigh national sovereignty and undermine the distinction of foreign and 
domestic (Negri & Hardt, 2000; Jessop, 2016; Slobodian, 2018). Furthermore, cutting-
edge technologies, many of which belonging to transnational capital directly or indirectly, 
also contributed to reforming the fundamentals of national economies as well as its 
capital accumulation system from territory-based to market-based (Garner, 2016). To 
increase control over the society and the nature of economy, transnational capital and 
other non-state players sought to neutralize statehood (Ohmae, 1995; Strange, 1996). 
Meanwhile, as the financial and market systems became more integrated, supranational, 
regional, and local actors become involved in the decision-making of policies along with 
national governments (Chakravartty & Sarikakis, 2006). For advocates of globalization, 
the pre-existing state system was insufficient and inadequate to new tasks that it was 
called upon to perform (Giddens, 2002).  
Combined with arguments of neoliberalism, transnational capital—including 
multinational corporations, banks, and other private equity firms many of which are US-
based—has attempted to penetrate domestic cultural domains and weaken the power of 
various states. For decades, both US cultural businesses and their government 
consistently attempted to override the cultural sovereignty of other states. Unlike the 
state’s emphasis on the unique characteristics of cultural forms—which serve to improve 
democratic accountability, promote distinctive national identities, and develop various 
types of individual and social creativity, etc. as public goods—global media 
conglomeration pushed deregulation and privatization of cultural goods and services 
toward the market by proclaiming them as general goods (Chakravartty & Sarikakis, 
2006; Flew, 2012). Combined with the growth of private cultural businesses in domestic 
markets, including broadcasting and telecommunication industries, the following 
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marketization of culture also challenged the state’s position in cultural industries (Flew, 
2012). 
As globalization and neoliberalism push individual states to withdraw and replace 
their presence with the overwhelming logics of a single and free market system, many 
believed that an increase in international migration and global flows of capital, media and 
technologies would reshape culture as more transnational (Appadurai, 1990). Arguing 
that both technologies and networks are open-ended and multi-edged structures without 
fixed boundaries, they proclaimed that “the state becomes just a node (however 
important) of a particular network (Castells, 2013, 19)” along with other players that 
could constitute a new environment of multilayered globalization that applied to the 
cultural domain. Combined with the mounting pressure from the US’s international trade 
regimes to recognize cultural products as general goods and thereby opening domestic 
markets, as well as the continuing dominance of US media conglomerates in the global 
cultural market, the changing nature of culture itself towards borderless and 
transnational characteristics seemed to be another challenge for state power in the 
cultural domain (Murdock & Choi, 2018).  
Despite these growing influences, however, it is premature to conclude that the 
state’s power in the cultural domain is in decline and that statehood is overpowered by 
transnational corporations backed by free-market mechanisms and their strong 
supporters—notably the US government. Most of all, much of the nature of neoliberalism 
is an outcome implemented by the state’s constant efforts of privatizing and creating 
market societies (Jones, 2012; Wilson, 2018). Indeed, the market system, including free-
market logics, is not a priori, and characteristics of both the capitalist system and the 
market are shaped not only by their inherent capitalist logics but also their relationship to 
state power (Polanyi, 2001[1944]). To become a society in which neoliberal doctrines 
rule the economy, adherents argue the government should not only deregulate or 
privatize public resources but also impose stricter regulations to control the population 
and rescue financial capital during crises as a last resort. Indeed, even in the 1990s and 
the 2000s when neoliberal practices and arguments were considered to be at their peak 
in the global arena, neoliberalism was far from having such a worldwide impact and 
much of its implementation depended on an individual state’s active involvement (López-
Alves & Johnson, 2019).  
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Such a paradox shows that doctrines of neoliberalism, which pressure the state 
to relinquish control and management of the exchange and allocation of goods and 
services to free market mechanisms, requires the state to perpetually engage in both 
making the market ‘free’ and implementing the ‘free-market’ economy (Jessop, 2016). In 
other words, fundamentals of this political and economic hegemony are based on a 
dialectical relationship—between political activities of state apparatuses as territorial 
power and capitalistic logics empowered by the activities of companies and their process 
of capital accumulation—that benefits both (Harvey, 2005). The relationship between 
transnational capital and states is more symbiotic than uneven or unequal (Bulut, 2016). 
Indeed, the state only recognizes the dominance of capitalists and is willing to yield its 
sovereignty to capital in the economic system because their extensive and extractive 
capacities of utilizing resources, combined with their vast infrastructural power, benefits 
the state in the control of the lives of all subjects effectively. In other words, the state 
adopts and engineers a neoliberal model as a mechanism of its economic growth and 
social reforms as the model corresponds to what the state wants (Wood, 2002; Ip, 
2018). 
Moreover, globalization has been contested in recent years as its credos and 
practices driven by market and economic integration are challenged by left-wing and 
right-wing sentiments. Combined with widespread public discontent with economic 
globalization and skepticism surrounding the increased movement of minorities—notably 
immigrants, ethnic, racial, and religious minorities, women, and gender minorities—anti-
globalization arguments and prioritization of national interests have reshaped 
mainstream politics in many countries including Brazil, Italy, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States (Mishra, 2017; Steger & James, 2019). In these countries, both right-
wing and left-wing populists gained political success by eliciting widespread support from 
voters who saw themselves as victims of globalization and neoliberalization, particularly 
surrounding the decline of the manufacturing industry due to the relocation of factories 
overseas, and the increasing influx of immigrants, both of which are outcomes of 
neoliberal globalization practices (Roth, 2018; Hays, 2019). condemning these changes, 
such populist politicians and their voters denounced mechanisms of globalization and 
sought to prioritize the interests of domestic workers and companies (Steger, 2019; 
Goldberg, 2020).  
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In effect, in countries where right-wing populists seized political power, resulting 
governments sought ways to reemphasize national sovereignty through the introduction 
of protectionist measures and stricter immigration policies (Eklundh, 2018; Stiglitz, 
2018a). In the form of unilateral assertions in diplomacy, restrictions on immigration, and 
emphases on patriotism and traditional values, many such doctrines prioritized their own 
nation’s interests over collaboration with other countries (Druckman, 2019; Hart, 2020). 
Despite differing political backgrounds among populists, their approaches to national 
sovereignty in governing the economy and society both questioned the triumph of 
neoliberal globalization in global politics.  
Of course, this is not to underestimate the prevalence of neoliberalism and 
globalization in every aspect of people’s lives. Despite populist groups’ emphasis on 
national sovereignty and accusations of ‘beneficiaries’ of globalization—such as ‘so-
called’ international financial elites who promoted economic integration and benefited 
from the single market at the expense of ordinary people’s lives, and immigrants who 
would aggravate social disorder and steal jobs—both the national economy and society 
are highly interconnected to those of other countries and irrevocable (Steger, 2019). 
Much of the domestic market mechanisms is strongly influenced by the global financial 
system while the state exercise leverages with various fiscal and industrial policy 
frameworks. Such interconnectedness often makes the state foster globalization 
proactively to survive in the global market (Goldberg, 2020). Also, an influx of immigrants 
often benefits the economy by bringing higher productivity and innovation that is 
essential to create more jobs (Bahar, February 7, 2017). When it comes to sociocultural 
changes, globalization has disarmed the resistance of national communities to foreign 
cultures as well as the consumption of foreign products and value systems, albeit very 
slowly in some regions (Oberoi & Hansall, 2018).  
Considering creeds of neoliberalism and globalization not only serve the interests 
of global forces but also some major players in domestic markets, it is premature to 
conclude that backlashes against globalization with prioritizing national interests 
undermine the fundamentals of neoliberal globalization. Despite growing skepticism and 
antagonism against global market integration, there are still several players in society 
who take advantage of globalization and their political, economic, and social power in 
both global and domestic arenas are significant (Hays, 2019). In that sense, it is more 
rational to say that the relationship between the nation-state system and forces of 
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neoliberal globalization is both complementary and confrontational rather than one-
sided. By collaborating and colliding with global market forces depending on its political 
and economic interests, the state can sustain and revisit its power in the era of 
globalization.  
Such dynamics between the state and global forces apply to govern cultural 
industries as well. The state cannot withdraw statehood from culture and let the market 
govern this domain because culture is fundamental to constructing citizenship and a 
sense of belonging in a given population by providing a distinctive collective identity 
which is its raison d’être of the nation-state system (Miller & Yúdice, 2002). Indeed, the 
state still retains various policy instruments to retain input into the future of its culture, 
including artists, businesses and platforms that strive to rise above national boundaries 
(Flew & Waisbord, 2015). Considering what differentiates cultural products from other 
merchandise are mandates to sustain political orders of the society such as promoting 
democratic virtues and propagating statist ideologies, it is not possible for the state to 
completely retreat from culture (Waisbord & Morris, 2001). 
Despite heavy pressures from the US government and their large conglomerates, 
many states strive to independently manage their cultural market and industries. Many 
states impose various trade barriers and regulatory measures like censorship, tariffs, 
and quotas to protect their domestic markets from imported cultural products. Along with 
protectionist regulations on trade, they promote domestic companies with a variety of 
support programs including tax benefits, technological supports, and direct funding 
towards the production and distribution of domestic cultural products so that domestic 
players can compete with foreign players. Most importantly, many countries and groups 
of countries, including the European Union and Canada, have been involved in setting 
norms of cultural trade and have sought to secure their cultural sovereignty (Garner, 
2016). By submitting lists of exemptions to free trade and protectionist measures like 
subsidies and institutional supports, national governments designed the form of 
globalization of cultural industries (Beale, 2002). As this research examines with the 
case of Korean cultural industries, there are ways that the state can intervene in 
globalizing its cultural businesses. 
The state exerts its influences on the cultural domain through developing 
technologies as well. Although it is true that technologies open up new possibilities to 
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bypass the state’s control, much recent technological development is in part made by 
the state’s intervention (Oh & Larson, 2011). Despite their borderless nature, platforms 
and networks that serve as major impetuses of globalization, many of their 
achievements and activities are motivated by state actors. The state exerts its power in 
technological development through various support programs for domestic companies, 
licensing service providers, building up infrastructure, and setting up certain technologies 
as the standard. Besides, the state has authorities to block, filter, and regulate content in 
the name of the public interest (Mueller, 2013). Granted, such policy outcomes are 
subject to the state’s political interests (Tawil-Souri, 2015). In this regard, the state takes 
part in governing and developing technologies as a major stakeholder. Given that much 
of the globalization of cultural industries is driven by cutting-edge technologies, this also 
makes the state engage in the cultural domain. 
Hence, in the era of neoliberal globalization which prioritizes free-market 
principles over other rules and customs, the state remains to be a heavyweight player in 
the cultural domain including the market and industries. Such a globalization system 
serves to the benefit of the US and its few Western allies and their capital, and the state 
never ceases to wield its authority over controlling its society (Harvey, 2005). Its right to 
legislate laws and ratify treaties persists. Even in a global system, the state continues to 
exist as a fundamental pillar of the system and remains as a fundamental point of 
reference at every level from individual to supranational players (Waisbord & Morris, 
2001). Both the state and the nation continue their involvement in various practices 
which produce, distribute, and consume cultural goods and services even as the nature 
of cultural production becomes more globally dispersed (Govil, 2009). In the same 
context, it also plays pivotal roles in managing cultural production through policy 
measures even if the chain of production becomes more transnational (Chin, 2003). In 
sum, the state continues to perform as a “significant locus of cultural identity and 
political-economic centrality (Aronczyk, 2013, 186)” in the cultural domain. So, what 
would be the distinctive characteristics of the Korean state’s intervention in its cultural 
businesses? 
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1.4. The Korean State’s Approach to Developing Cultural 
Industries 
There are reasons why studying the roles of the Korean state in developing 
Korean cultural industries is important. First of all, the nation’s cultural businesses, 
including film and music, are now recognized as major pop cultural factories in the global 
market. Given that the presence of Korean cultural products was limited to the East 
Asian region and its effects on promoting a national image were marginal until the 
2000s, analyzing the state’s position in the cultural domain would be crucial to explain 
how the nation’s cultural goods became prominent in the global market in recent years 
(Aronczyk, 2013; Jin, 2016). Second, compared to other hubs in the global cultural 
industries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, in which artists and 
entrepreneurs have a long history of targeting global audiences, the presence of Korean 
cultural industries in the international market is an interesting phenomenon because its 
history of exports to foreign markets is relatively short. Granted, the state’s active 
strategies of promoting industries and various support programs were significant in 
promoting cultural businesses' desire to expand their market overseas. Finally, Korean 
cultural products are hybrid in their nature and much of their popularity is driven by 
digital platforms and smart devices, which are all pillars of globalization (Jin, 2017; Ryoo 
& Jin, 2018).  
Understanding the roles of the Korean state in relation to the birth and growth of 
the Korean Wave is important as its policy schemes contributed to attracting investment 
from the nation’s major conglomerates. Furthermore, it also shows how the state 
responds to the flow of globalization in the cultural domain, which had been traditionally 
considered as the state’s political tool to promote its ideologies for justifying its control 
over the population and arousing national consciousness. Given that the nature of 
Korean cultural industries has become more transnational, and the market becomes 
increasingly borderless, analyzing their relationship with the state sheds light on how the 
state reconfigures its position in its cultural politics where its mechanics are subject to 
transnational capital and market logics that often argue for the retreat of the state from 
culture.   
The Korean state has led the development of its cultural industries through 
mobilizing and allocating private and public resources and engaging in the production 
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and distribution of cultural goods and services with a series of direct and indirect 
measures. Such a state’s deep involvement in its cultural industries could be possible 
due to its legacies of the developmental state—an economic development system in 
which the state wields its power and authority over mobilizing all public and private 
resources and legitimizes such measures in the name of developing the nation (Chang, 
1999). As a developmental state, the Korean state initiated a series of pan-governmental 
programs to create and develop new industries in the 1960-1970s. Along with the state’s 
financial and institutional support, family-owned major conglomerates, often known as 
Chaebols in Korean, cooperated with development masterplans and expanded their 
business into these industries.8 Thanks to the state’s support, many entrepreneurs—
whose businesses had produced light industry goods including construction, cosmetics, 
and food products—were able to invest in new businesses such as automobiles, 
electronics, petrochemistry, and shipbuilding, and make inroads into foreign markets. In 
this regard, the rapid growth of the Korean economy in the late 1960s to 1980s was an 
outcome of the collaboration between the state’s leadership in mobilizing and allocating 
resources and the private entrepreneurship of major companies. Despite criticism of a 
corrupt relationship between political and business circles, cooperation between the 
state and Chaebols became the main mechanism of the Korean developmental state 
(Lim, 2012).  
Such a relationship between the state and leading conglomerates was vital to the 
development of Korean cultural industries (Jin, 2016). In the early 1990s, the Korean 
state introduced several masterplans for developing and promoting cultural industries as 
part of transforming the national economy into a service-driven economy with higher 
 
8 A Chaebol refers to a mega-industrial conglomerate in which a system is fully controlled by the 
owner and his/her families. These family-controlled business groups make up many diversified 
affiliates and its management rights are transferred through generations in ownership, which is 
consolidated by cross-shareholding among subsidiaries. Much of a Chaebol’s success and 
expansion of its business was owing to the state’s concentrated supports with tax benefits and 
financial subsidies, trade protection, public-private consultation, and research and development 
with public institutions, etc. From the state’s perspective, large and heavily capitalized 
corporations were effective systems to realize its export-oriented industrialization model towards 
economic development and they were easy to mobilize under its control. Indeed, Korea’s 
development of heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s and the information technology 
industry in the 1980s and 1990s were outcomes of symbiotic relationships between the state and 
Chaebols (Lim, 2012). In return for the state’s preferential treatment, these family-businesses 
were expected to participate in state-led development projects by investing their capitals and 
resources and fund major political parties. Such a close relationship between political and 
business circles became hotbeds of corruption throughout the nation’s history.  
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value-added businesses. In the belief that utilizing electronics with cultural software 
would be more important than producing electronic equipment in the future economy, the 
state encouraged Chaebols to invest in cultural businesses including the film and 
television industry by providing incentives (Jin, 2011b). In detail, it enacted a series of 
laws and regulations to deregulate industries that had been under the state’s strong 
political and economic control. Also, the state established several public agencies 
dedicated to directly support cultural businesses, which functioned as major financial 
sources for small and medium-size producers.  
Following the state’s schemes such as the deregulation of the media market in 
the late 1980s and the introduction of new distribution platforms such as cable television 
in 1995, major conglomerates including Samsung and Hyundai expanded their 
businesses to various cultural industries. Along with an infusion of their capital into the 
market, such companies’ participation laid the groundwork for restructuring the 
fundamentals of industries that had been previously dominated by small businesses. For 
instance, based on its strength of home electronics in the market, Samsung merged 
different media production businesses which had initially been managed by its 
subsidiaries—including Cheil Communications (a marketing company) Samsung 
Electronics, Samsung Corporation (a general trading company), and Star Max (a video 
importer and film production company)—and established Samsung Entertainment Group 
in 1995 to expand its business to produce films, popular music, and television (Chung, 
December 17, 2007).9  
Until 1999, when Samsung withdrew itself from cultural production in the 
aftermath of the nation’s financial crisis, Samsung Entertainment Group’s contributions 
to cultural production were significant. Notably, in film production, Samsung employed 
an advanced production system adopted from Hollywood that included practices such as 
separating financing and production tasks, and the systematization of marketing, 
distribution, and accounting (So et al., November 12, 2000). Most of all, Samsung 
 
9 Prior to the establishment of Samsung Entertainment Group in 1995, the conglomerate’s several 
subsidiaries had already been involved in media business (Chung, December 17, 2007). For 
instance, Cheil Communication produced television dramas such as In the Midst of Life (1994, 
broadcast by Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation) and documentaries like Hospital 24 (1994, 
broadcast by Seoul Broadcasting System) (Yonhap News, April 12, 1994; Yonhap News, May 25, 
1994). In addition to this, it had both a newspaper company (Joong-Ang Ilbo) until 1999 and a 
television broadcaster (Tongyang Broadcasting Company, TBC) until 1980 (Kim D., 2018). 
Needless to say, these experiences became pivotal to Samsung’s entry into cultural industries. 
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Pictures, the company’s film production studio, produced the action film Shiri in 1999, 
the first big-budget blockbuster Korean film, on which the company spent 3.1 billion 
KRW (2.7 million USD). The megahit of Shiri in the box office - raking in 36 billion KRW 
(33.1 million USD) - became a major touchstone in the nation’s film industry and proved 
film businesses could make big profits (Kim JH., February 13, 2019). Along with 
Samsung, other Chaebols such as Hyundai and Daewoo invested in cultural industries 
in the form of owning a cable channel broadcaster (Hyundai and Daewoo), multiplex 
theatres (Daewoo), and newspapers (Hyundai). Despite their withdrawal from cultural 
production in the midst of the nation’s financial crisis in the late 1990s, the entry of first-
tier Chaebols meant heavy inflows of investment into cultural industries. Also, it 
encouraged second-tier Chaebols— such as CJ and Lotte in which cultural businesses 
became their core business—to expand their interests to cultural production (Jin, 
2011b). As Shiri’s success demonstrated, their strong financial prowess not only 
reshaped the structure of the cultural industries as capital-intensive ones but also 
developed large-scale cultural goods.  
The importance of cultural industries in the policy context became more crucial in 
the aftermath of the nation’s financial crisis in 1997. A number of manufacturing 
businesses went bust due to rounds of the credit crunch, which led the state to improve 
the economic structure and lay the groundwork for economic improvement with new 
industries. In this regard, the government accelerated its programs of restructuring the 
economy with knowledge-driven businesses, including cultural industries. The growing 
popularity of several television series and popular music artists in China, Hong Kong, 
Japan, and Taiwan—the beginning of the Korean Wave—triggered the government to 
boost up industries as its strategic up-and-coming industry of the future.  
As the state recognized the economic potentials of cultural industries, it began to 
become involved in the production chain of various cultural goods and services. Starting 
from 1999, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) established several affiliations 
including the Korea Game Agency, the Korean Broadcasting Institute, and the Korea 
Culture and Content Agency, whose missions were to provide working spaces and 
mentorship, tax and financial benefits, technical supports, counselling on exports and 
promotion in overseas markets, etc. At often, the state’s contributions in cultural 
businesses were pan-governmental, as various governmental branches such as the 
Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Information and Communication 
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introduced programs for research and development which some companies in the 
cultural sector were available to apply. Furthermore, to target foreign markets, it even 
provided some guidelines in designing storylines and characters of content in the form of 
national competitions or state-led funding projects. Throughout introducing masterplans 
and implementing detailed schemes to develop and support cultural industries, the state 
became a major patron of industries (Lee, 2019a). Such a strong involvement of the 
state in culture for economic purposes represents the nation’s legacy as a 
developmental state. 
While the Korean Wave began as a cultural phenomenon, the Korean state 
understood it as an opportunity to strengthen its power and political and economic 
influence overseas. Various cultural forms, from pop idols and films to cuisine and 
traditional costumes, became instruments for improving the nation’s soft power, which 
refers to “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction 
rather than coercion or payment (Nye, 2008, 94).” In 2007, following the established 
British Council (the United Kingdom), Alliance Française (France) and Goethe Institut 
(Germany), MCT established the King Sejong Institute Foundation to spread and teach 
Korean language and culture in foreign countries.10 As of 2019, the Foundation has 180 
local branches in 60 countries. Such political and diplomatic efficacy of Korean cultural 
products was another driving force for the Korean state to engage in the cultural sector 
directly so that its cultural commodities would satisfy the state’s political and economic 
needs by improving its national image to foreign audiences (Nye & Kim, 2013; Al-Rawi, 
2020). Finally, the state’s interpretation of the Korean Wave is deeply related to 
nationalistic discourses as it has persistently emphasized the Korean Wave to promote 
the public’s national awareness by showing off how much Korean culture is popular and 
valued as high-quality content globally (Whang, 2015). Combined with the state’s 
constant effort of utilizing culture as an economic means, its viewpoints of the Korean 
 
10 Before the establishment of King Sejong Institute Foundation, Korean language education 
overseas had managed sporadically by Korean Cultural Centers, which were local branches of 
the Korean Culture and Information Service, an MCT affiliation for promoting Korean culture and 
accurate information for overseas publicity. However, the lack of universal education guidelines 
and teaching materials and methods highlighted the need to introduce a systematic approach to 
teach and promote Korean language overseas. Most of all, the mounting interest in the Korean 
culture in the wake of the Korean Wave also pushed the Ministry to establish an institution 
specialized in teaching Korean language as a means of promoting Korean culture as the means 
of yielding the nation’s soft power (Eom et al., 2019). 
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Wave as a political tool contributed to reducing aesthetic and creative values of culture 
to the basic extrinsic utility. 
In short, the Korean state played pivotal roles in both developing the Korean 
cultural industries and utilizing the Korean Wave for its political interests through a 
variety of policy initiatives. In this regard, understanding the relationship between the 
state and the Korean Wave shows how a global cultural phenomenon can serve as an 
instrument for accomplishing the state’s political and economic missions. This calls for a 
reconsideration of how we understand the state’s positions in cultural industries which 
have become increasingly dominated by the logic of neoliberal globalization which 
argues for the state’s withdrawal from culture and strives to manage culture with market 
dynamics.  
1.5. Research Methods and Data Collection 
Cultural policies, including cultural industry policies, are crucial in the cultural 
domain because they are an important part of understanding culture and contextualizing 
the present (Miller & Yúdice, 2002). With their instruments, including media, regulations, 
cultural institutions, and technologies, cultural policies aim at producing cultural citizens. 
In this regard, as cultural policies, including cultural industry policies, are about “the 
promotion or prohibition of cultural practices or values by governments, corporations, 
other institutions, and individuals (Throsby, 2010, 8)”, cultural industry policies are 
subject to political and economic dynamics of a given society as well as the institution’s 
characteristics, and embed and express preferred cultural values and represent the 
political power of the state. Through policies, the state decides the range of diversity and 
access to culture and the needs of the public (Lewis & Miller, 2003; Napoli, 2008). To 
coordinate, promote, and even control cultural industries, cultural industry policies, 
including policymaking processes and their implementations, are highly political.  
Moreover, understanding the state’s policies is important in the study of cultural 
industries because laws, regulations, and other institutional supports are important 
factors in defining various characteristics of the production and distribution of cultural 
merchandise (Druick, 2016). In this regard, policies should not be underestimated as 
mere instruments of the state or as basic regulatory tools (Freedman, 2008). If that is the 
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case, it becomes important to understand their meanings by asking “why is this policy in 
the form now and in whose interest is it designed? Neither policies nor their presentation 
should ever be taken at their face value (Garnham, 1998, 23).”  
Given that culture is a place where power is exercised, reinforced, and contested 
and is intertwined with a variety of sociocultural, technological, and political-economic 
factors and agents in private and public spaces and global and local spheres, policies 
are simply more than reflective and technical measures which merely mirror 
technological changes in cultural production and distribution systems (Mulcahy, 2006). 
Rather, they are outcomes representing the different interests of stakeholders in a 
society which are then blended with policymakers’ desires (Freedman, 2008). 
Considering this, policy analysis aims to examine “the ways in which policies in the field 
of communication are generated and implemented, as well as their repercussions or 
implications for the field of communication as a whole (Hansen et al., 1998, 67).” Based 
on this explanation, this dissertation investigates how the state repositions itself through 
policies in its cultural industries in which mechanisms are strongly influenced by logics of 
neoliberal globalization, with a focus on the Korean state. In detail, this study tries to 
answer the following questions. 
1. What are the roles of the Korean state in its cultural industries? 
a. What are the strategies of the Korean state for promoting its cultural 
industries? 
b. What are the distinctive characteristics of the Korean state’s strategies for 
developing cultural industries as the developmental state? 
c. How does the state reconfigures its position and roles in cultural production 
in response to globalization?  
2. How has the Korean state instrumentalized its cultural industries? 
a. What are political and economic imperatives that make the state intervene 
in cultural production?  
b. What are the ideological frameworks of the Korean state used to utilize 
cultural goods and services? 
c. How does the Korean state interpret the global popularity of Korean cultural 
products?  
3. What are the characteristics of the public-private relationship with the cultural 
industries in the era of the Korean Wave? 
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a. How do players in Korean cultural industries understand the state’s 
contributions to cultural industries? 
b. How does the private sector recognizes the Korean Wave? What does 
globalization mean to cultural production?  
c. What are the strategies for cultural producers to make the Korean Wave 
sustainable, and how are they reflected in their outcomes?  
Based on the above set of questions, I conducted semi-structured in-depth 
interviews with policymakers and cultural workers, and discourse analysis as my main 
research methods to examine the rationales of the Korean state’s approach to its cultural 
industries, supplemented by historical contextualization and the analysis of policy 
documents. To strengthen the discourse analysis, I will use newspaper articles, 
regulations, and other legal and policy documents to investigate both the historical 
backgrounds of the nation’s cultural industry policies and political and economic 
conditions that have influence in policymaking processes. 
Interviews are a useful method of asking for knowledge that resides in people’s 
minds in an undefined and invisible manner that cannot be observed without their 
behaviours (Brinkman & Kvale, 2015). The use of interviews is expected to provide a 
better understanding of an individual’s experiences and perspectives on the subject and 
works to validate and verify other information sources (Lindlof & Taylor, 2019). 
Considering that much of the policymaking processes remains invisible and offline and 
cannot be inferred through policy outcomes, interviews with people involved in the 
process of making policies are useful to explore how they interpret policies as a means 
of materializing their ideas (Schlesinger, Selfe & Munro, 2015). Considering that it is 
difficult to measure the contribution of each stakeholder to the cultural domain, 
interviews as a method can be an effective way of finding imperatives and implications of 
the state’s support for cultural businesses (Mulcahy, 2006).  
Given that the legacies of the developmental state and the state’s leading role in 
developing cultural industries, understanding the presences and roles of those who 
formulate and implement cultural industry policies becomes more important in the 
Korean context. In relation to this, although policies are understood as outcomes of a 
process that is mediated by multiple stakeholders, much of policymaking is still governed 
and dictated by elites, including politicians, bureaucrats, and top figures in cultural 
industries, etc. (Freedman, 2008). In this regard, interviews with policymakers are a 
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useful method to investigate how their thoughts and attitudes on culture are realized 
through policymaking (Herzog & Ali, 2015). While most such policymakers are unknown 
to the public, understanding their perspectives on culture is important considering the 
formulation and implementation of cultural policies are in the hands of bureaucrats who 
are often armed with technocratic expertise rather than artistic knowledge 
(Lewandowska, 2019).11  
In detail, I conducted interviews with 15 policymakers (Participant A–O) who 
have experiences working in the Ministry of Culture, Sport, and Tourism (MCST) and its 
executive bodies—the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA), the Korea Culture and 
Tourism Institute (KCTI), and the Korea Film Council (KOFIC), and the Korea 
Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE), etc.12 In addition to this, I 
additionally recruited two interviewees from a state-owned financial institution under the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) which provides low-interest financing for 
cultural businesses and a public institution affiliated with the Ministry of Science and ICT 
(MSICT) that manages the Ministry’s support programs on the broadcasting industry. 
Finally, I interviewed a professor at a university who has participated in a number of 
 
11 Technocrats refer to bureaucrats whose expertise is formulated and trained by techniques 
which are made by methods and analytics widely used in political science, economics, and 
management, etc. Since they shape professional self-interest of bureaucrats, such techniques 
are often employed to cope with public problems and improve the ‘efficiency’ of public services 
(Lewandowska, 2019). Combined with evaluating policies with positivist and empirical indicators 
in which mechanisms emphasize empirical evidence valued by scientific measurements (e.g., 
profitability) rather than artistic creativity or other intrinsic values of culture, technocrats shape 
institutional contexts of cultural institutions (Khan, 2019). Needless to say, their approach to the 
cultural domain often collides with private sector advocates for cultural industries and other 
bureaucrats who have backgrounds in the arts and media production. However, the power of 
technocrats is overwhelming in Korean bureaucracy, as the Korean government recruits more 
than 80% of the total number of bureaucrats from the pan-governmental civil service examination. 
Although it designates up to 20% of high official positions open to the public to reform the 
bureaucracy, the number is still minimal. This contributes to instrumentalizing their policy objects.  
12 Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) is a MCST-affiliated agency that is responsible for 
supporting and governing the nation’s cultural products. In cooperation with other public 
institutions, the agency provides various programs for cultural producers such as low-interest 
loans, technical training, entrepreneurship education, and the promotion of their products in 
foreign markets, etc. The Korea Culture and Tourism Institute (KCTI) is the Ministry’s official 
think-tank and is charged with evaluating and researching cultural industry policies. Korea Film 
Commission (KOFIC) is a state-funded self-regulating body under the Ministry that support film 
production through education, funding, and training. It also conducts sales promotion of Korean 
films in international markets. Finally, the Korea Foundation for International Cultural Exchange 
(KOFICE), a MCST-affiliated organization that manages cultural exchange programs and 
promote Korean culture overseas. Details of these organizations will be explained in following 
chapters.  
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advisory committees under the Ministry. All research participants have experience in 
formulating and implementing cultural industry policies and related programs that are 
related to the Korean Wave. The following Table 1.1 is the list of policymakers who 
participate in this research as interviewees. 
Table 1.1.  The list of research participants (cultural bureaucrats) 
Participant Affiliation 
Participant A An affiliation of MCST 
Participant B An affiliation of MCST 
Participant C An affiliation of MCST 
Participant D An affiliation of MCST 
Participant E An affiliation of MOEF 
Participant F MCST (retiree) 
Participant G An affiliation of MCST 
Participant H MCST (retiree) 
Participant I An affiliation of MCST 
Participant J An affiliation of MCST 
Participant K An affiliation of MSICT 
Participant L An affiliation of MCST 
Participant M MCST 
Participant N MCST 
Participant O A professor at a university who is affiliated with 
MCST’s various advisory committees 
 
In addition to this, I also interviewed staff working in cultural industries who are 
involved in producing and distributing cultural products. When it comes to understanding 
cultural industry policies, their positions and roles are important because they are major 
policy objects. These Interviews with cultural workers was inspired by the tradition of 
production studies—which involves examinations of “the cultural producers and of the 
organizational sites and practices they inhabit and through which they exercise their 
power (Garnham, 1995, 65)”—aimed at investigating how shifting experiences, policies, 
and structures are manifested in cultural production (Druick & Deveau, 2015). That said, 
voices of cultural producers can shed light on the larger contexts of industrial shifts, 
political-economic imperatives, and regional dynamics—all of which also serve as 
important considerations for planning and implementing cultural industry policies (Lee & 
Jin, 2018).  
On one hand, understanding how cultural producers interpret policies is 
important as the state’s measures toward developing and promoting cultural industries 
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function as major elements that influence creativity and shape every process of cultural 
production and distribution (Jin, 2021). Indeed, the state’s measures toward culture (and 
sometimes other policies) can impact earnings, performance and business strategies 
that are subject to changes in policy outcomes (Rogers & Sparviero, 2011; Park, Lee & 
Seo, 2019). On the other hand, assuming that cultural workers and practitioners are 
subjects who contribute to making culture through the control of various settings and 
practices involved in production narratives, their reflections and evaluations of policy 
measures provides important context toward understanding the inner workings of 
cultural production more broadly (Mayer, Banks & Caldwell, 2009; Lee & Jin, 2018). 
Moreover, their practices in cultural production are deeply connected to broader social 
relations. In this regard, not only their goods and services but also their identities, 
positions, and roles are important to consider in order to better understand the nature of 
cultural industries (Mayer, 2011; Lee & Jin, 2018). Thus, by shedding light on their 
experiences, interactions, and observations, interviews with cultural workers will 
contribute to understanding how cultural workers reinterpret policies and what industrial 
needs are, which are often neglected in analysis of cultural industries (Mayer, 2016).  
Based on this explanation, I interviewed 10 cultural workers who are working as 
creators and producers in the nation’s audiovisual businesses focusing on film, music, 
and television—which have led the globalization of Korean cultural industries and the 
Korean Wave. Each research participant has at least 5 years of experience in cultural 
production. The following Table 1.2 is the list of cultural workers in the field of cultural 
production who participated in this research as interviewees.  
Table 1.2. The list of research participants (cultural workers) 
Participant Occupation and industrial field 
Participant P Television producer 
Participant Q Television producer / distribution business 
Participant R Television producer / entertainment agency  
Participant S Television producer / distribution business 
Participant T Film marketer at a production studio 
Participant U Film marketer at a production studio 
Participant V Film producer 
Participant W Music producer 
Participant X Webtoon artist  
Participant Y Television producer / an executive of a broadcaster 
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All the interviews were semi-structured, one-on-one, and in-depth with an hour 
and a half-length on average, and all participants were extended ongoing informed 
consent. As research participants in this study work and represent various organizations, 
all interviews were anonymized, and participant information was kept confidential. 
Ensuing anonymity holds twofold importance: respecting participant privacy maintains 
the safety and reputation of participants (Brinkman & Kvale, 2015). It also provides 
space for individuals to comfortably discuss their opinions regarding the state’s approach 
to cultural industries and their perspective about the relationship between the Korean 
state and various industries. Along with interviews, to better contextualize, enrich, or 
problematize responses from research participants, this study uses relevant policy 
documents, press articles, and interviews of leading figures in cultural industries as 
supplementary data to support, compare or counter statements of research participants.  
The findings of interviews provide how different actors, arguments, arenas, and 
controversies are intertwined in policymaking and its outcomes (Freedman, 2008). By 
comparing the experiences and thoughts of policymakers and cultural workers all of 
whom are involved in the same field, this study expects to find similarities and 
differences how each group interprets culture and evaluates cultural industry policies. In 
other words, based on interviews with both policymakers who design and implement 
cultural industry policies and cultural workers who interpret policy outcomes in the field, 
the study explores the meanings of cultural industry policies—how they are constructed 
by policymakers and how their meanings are reinterpreted or contested by cultural 
workers (O’Brien & Miles, 2010; Herzog & Ali, 2015).  
Then, this study conducts discourse analysis of the findings of interviews as 
texts. In policy studies, a discourse can be explained as “‘patterns in social life, which 
not only guide discussions, but are institutionalized in particular practices’ (Hajer & Laws, 
2006, 260).” As a discipline and set of institutionalized practices of the state to effectively 
address its shared values, a discourse becomes materialized through setting the rules 
as a system (Streeter, 2013). Given that the practices of bureaucrats are also outcomes 
of constant negotiations within their ethical, intellectual, and political interests, and with 
broader institutional contexts, it is important to understand the rationales behind 
policymakers’ decisions to plan and implement specific policy frameworks (Bennett, 
2006; Khan, 2019). In this regard, discourse analysis focuses on the rules and meanings 
that shape the construction of political and sociocultural identities as historically, 
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contextually, and socially constructed practices by investigating “what structures, 
strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events 
play a role in these modes of reproduction (van Dijk, 1993, 250)”. In other words, by 
investigating social contexts, structures, and practices surrounding the text, this method 
aims to reveal dominance, inequalities, power relations, and stereotypes that construct a 
text’s meaning (van Dijk, 2001). 
Understanding discourses of policymaking and its outcomes is important since 
policymaking is subject to social and economic structures as well as the political 
ideologies the state and society pursue. This sees the formulation and implementation of 
cultural industry policies as outcomes of power struggles among various stakeholders 
(Vestheim, 2012). In this regard, the efforts of policymakers to interpret cultural 
phenomena and codify their perspectives through policymaking are important as long as 
their process of policymaking can be considered as a communicative practice with 
strategically articulated languages (Lentz, 2013). Their interpretation of phenomena and 
codification through policies, regulations, and materialization through various schemes 
are likely to be legitimized and reproduce the state’s dominance in the cultural domain 
(van Dijk, 1993; Ali, 2019). This becomes more crucial as the state’s position and 
influence on the cultural domain is believed to be challenged by various stakeholders of 
neoliberal globalization: policies indicate how the state sustains its position in the cultural 
domain. Meanwhile, interviews with figures in cultural production contribute to flourishing 
the study’s interpretation of discursive politics in the nation’s cultural industries by 
showing how power is exercised through policy outcomes.  
In terms of discourse analysis, this study focuses on identifying specific patterns 
of expression used by interviewees (Streeter, 2013). Given that the language used 
contains more than mere description, it analyzes how such expression patterns create 
meaning in conjunction with relevant materials—including policy documents, regulations 
and legal frameworks, statements from high officials and industrial figures, and media 
coverages—to find connections to broader practices and logics in society as contexts. 
Through exploring these contexts, this study expects to identify the political, economic, 
and social influences underlying research participants’ articulation, thereby discovering 
the politics of policymaking (Freedman, 2008). Finally, it examines discursive formations 
of the Korean state’s utilization of its cultural industries, as well as their global popularity, 
which are represented by policymaking. The formations are outcomes constructed and 
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consolidated by ideologies and thoughts that have been politically and historically 
dominant in both policy contexts and society (van Dijk, 1993; Streeter, 2013). 
Considering the state's power, understanding the discursive dynamics of policymaking is 
important as they influence how Korean society should interpret its cultural industries 
with which knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies (van Dijk, 1993; Wodak & Meyer, 2009).  
In short, by employing interviews and discourse analysis, the study aims at 
investigating the broader trends and power dynamics of cultural industries and how the 
state secures its interests and repositions its roles in culture industries against tides of 
neoliberal globalization. Throughout investigating broader political-economic and social 
contexts, structures, and practices surrounding the text, the study investigates 
underlying mechanisms and power dynamics of the Korean state’s cultural industry 
policies and their relationship to society. Considering that language used by 
policymakers and written in policies reflect power and ideologies, discourse analysis can 
shed lights on how a particular discourse directs how policy actors interpret reality, 
recognize problems, the directions they take to arrive at solutions (Hajer & Laws, 2006; 
Ali, 2019).  
1.6. Structure of the Work and Research Contributions 
The second chapter introduces how scholars have analyzed the relationship 
between neoliberal globalization and the state. Along with definitions of neoliberalism, 
globalization, and the state, the chapter focuses on controversies over the roles of states 
in the cultural realm. Despite skepticism surrounding state sovereignty, it concludes that 
the state continues to exercise considerable power in the cultural sphere and its 
stakeholders. The chapter also brings in discussions about the instrumentalization of 
culture in policy contexts. To better understand the concept of instrumentalization, the 
chapter introduces the rationales of cultural policies and the transition from cultural 
policies to cultural industry policies. While many scholars have examined the 
instrumentalization of culture in line with neoliberal doctrines, the chapter considers a re-
evaluation of the state’s reaction to an interpretation of cultural artifacts as a means of 
economic development and substitutes for public resources in line with deregulation and 
marketization. By doing so, this chapter explains the necessity of understanding both 
non-market aspects as well as economic objectives underlying the instrumentalization of 
culture. Then, the third chapter illustrates the history and characteristics of each 
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administration’s approach to cultural industries chronologically. Throughout the chapter, 
it emphasizes how the Korean state has planned and implemented policies and various 
support programs to cultural industries and how they reflect legacies of the 
developmental state.  
Subsequently, the fourth chapter examines the outcomes of analysis with several 
sub-chapters. Based on the findings, it explains how the state manages the flow of 
neoliberal globalization in the cultural realm through its policies, including regulations 
and various measures, and how they are understood in practice. Then, based on 
interviews with cultural workers, the fifth chapter discusses how the state situates itself 
and reconfigures its role in accordance with neoliberalism and globalization with respect 
to cultural industries, while it continues to instrumentalize culture to accomplish its 
political and economic missions. The concluding chapter will summarize the overall 
findings and arguments of the study and revisit the state’s roles in cultural industries as a 
powerful stakeholder in the era of globalization and neoliberalism. 
The findings of this research are expected to shed light on the impacts of policy 
measures designed and implemented by the Korean state. To date, research has 
examined the state’s proactive roles in the development of Korean cultural industries, 
with findings indicating that the state’s active contributions were pivotal to promoting 
investment from the private sector, constructing infrastructure necessary for the 
promotion of cultural businesses, and financing cultural production, etc. (Jin, 2011; Kwon 
& Kim, 2014). These and other methods used by the state as means of developing the 
cultural industries were far from neoliberal in practice, which demanded the state’s 
withdrawal from the market and favoured industrial development led by market forces 
with (free-)market-oriented mechanisms (Kim, 2017; Lee, 2019b). This reflects both the 
legacy of the Korean developmental state and the efficacy of cultural products for the 
state’s political and economic objectives (Lee J-Y., 2012; Jin, 2016; Ryoo & Jin, 2020).  
While much of this research is based on previous scholars’ findings, the study 
further explores discursive meanings of cultural industry policies which the state has 
designed and implemented to promote businesses in the field. The findings of this 
research not only reconfirm the state’s strong presence in cultural production but also 
detail the state’s responses to the changing dynamics in cultural industries as an 
outcome of the neoliberal globalization of industries. Based on the notion that the state’s 
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cultural policies reflect its role of mediating different social relations among stakeholders 
and their representation, the study explores how the Korean state’s approach to 
promoting cultural production cannot be understood as a simple dichotomy between the 
state’s withdrawal from the market and the state’s full control of cultural production 
(Beale, 1999).  
The findings of this research indicate that the state’s response to developing 
cultural businesses would be more ambivalent and symbiotic. Depending on political and 
economic conditions, each administration utilizes both state-developmentalist and 
market-oriented measures to develop cultural industries and reconsolidates its presence 
in cultural production as a major stakeholder. Through several policy imperatives as 
detailed cases, the findings demonstrate how the state reconfigures its position in the 
cultural domain and maintains power in the face of an influx of market forces and the 
increasing level of globalization. This study also details how the state continues to 
maintain its traditional objectives of cultural policies as political instruments to manage 
citizens and motivate national pride by illuminating how political-economic meanings of 
Korean cultural industry policies. In that sense, the findings provide some insights that 
can further understand how the state continues to utilize the cultural domain that is 
simultaneously commercialized and transnational in the era of neoliberal globalization.  
In terms of methods, this dissertation is also genuine in its attempt to provide a 
comprehensive overview of how to interpret Korean cultural industry policies through 
conversations with both cultural bureaucrats, who make policies and various support 
schemes, and cultural workers—who are the main recipients of policies. Furthermore, as 
the Korean state has fostered the industrialization of cultural production for the sake of 
economic development and other political missions, responses from the field about how 
industrialization has influenced the production of cultural products would provide a 
multifaceted perspective of policy formulation and implementation as well as underlying 
discourses, as cultural production reflects the power dynamics among various actors 
including the state, major corporations, and individual creators, etc. (Hesmondhalgh, 
2010; Druick & Deveau, 2015). Combined with this research’s ethnographic method 
(interviews), their lived experiences in the field and evaluation of the state’s promotion 
schemes can provide a more holistic understanding of the discursive meanings behind 
the management of the Korean cultural industries, as well as broader political and 
economic contexts that shape the nation’s cultural production. Given that policies are 
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important factors that shape the political and economic climate of creativity and make 
space for cultural production, such an approach that analyzes both policymakers and 
cultural workers contributes not only to cultural policy studies but also to the tradition of 
production studies (Druick & Deveau, 2015; Jin, 2021).  
In this regard, the analysis of both policymakers and targets of policies is 
important as it not only helps further understanding of how policies are interpreted in the 
field but also sheds light on the discursive framework of policymaking that becomes 
fundamental to the state’s approach to cultural industries. Therefore, both methods and 
the findings of this research can contribute to better unpacking political, economic, and 
social imperatives that have incentivized state intervention in the development and 
instrumentalization of the Korean cultural industries.  
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Chapter 2.  
 
Neoliberal Globalization, the State and Cultural 
Industries 
2.1. Introduction 
For decades, the cultural industries of individual countries have been challenged 
by both transnational and national capital. Backed by the US government and several 
organizations which advocate free trade of all products including media and cultural 
goods and services and elimination of all the restrictions that interrupt principles of the 
free market, a handful of Western media conglomerates have penetrated a number of 
local cultural markets and hold positions as major stakeholders in local industries. 
Thanks to their cutting-edge media technologies and clusters of cultural production 
equipped with well-developed infrastructures, skilled labour, and financial systems, US 
cultural products have become prominent in the global market (Thussu, 2018). In 
contrast, other nations lack the resources to develop cultural products with high 
commercial viability, impacting their ability to compete in the global market. With the 
advantages of technology, infrastructure, labour, and capital, transnational cultural 
forces led by US capital consolidate their power in the cultural domain and threaten local 
states’ presence in the field.  
Such pressure increasingly evidences when accounting for the adoption of 
neoliberal ideologies and practices, particularly the viewpoint that free-market logics 
would direct and promote individual action (including cultural or artistic creativity) and 
more accurately assess the value of cultural goods and services. Meanwhile, the rise of 
new technologies—including the Internet, smart devices, and platforms—also enabled 
the penetration of US-based tycoons into domestic markets. For instance, Netflix, a 
major online subscription video-on-demand (SVoD) service provider, provides its service 
has expanded to more than 190 countries. Its growing presence in local markets often 
challenges players in domestic cultural industries and disrupts existing media regulatory 
schemes (Cunningham & Scarlata, 2020). In the meantime, over 3.6 billion people use 
social media worldwide, most of them are US-based social media such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube (Statista, 2021). Such use of US platforms consolidated the 
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hegemonic power of US capital in the cultural domain and weakened local businesses in 
many countries. In a similar vein, measures based on neoliberal ideas and globalization 
seemed to limit, if not incapacitated, the state’s measures toward protecting and 
promoting domestic businesses and markets. Not surprisingly, many have expected a 
retreat of the state from the cultural realm and the rise of a transnational cultural sphere 
run by free-market mechanisms and communication technologies.  
This chapter is a response to such positions which argue that, in matters of 
culture, the state becomes weakened and replaced by the logics of globalization and 
neoliberalism. Throughout a brief overview of the concepts of neoliberalism and 
globalization, this chapter argues that the state’s power persists in the cultural realm as 
a prominent actor. Considering that neoliberalization requires the reengineering of 
capital accumulation systems to reinforce pre-existing political-economic and power 
structures, the state plays pivotal roles in materializing neoliberal ideas in policy contexts 
and interprets various arguments to satisfy its political, economic, and social mandates 
(Harvey, 2005).  
Meanwhile, the state also maintains its ability to manage the flow of global forces 
into the domestic realm by employing various policy packages. When it comes to cultural 
industries, this prominence becomes more evident given that the cultural industries are 
vital for the state to retain its sovereignty over the population. In this regard, 
neoliberalism and globalization do not necessarily bring about the retreat of the state 
from its culture. Rather, the state repositions its role in relation to neoliberalism and 
globalization to maintain its power in cultural politics through the development of a 
symbiotic relationship.  
2.2. Arguments of Neoliberal Globalization 
2.2.1. Ideas of Neoliberalism: A Brief Overview 
Whether officially recognized or not in policy contexts, neoliberalism is one of the 
most common ideologies and practices for societies and policies today. The term is 
widely understood as an ideology that argues for an institutional arrangement of the 
economy as well as society structured and influenced by doctrines of the free market, 
resulting in the prioritization of the market and private interests over any interventions on 
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the part of the state (Duménil & Lévy, 2005; Connell, 2010). In the belief that sustainable 
economic prosperity can only be realized through perfect competition driven by laws of 
supply and demand, it argues for the adoption of free-market principles based on the 
accumulation of resources by individual players as a fundamental mechanism to operate 
the society (Hayek, 2002; McGuigan, 2014). For neoliberals, an effective marketplace 
with free competition among private entities would be ideal for the exchange of goods 
and values.  
Neoliberalism is fundamentally based on the notion that the state and its 
bureaucrats are incapable of managing the economy (Dreiling & Darves, 2016). Arguing 
that artificial interventions in the market by politicians would result in a malevolent 
influence on the market and bring terrible outcomes, Milton Friedman (1953), one of the 
most enthusiastic advocates of neoliberalism, called for the market to be free from 
intervention, believing it would create societal benefit naturally as it operated. Underlying 
this belief is the assumption that state policies are the result of ineffective collaboration 
and bargaining with and among various stakeholders—based on a compromise between 
the working and capitalist classes most notably in the period after the Great Depression, 
which harms the competitiveness of the economic system (Duménil & Lévy, 2011; Gill-
McLure, 2013). Then, such a ‘collusion’ among economic players would distort the 
market mechanism of redistributing goods and weaken entrepreneurial spirits and 
morality. In this regard, neoliberals urge the state to lift ‘incompetent’ bureaucratic 
interventions and introduce measures of privatization and deregulation to improve the 
efficiency and productivity of the economy (Chang, 2004).  
By removing what are seen as unnecessary restrictions, such as reducing tax 
rates and regulations of enterprise capital, neoliberalism expects that free-market 
competition will benefit every participant in the end; the quality of goods will increase 
while prices decrease. Neoliberal tenets also argue that those unable to compete in the 
system will still eventually benefit through the cheaper pricing of commodities and have 
opportunities in employment provided by successfully competitive businesses, who will 
invest in other businesses as a means of further accumulating profit. Such a system of 
exchanging goods and values with an efficient and unfettered market mechanism would, 
according to neoliberal proponents, distribute resources the best, benefitting both 
economic growth and social organizations (Hardy, 2014). In relation to this, believing 
there are no discriminatory measures within the market mechanism that suppress those 
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who have different political views or cultural, ethnic, and racial backgrounds, Friedman 
(2002) argued that economic freedom is necessary to promote political freedom. Again, 
for advocates of neoliberalism, economic freedom would not be guaranteed if the state 
was involved in producing and exchanging goods and services.  
Granted, major tenets of neoliberalism—many of them developed out of distrust 
of state intervention— were opposed to Keynesian doctrines which provided the 
rationale for the state’s intervention in the market for decades. Skeptical of the idea that 
market equilibrium would be reached by maximum freedom of production and 
consumption by individuals based on self-interest, particularly because demand was not 
always met by available supply, Keynes (2018 [1936]) promoted the state’s active 
intervention in the market to maintain the balance of supply and demand in the form of 
expanding fiscal spending, increasing direct investment, and managing distribution of 
resources, etc. Focusing on reassuring private investors of the stability of the future 
economy, he believed such engagements by the state would be the essence of its fiscal 
policies. His ideas of increasing government expenditure became instrumental for the 
US to overcome the Great Depression in the 1930s. Despite claims that his arguments 
were assaults on free enterprise and laissez-faire economic freedom that consisted of 
traditional economic values, such efficacy made his argument prominent in many 
countries and legitimized state intervention in the market for decades (Skousen, 2007).  
Not surprisingly, neoliberal proponents greatly disliked Keynesianism’s 
domination in the market and policy development. In the belief that state intervention 
would discourage profit growth as a motive and weaken competition among financial 
sectors managing the capital market, neoliberalists argued to abolish measures that 
interrupted free-market principles and impeded what they saw as individual liberties 
(Hall, 1989). They seized the opportunity to submit their beliefs into policies in the late 
1970s when the British economy experienced a failure of price policies and applied to 
the International Monetary Fund for a bailout; while the US was in political and social 
turmoil over the backlash against the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal (Jones, 
2012). Such political and economic upheavals in these societies created an air of anxiety 
and legitimized the dismantling of existing economic principles and welfare policies in 
the name of overcoming the crisis (Klein, 2008). Backed by the US government and 
neoliberal economists, international financial organizations revamped their financing 
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schemes to coerce structural adjustment programs falling in line with neoliberal practices 
of deregulation and privatization and became a governing rationality.  
While neoliberalism began as an economic ideology, its consequences were 
unprecedented. As a method of governing society, neoliberalization was accompanied 
by a set of both national and international policies that aimed at business domination of 
social affairs (McChesney, 2001). A new type of liberalism emerged, the virtues of which 
were built on individualism and the protection of private property rights as well as the 
restriction of all exclusive power from people’s lives. Following curtailments in public 
welfare and withdrawal of the social welfare system, individual responsibility and self-
governance emerged as official policy dialogues, replacing public welfare (Gamble, 
2014; Innset, 2020). This argument was based on a premise that allocation of resources 
would be conducted most effectively through market forces and its virtues, such as 
competition, credit, and efficiency, rather than moral imperatives or the state’s 
intervention (Fitzpatrick, 2018). In a neoliberal world, consumers, not an electorate, 
would be sovereign (Klein, 2008). Unlike traditional liberalism which distinguished the 
political life and economic life of citizens, neoliberalism reduces the political lives of 
citizens to the economy. It compels all players in the society as Homo Oeconomicus to 
seek their exchangeable market values as individual objects through self-
investment/exploitation rather than solving structural problems (Dardot & Laval, 2013; 
Fitzpatrick, 2018).  
Thus, in the world in which an individual’s avarice through free-market principles 
is considered as the main impetus of economic growth, it seems evident that the state 
would step back from its position of allocating resources to its population as a political-
economic system of redistributing wealth. Such changes—that directly relate individuals 
to the market by blocking external interventions—are often understood as symbolizing a 
retreat of the state. An individual’s victory or defeat in the competition is solely 
determined by personal competence and responsibility, while state responsibility in the 
society’s structure and resource management would be lessened (Harvey, 2005). In this 
regard, the transition to neoliberalism in policy contexts means more than a 
transformation of pre-existing economic policies; it challenges the everyday reality of 
people as well as statehood (Mirowski, 2013).  
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Meanwhile, neoliberalization is fostered by the financialization of capitalism, “the 
shift in gravity of economic activity from production (and even from much of the growing 
service sector) to finance (Foster, 2007, 1)”. As the expansion of banking capital would 
be essential to deepen capital accumulation, the financialization of capitalism meant 
“self-perpetuating wealth creation in capital market (Bryan, 2004, 103)” and profit 
generation became of greater importance than producing goods and services. Such 
financialization signified the hegemony of financial capitalists and reflected compromises 
between industrial and financial capital that would be driven by financial actors 
(Brunhoff, 2003). The financialization of capitalism is deeply related to efforts of market 
integration by the US government and financial actors in the market. For decades, the 
US had strived to establish rules for integrating commercial trade and financial relations 
under its leadership with the US Dollar as a global reserve currency. Furthermore, the 
growing importance of finance, financial institutions and markets in the US and many 
advanced countries not only transformed the entire economic system and its agents, 
including banks, non-financial corporations, and workers, into a finance industry-based 
system but also became another incentive for integrating the global economic system 
(Lapavitsas, 2013; Nesvetailova, 2013). As long as profits from financial businesses 
remained in control over this system, it became crucial for these countries to liberalize 
capital flows—in both domestic and international markets—to maximize their financial 
gains (Davis & Kim, 2015).  
The financialization of capitalism transformed the profit model of stakeholders in 
advanced economies toward the accumulation of profit from financial capital. This 
resulted in the relocation of their manufacturing businesses to wherever they could 
locate the lowest production costs, including taxes and cheap labour, and ensured 
repatriation of their profits. Expecting massive investment, many countries endeavoured 
to attract such relocating businesses, promising to provide a package of privileges such 
as tax benefits and exceptions from regulation, even if these measures increased wage 
stagnation and wealth inequality (Palley, 2007). Such changes demonstrated the power 
shift from producing goods and services to accumulating capital in the economy, which 
would become a defining characteristic of a neoliberal world. Moreover, along with the 
liberalization of trade, the financialization of capitalism accelerated the penetration of 
multinational corporations into regional economies, and it meant much of the global 
economy would be in the hands of transnational finance as the key major forces of 
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current flows of globalization (Dent, 2003; Dreiling & Darves, 2016). Then, the push for 
financialization and liberalization in markets outside of the US was not only a 
characteristic of neoliberal policies but also a profound characteristic of a newly 
emerging globalized economy and society driven by neoliberalization. Thus, it is 
important to consider the roles of neoliberal globalization in the development of this 
economic and ideological concept. 
2.2.2. A Brief Introduction of Neoliberal Globalization 
Globalization is generally understood as the process of the integration of the 
world, which includes “anything from the Internet to a hamburger (Strange, 1996, xiii)”. 
Due to the complexities of the phenomenon, there are several definitions of 
globalization. Ritzer (2007, 1) defines globalization as “an accelerating set of processes 
involving flows that encompass ever-greater numbers of the world’s spaces and that 
lead to increasing integration and interconnectivity among those spaces.” Focusing on 
connectedness, Held and his colleagues (1999, 2) explain globalization as “the 
widening, deepening, and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of 
contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual”, 
while Lechner and Boli (2015, 5) define it as a multiplicity of linkages which makes “more 
people become connected in more and different ways across ever-greater distances.”  
While there are various interpretations of globalization, it is evident that the 
United States government and US-based private capital have been the main drivers of 
the process (Jarvis, 2007; Ferguson & Mansbach, 2012; Ritzer & Stillman, 2017). Along 
with its allies including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, the US has regarded 
itself as a pioneer guiding other countries toward the integration, showing off its 
advanced technologies and better economic outcomes. Based on their achievements in 
politics, economy, and culture, the US demanded less-developed countries to follow 
their lead through decoupling the relationships among state power, sovereignty, and 
territoriality— all of which have been understood as a founding pillar of political and 
economic modernization (Martinelli, 2005). Such an argument has been materialized 
through a series of multilateral agreements and international organizations that set up 
common regulations and orders that have the same legal effect as domestic laws.  
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Moreover, the activities of many Western financial institutions, including private 
equity firms, security companies, and credit rating agencies, have become a major 
impetus that pressures many states to follow their direction toward the market 
integration. The expanded trade volume and immensely mobile financial capital greatly 
increased the interdependence of national economies, which implied the rise of a united 
market system that is stimulated by capitalist motives for profit and the accumulation of 
capital (Ampuja, 2012; Ferguson & Mansbach, 2012). Regularly, such connections are 
legitimized and materialized by international market and trade regimes as well as 
regional economic blocs such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), Mercosur (a 
South American trade bloc), the European Union (EU), and Canada-United States-
Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), etc.  
Much of the current logic of globalization is deeply connected to neoliberalism, 
which demands the removal of barriers that interrupt the free market, such as tariffs, 
quotas, and any regulatory measures that give preference to domestic players. Thus, 
neoliberal globalization can be understood as a phenomenon and an ideology that 
demands the guaranteed distribution of “maximum profits to the private sector through 
deregulation, privatization, and liberalization while pursuing a small government function 
(Jin, 2020b, 2)” through integrating different political and economic systems into a single 
market. This type of globalization is an artifact planned and promoted by the 
transnational capitalist class—transnational corporations and financial capital—as new 
elites and a new ruling class (Nash, 2017).  
Indeed, arguing that the market becomes increasingly transnational and 
borderless, advocates of neoliberal globalization—such as private financial institutions, 
multinational corporations including media and platform moguls—demand the state to 
remove various regulation, many of which are necessary to fulfill the state’s traditional 
duties to support the society and protect economic activities of citizens, such as 
financing domestic entrepreneurship and providing small loans for households and the 
middle-class. Following this argument, the US and several other nations materialize 
neoliberal ideologies as policies, suspending their obligations to society, and demand 
that other nations follow their measures (Robinson, 2017; González, 2019). Thus, under 
the leadership of the transnational capitalist class, advocates of neoliberal globalization 
strive to integrate the world into a single market operated by free-market principles, 
which will be an ideal situation for realizing their tenets.  
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Considering the power of neoliberal market forces that exert influence in the 
current phase of globalization, the term ‘globalization’ can be understood as the 
“integration of economic activities, via markets. The driving forces are technological, and 
policy changes—falling costs of transport and communications and greater reliance on 
market forces (Wolf, 2005, 19).” Such characteristics of globalization have strengthened 
the rights of many powerful non-sovereign actors—including banks, corporations, private 
equity funds, and regional and international financial organizations—to speak in the 
international political and economic system (Marsonet, 2017). As new players became 
increasingly influential in global politics, they demanded a new mechanism that would 
reflect the voices of these non-sovereign players through their strong financial power. 
Granted, such demands challenge the power previously enjoyed by sovereign states in 
global politics and blurs national boundaries that otherwise legitimize state control over a 
given population (Jessop, 2016; Slobodian, 2018). 
In addition to this, the development of cutting-edge information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), notably the Internet and smart devices, provided an 
essential framework that enables the exchange of information freely in real-time 
everywhere in the world (Castells, 2013). Given that much of the recent development of 
ICTs is led by US-based platform giants such as Apple, Facebook, and Google, and 
their penetration into local markets has incapacitated numerous local regulations and 
weakening local companies, the development of ICTs and platform moguls that utilize 
new technologies worldwide to consolidate their market share are also considered as 
major impetuses of globalization and challenge the state’s authority in controlling and 
managing the market (Jin, 2015; Srnicek, 2017).  
In this regard, such technological advancements and economic integration 
toward a single market sees globalization restructuring “the ways in which we live, and in 
a very profound manner (Giddens, 2002, 4)” and redefines elements of modern 
society— “household, family, class, democracy, domination, state, economy, the public 
sphere, politics and so on (Beck, 2005, 50)” which had previously been characterized 
within the traditional boundaries of nation-states. Based on the overwhelming power of 
various capital, globalization constructed by neoliberal virtues has become a dominant 
force in the global arena and clashed with residual traditions and institutions on a 
worldwide scale (McGuigan, 2016).  
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In short, along with other factors, including the development of cutting-edge 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), the increasing number of 
immigrants, and the growing roles of international organizations, market forces and 
capital are key forces working toward coalescing the world under the single market 
system, a defining characteristic of the current flow of globalization (Wolf, 2005; Iosifidis, 
2016). Although neoliberalization and globalization are not synonyms, they are co-
constitutive insofar as both arguments posit the individualization of subjects and a single 
market system. Both concepts are also skeptical of nation-state systems, based on 
technological advances that enable the integration of financial systems and information 
exchange (Ampuja, 2012; Micklethwait & Wooldrige, 2015). However, there are some 
gaps between the ideals of neoliberalism and reality, which require the state’s 
participation in both global and domestic economies and societies to realize neoliberal 
doctrines. 
2.3. Rescaling the State’s Position in Neoliberal 
Globalization 
2.3.1. Myth of the Free-market Principle: Neoliberalism’s Skepticism 
about the State 
On the surface, doctrines and practices of neoliberal globalization seem to collide 
with the state’s authority to control its territory and population. Indeed, the state’s 
position in entrepreneurial activities has been significantly weakened in contrast to the 
roles of private entrepreneurship that have become more prominent in market activities 
(Schuster, Schmitt & Traub, 2013). Moreover, regional economic integration which 
promotes common trading provisions and market regulations towards free and fair trade 
and changes the industrial structure towards a knowledge and service-oriented economy 
as opposed to a manufacturing economy contributed to neutralizing the state’s control of 
markets. Such transformations of the economic environment have forced the state to 
ease or lift many of its policy prerogatives such as regulations and taxations—which are 
major tools to exert its authority to the market—as an effort of making it more attractive 
to investors than other states as competitors in the market (Lucarelli, 2004; Nijs, 2016). 
For instance, in the aftermath of the Eurozone Crisis in the early 2010s, several 
European countries—notably Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, had to comply with 
requirements from creditor nations and organizations such as France, Germany, and the 
47 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in return for bailouts, which included pension reforms, 
the increase of value-added taxes, and the control of national properties by creditors, 
etc. (Lapavitsas, 2019). In the meantime, low-income and underdeveloped countries 
deregulate their domestic financial and labour market to attract foreign investment from 
multinational corporations and transnational financial capital (Akkermans, 2017).  
Based on the notion that much of the current flow of globalization is operated by 
the international monetary system sponsored by finance and banking capital that 
strongly supports free trade and the liberalization of capital movements, some scholars 
began to argue that the nation-state and statehood are, at an extreme, being dismantled 
or at the very least in decline, as sovereign states and global markets cannot coexist 
(Rodrick, 2011; Verde, 2017). As the world economy is being transformed by 
transnational corporations and global capital intent on gaining more rights and power to 
expand their markets worldwide without state interference, they explain that such 
changes will enable transnational market forces to bypass boundaries and overwhelm 
the state’s authority in many markets. In this regard, they demanded that states 
relinquish some sovereignty to world bodies that included non-sovereign actors (Jarvis, 
2007; Marsonet, 2017).  
Many skeptical mantras from advocates of neoliberalism about the state’s roles 
assume market equilibrium as pre-given (Fukuyama, 1992). In theory, the market 
system that is operated by full competition is an ideal structure of distributing resources 
most effectively so that it maximizes economic efficiency. In reality, however, it is difficult 
to expect such a perfectly competitive market that guarantees free and fair competition 
for allocating resources—including capital, commodities, and information, etc. (Madra & 
Adaman, 2014). Most of all, there is an issue of monopolies and oligopolies which are 
some of the outcomes of market competitions. Since they bring less intense competition 
and heighten the entry barriers of new players, monopolies and oligopolies will stifle 
innovation—which many neoliberals hype as the main benefit of free-market principles. 
Even if neoliberalists are reluctant to invite the state to intervene in the market to prevent 
monopolies, arguing that its intervention may harm entrepreneurial merits and 
emphasize disadvantages of interventions, it is vital to impose anti-trust measures on the 
market system considering the concentration of power of few players will interrupt the 
entire price system and the economy (Lucarelli, 2004; Roncaglia, 2019).  
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Moreover, the market cannot manage public goods because of their non-
excludable and non-rivalrous characteristics—like the air or knowledge, they are 
available to everyone, and their supplies are not affected by consumption.13 Such 
characteristics make logics of revenue-expenditure processes less effective in 
controlling these resources. Without proper interventions from outside, this may result in 
depleting or taking advantage of them without collecting exchange values (Johnson, 
2015). While many neoliberal proponents recognize the state’s position of managing 
public goods, they argue the state’s allocation of public goods should be non-selective 
and encourage more private investment (Lucarelli, 2004). However, such an approach to 
allocate and manage public goods often neglects qualitative aspects of accountability 
and responsibility of stakeholders given that much of the procedure is driven by 
quantitative measures (Neyland, Ehrenstein & Milyaeva, 2019).  
Such variables indicate the market system is imperfect in nature and much of 
neoliberalism’s imaginary of the ‘invisible hand’—a metaphor that explains optimal 
equilibrium of distribution through the market’s pricing mechanism operated by free 
competitions among individuals that will eventually allocate resources justly—is defective 
in reality (Roncaglia, 2019). As there is no guarantee of a fully competitive market, free-
market mechanisms only benefit predominant financial capital and may cause a market 
failure, when resources in the market are allocated inefficiently to actors in the economy 
and equilibrium becomes disrupted. This would delay economic growth and erupt a 
financial crisis that negatively impacts the lives of people, marking the inevitability for the 
state to intervene in the market system to oversee whether it distributes resources 
effectively or not (Lucarelli, 2004; Medema, 2009).  
Doctrines of neoliberalism have political discrepancies in their logics. Again, 
advocates of neoliberalism expect the state to transform the preexisting society into a 
fully marketized one through marketizing publicly controlled resources, deregulating both 
industries and capital to promote competition and for private interest, and marketizing 
more public welfare schemes in the name of consumer choice and economic efficiency 
(Wilson, 2018). Based on their distrust of the state, they claim that a state-interventionist 
economy, in which dynamics are determined by political negotiations to stabilize the 
 
13 Unlike private goods where values drop in supply as more people use them (rivalrous) and are 
not available to all citizens (excludability), the values of public goods do not dwindle in their 
supply regardless of the amount of consumption and every citizen has access to use them.  
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society through guaranteeing interests of different interest groups, only increases 
rigidities in the economic system (Jones, 2012). Labelling them “institutional sclerosis”, 
they insist such coalitions will end up resisting necessary changes for economic 
development (Olsen, 1982). Much of this argument is based on the premise that any 
unproductive political activities would generate additional expenses because they would 
result in privileging specific groups at the expense of market profits. In a similar vein, 
neoliberalists viciously attack inefficiencies of public expenditures and state-owned 
enterprises and argue to privatize and marketize their structure and management which 
had been controlled by bureaucrats (Chang, 2004; McGuigan, 2014). As a 
consequence, commodification and privatization of public resources become key 
characteristics of neoliberal reforms; a number of public institutions—schools, hospitals, 
and even prisons—have become privatized and many of them are forced to manage 
themselves as competitive entities (Connell, 2010).  
However, if neoliberals discredit the state’s intervention as disrupting market 
equilibrium by favouring certain interests from different interest groups including trade 
unions and consumer organization, then it becomes paradoxical for them to urge the 
state to prioritize the interests of private enterprises and capitals (Chang, 2004; Lucarelli, 
2004). Granted, this paradox is used to restrain opponents of neoliberalism from 
insisting on their rights and criticism of free-market principles in the hands of economic 
development. If so, ideas of a free-market economy, which is a practical impossibility, 
serve to privilege financial and rentier interests for the sake of the working class and 
industrial capital (Davidson, 2018; Peters, 2018). This only can be realized through 
another intervention from the state.  
Again, much of this paradox stems from the perspective that views the 
marketplace as a self-governing and pre-given system of exchanging goods and 
services. However, the market cannot be self-regulatory as it is a socially constructed 
mechanism made by industrial change and the state’s sophisticated plans to perform as 
a means of driving the capitalist economy. It has never been truly free and self-
regulating (Polanyi, 2001[1944]). This means that the state’s interventions in the market 
exist in principle to allocate resources in more effective ways. By the same token, the 
free-market economy cannot be realized due to its deficiencies in the market system 
which stem from the uncertainty and unpredictability that exist in valuing goods and 
services explained above (Stiglitz, 2018b). If that is the case, then doctrines of free-
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market and relevant arguments of free-labour and free-trade instead reflect an ideology 
that privileges the interests of certain industrial and financial capital and pushes the state 
to serve their profits (Harvey, 2005; Nijs, 2016).  
In this regard, the state continues to exert sovereign authority over global forces 
through regulations of the market and foreign, labour, and trade policies. Despite various 
limitations, the effects of its actions and decisions in economy and society demonstrate 
how the state can actively manage and appropriate the penetration of neoliberal 
doctrines into its territory and population (Rosina, 2019). In this regard, nation-states 
continue to serve as the most significant force in shaping the global economy (Dicken, 
2015). This incentivizes proponents and beneficiaries of neoliberal mechanisms to work 
with and exert pressure on the state to further neoliberal goals, often requiring private 
neoliberalists to align their profit and goals with state interests.  
Capitalists, armed with neoliberal doctrines and the goal of capital accumulation, 
need a large market without state intervention. However, they still want a multiplicity of 
states to manage and control different resources which cannot be controlled by a single, 
gigantic entity (Wallerstein, 2004). Thus, they try to cooperate with governing elites of 
the state, who determine the form of capitalism that the society would pursue and exert 
their authorities through executing policies so that they can mobilize its resources and 
authority to restructure the economy and society (Harvey, 2005; Schmidt, 2009; Major, 
2013). As long as the market is not a self-regulating organ, the state still has mandates 
in designing and implementing measures on neoliberalization while maintaining 
autonomy to guide and discipline actors in society as the neoliberal state (Dreiling & 
Darves, 2016; Maron & Shalev, 2017).  
2.3.2. The Neoliberal State: An Architect of Managing the Paradoxes 
of Neoliberal Reality 
The neoliberal state would be understood as “an interventionist state that works 
to actively promote and construct a free-market society (Wilson, 2018, 37)” based on 
pre-existing relationships among institutions and characteristics of political-economic 
regimes. The state’s measures are valid as long as they serve the interests of economic 
actors and coincide with market logics (Madra & Adaman, 2014). The neoliberal state 
reconfigures its positions and functions to enforce pro-market, neoliberal agendas to 
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cope with both transnational and national-local capitalist classes (Robinson, 2001). 
Policy authorities mobilize their ability to secure private property rights and promote 
freedom of capital by maximizing free-market frameworks and reducing its pre-existing 
interventionist methods, if market interests coincide with the state’s interests (Harvey, 
2005).   
The neoliberal state often highlights virtues of meritocracy that contend that 
social justice is realized by fair competition where the best and most diligent people 
succeed under the assumption of equal opportunity and mobility for all individuals to 
utilize their abilities freely (Littler, 2016). In accordance with meritocracy, fundamental 
principles of managing the state such as equality and liberty are reinterpreted by 
outcomes of competitions. As long as an unfettered free-market system, which is 
believed to incarnate doctrines of meritocracy most justly, becomes sanctified as the 
venue of assigning and managing values of all resources—including humans, the state 
should abide by its mechanisms. In this regard, the neoliberal state attempts to change 
economic orders and the public welfare system through the introduction of competitive 
systems in the belief that ‘improper interventions’ in the name of non-market virtues like 
social justice only infringe on individual acts that should be arranged by contracts in the 
marketplace (Plant, 2009). While neoliberal elites extend their interests by deregulating 
influxes of financial institutions, their belief reduces the bargaining power of trade unions 
and other interest groups in the name of fair competition (Littler, 2016; Roncaglia, 2019). 
In conjunction with the neoliberal ontology of reorganizing society with free-
market principles, it becomes an important task for the state to cultivate an enterprise 
culture by enforcing more schemes in society driven by competitive logics. Also, it must 
control citizens’ choices of collective activities that shape possessive individualism which 
drives a neoliberal society (Harvey, 2005). Arguing that the future of both the state and 
its citizens depends on their gains from global market competition, the state argues for 
the creation of a climate customized to good businesses or investment and profiteering 
of its citizens. Presuming an active role of the state, this becomes the essence of 
governmentality the neoliberal state should pursue although it sounds paradoxical to a 
laissez-faire style of governance (Wilson, 2018). Under the neoliberal regime, citizens 
are transformed as human capital that appreciates themselves in the market and are 
trained to satisfy private enterprises. 
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When it comes to enforcing neoliberal ideas, the neoliberal state often employs 
authoritarian and coercive measures on the society. In the name of the rule of law that 
represents the interests of corporates and financial capital, they suppress opponents of 
neoliberal reforms (Nijs, 2016; Plant, 2009). Moreover, as remedies for curing hostile 
sentiments against draconian changes in the economy and society, and diverting the 
public’s attention, the state puts emphasis on restoring traditional values and historical 
legacies to citizens (Harvey, 2005). The resurgence of traditions and nationalist 
sentiments became a useful tactic for the neoliberal state to shift public responsibility 
onto individuals and attract other factions of conservatives who adhered strictly to 
restoring national and traditional values. Given that the global market with minimal 
restrictions and barriers is believed to be a utopia for neoliberalists, the revival of 
national values to control the population seems contradictory.  
This reinforces that the neoliberal state is a joint and subtle effort by different 
facets of the conservative camp in many Western capitalist societies rather than a rigid 
doctrine of pure neoliberalism (Wilson, 2018). Despite different perspectives of 
understanding the position of the state and nation, neoliberalism seized hegemony in 
conservative politics because their ideas were deemed to be useful tools for defending 
against Communists (Harvey, 2005; Jones, 2012). For many conservatives, any 
collective actions of workers would be considered as potential threats to rulers and 
representing collectivism. Traditional conservatives—who adhered to traditional values, 
social norms, and orders—did not have much ideological objection to neoliberalism in 
the belief that it would defend their values from the rise of subversive ideas and 
countercultures which argued for the liberation of oppressed classes (Hackworth, 2012).  
This was similar to religious conservatives because many ideas of class 
liberation seemed to be against religious instructions and traditions. For them, 
neoliberalists, who insisted on disassembling the welfare state established by class 
compromises, would be saviours to secure the elite’s vested interests and protect their 
states from communization (Jones, 2012). Indeed, neoliberalists were actively against 
the locating of resource control in the hands of the party-state system and the production 
of goods and services only for their use-values. According to neoliberals, such an 
approach would inhibit innovation and waste taxpayers’ money (McGuigan, 2014). 
Finally, the triumph of capitalism over communism has made neoliberalism an inviolable 
ideology of governance and legitimized any attempts of the state to enforce neoliberal 
53 
measures on the society in the name of ‘reforms.’ Meanwhile, cutbacks in public 
spending such as education, health, and other welfare programs following neoliberal 
doctrines of limited government and free enterprise revived an old role of households as 
a basic unit responsible for taking care of individuals (Cooper, 2017).14  
Such internal dynamics imply that the construction of the neoliberal state 
represents local characteristics, including political conditions within its territory. In other 
words, along with paradoxically active roles of the state in free-market mechanisms, this 
indicates that the neoliberalization of each country is subject to its local institutional 
characteristics. There is no such state which only rubberstamps laissez-faire policies for 
the sake of capital against all odds. The state approves neoliberal virtues only if they 
coincide with the interests of the ruling elites and manageable in local contexts (Dicken, 
2015; Dreiling & Darves, 2016; Maron & Shalev, 2017). If so, the state’s sovereignty in 
its political and economic milieu does not vanish or weaken. Rather, it should be 
explained as a re-articulation of sovereignty along with adopting the logics of free-market 
principles as long as they do not infringe on the ruling class’ interests, which are deeply 
connected to financial capital and corporate expenditures (Nijs, 2016).  
The state is also responsible for setting norms and rules of international 
organizations, including monetary authorities, which attenuate its authority from various 
economic activities and manage a single market (Dicken, 2015). While more 
organizations invite non-state actors to their governance systems and engage in 
decision-making processes, the position of newcomers remains still marginalized 
compared to states which enjoy the rights of full membership (Major, 2013). Among 
states, several powerful states often disregard the decisions made by international 
organizations which also limit their authority in governing other nation-states. A recent 
 
14 In the US, neoliberalists’ emphases on families and other traditional norms and values 
appealed to advocates of neoconservatism, who were against countercultures inspired by the left 
and insisted on restoring and prioritizing traditional Western values based on Christianity, 
patriarchism, and American exceptionalism—which rested on the belief that “America’s values, 
political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration (Walt, 2011, para. 2)” 
that would legitimize the nation to lead and discipline the world as a virtuous country. Under the 
presidency of Ronald Reagan (1980–1988), neoconservatism provided an emotional, ideological 
foundation of the administration’s neoliberal projects of reducing public expenditures in the name 
of individual freedom by describing welfare recipients, immigrants, feminists, and progressives as 
antitheses of American values. Such a connection to neoconservatism played a pivotal role in 
neoliberalization and reshaping the entire US politics and society (Konings, 2012; Drolet & 
Williams, 2020).  
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resurgence of protectionist measures on trade under the Trump administration and the 
UK’s withdrawal from the European Union demonstrates how ideas of a single, 
integrated, and borderless free market become fragile when they collide with political 
interests of individual states (Melchior, 2018; Jin, 2020b).  
Based on this explanation, the state’s mandates and commitments to 
neoliberalization are far from neoliberal ideals which demand the state to let free-market 
principles operate society as bystanders with minimal intervention. Even if advocates of 
neoliberalism expect minimal state participation, the state remains largely active to serve 
the interests of corporate actors and capital (McChesney, 2001). Indeed, the state 
becomes an architect of reshaping the society following neoliberal rules. It sets up laws, 
regulations, and institutions to characterize economic freedom and rules of the 
competition that its citizens should follow (Harvey, 2005; Nijs, 2016). If so, the state's 
‘withdrawal’ from the economy can be better explained as the reconfiguration of its 
position. While it seems to devolve some power to private enterprises and financial 
capital market principles, it is better understood as a strategy of profiteering its resources 
in concert with neoliberal elites who transcend borders. This is related to what Ong 
(2006, 78) calls as ‘graduated sovereignty’, which refers to “the effects of a flexible 
management of sovereignty, as governments adjust political space to the dictates of 
global capital, giving corporations an indirect power over the political conditions of 
citizens in zones that are differently articulated to global production and financial 
circuits.”  
In sum, although it seems to outsource some sovereign decisions to non-state 
actors in the name of maximizing economic efficiency with market logics, the state 
considers itself to be a regulator of connecting its economic spheres and populations 
with global markets. If the state is a subject of neoliberalizing its economy and society, it 
becomes more important to understand how it redefines its position in the cultural 
domain because it has resisted the neoliberal demand for the state to yield its cultural 
sovereignty to global market forces as it is vital to govern citizens through producing 
distinctive collective identities and legitimize its authority as sovereign. 
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2.4. The Position of the Neoliberal State in Cultural 
Industries 
2.4.1. Neoliberal Globalization of Cultural Industries 
Given that globalization equips “the multilayered realities of communication 
systems, networks, and regulation (Raboy & Padovani, 2010, 156)”, its impacts on 
domestic cultural businesses are unprecedented—from the production and distribution 
system to characteristics of individual cultural goods. Combined with doctrines of 
neoliberalism, global forces in cultural industries have called for deregulating the market 
and reregulation to better serve corporate interests (McChesney, 2001). For decades, 
the US government and its media conglomerates have sought ways of enforcing free-
market principles in cultural trade. They argue the removal of barriers to cultural goods 
and services, including trade restrictions and censorship on foreign imports and 
information, would promote freedom of the press and satisfy consumer demand 
(Freedman, 2008; Throsby, 2010; Murdock & Choi, 2018). In the name of the free flow of 
information, the US has stepped up the pressure on countries to open their markets and 
deregulate their media and communication domains.15 Backed up by international trade 
regimes such as WTO which insist on categorizing cultural merchandises as general 
goods, the notion of a single market of culture that embodies neoliberal globalization of 
cultural industries becomes concretized (Leiva, 2017).  
In relation to this, the issue of defining the status of cultural products in 
international trade—whether to continue their status as exemptions or recognize them as 
general goods—exposes again a fault line between transnational market forces and the 
state (Garner, 2016). Such disputes embed ideas of commodification and 
instrumentalization of culture that understand culture as commodities in which values are 
judged by market dynamics and converted into currency. On one hand, the US has 
 
15 The free flow of information referred to a principle that countries should not impose any barriers 
to control or limit the flow of information—including the press and cultural products (Thussu, 
2018). Arguing that production, distribution, and consumption of information should be free from 
the state’s intervention, its supporters anticipated that information would promote people’s right to 
communicate. Granted, the US government endorsed this principle to exert pressure on 
liberalizing media system and adopting free-market principles to other countries—which would 
consolidate the dominance of US cultural products thereby strengthening its political hegemony 
worldwide (Thussu, 2015).  
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pushed countries to lift trade barriers that restrict the import of US cultural products in 
the name of the free flow of information and free and fair trade. In line with the 
digitalization of cultural industries, the US urges countries not to impose restrictions on 
digital networks—which are to be key platforms for distributing and consuming cultural 
goods—arguing that they are part of the digital economy (Gagné, 2019). On the other 
hand, other countries have demanded a space for domestic industries against the US’ 
pressures even though many domestic markets have opened their cultural market 
increasingly to foreigners. They strive to legitimize their protectionist measures on the 
market because of non-commercial values of cultural products that are vital to protect 
their distinctive cultural heritages and promote citizenship, education, national identity, 
and social cohesion (Goff, 2017; Jaramillo, 2019). 
Alongside the pressure from the US, new communication technologies are 
another driving force of globalization in the cultural industries that often bypass and 
neutralize boundaries and regulations of individual states (Raboy & Padovani, 2010; 
Mansell & Raboy, 2011). Moreover, innovations led by new media technologies 
developed by US companies have reshaped the nature of media production and 
distribution systems worldwide. For instance, the emergence of SVoD services such as 
Netflix, Disney+, and Amazon Prime incapacitates pre-existing broadcasting schemes in 
many states initially designed to protect their own broadcasting businesses because new 
players use the Internet, not airwaves or cables, to aggregate their catalogue to 
subscribers. Such a bypass—direct transactions between US platforms and local 
customers—becomes a fundamental risk for both domestic businesses and regulatory 
bodies. While local broadcasters launch their own SVoD services like BBC iPlayer (UK), 
Globoplay (Brazil), iQiyi (China), Salto (France), and Wavve (Korea) to counter the 
penetration of US SVoD giants, their positions in the market are marginal except for a 
few countries (Lobato, 2019). In this regard, new media technologies serve as advance 
guards for reinforcing the US cultural hegemony. It realizes the idea of the free flow of 
information—a long-cherished wish of the United States government—through 
declawing all the major obstacles imposed by other states globally (Jin, 2015; 2019).  
While states strive to defend their domestic industries from the growing 
penetration of US cultural products, globalization’s influence on local cultural production 
is enormous. Indeed, the impacts of American cultural industries and their products—
films, popular music, television is very prominent and visible everywhere (Giddens, 
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2002; Yúdice, 2003; Yoon, 2018). Moreover, their distribution and consumption 
mechanisms have become more subject to US-based social media platforms such as 
Twitter and YouTube, which makes it difficult for the local music genre to create its own 
cultural force (Jin, 2019). As a contemporary example, Korean pop music (K-Pop) is 
strongly influenced by US mainstream pop and African American music genres such as 
rhythm and blues (R&B) and hip-hop, and major K-Pop agencies invite many composers 
from the US and European pop music businesses as producers to globalize their music. 
Combined with lyrics from domestic lyricists, a distinctive trainee system, and visual 
impact and presentation of individual singers, the case of K-Pop demonstrates how local 
cultural production is influenced by US pop culture (Elfving-Hwang, 2018).16  
Apart from the case of K-Pop, numerous local cultural businesses have adopted 
genre characteristics of US cultural products and blended them with local cultures, 
thereby producing new and hybrid cultural forms and identities. In the television industry, 
the export of US television formats worldwide has become more prominent in many 
television markets and their local versions are popular in many countries (Ganguly, 
2019). In addition to this, as more local cultural production promotional strategies 
become dependent on US-based platforms, this disrupts the creation of distinctive 
cultural forces. In the case of Korean television, there is an increasing desire on the part 
of producers to co-produce their content with Netflix, a US online subscription video-on-
demand platform to recoup production costs and promote their products in global 
markets (Kim, 2021).  
In this regard, combined with the US government’s pressure on free trade in 
cultural goods and services, the impacts of US popular culture on local cultural 
production and the dominance of US distributors in the global market reinforce structural 
imbalance between US-led global forces and local players. Furthermore, this indicates 
 
16 The Korean music industry’s in-house trainee program is based on a cycle of auditions and 
scouting, training, and debut. A trainee is chosen either by auditions or street-casts and offered a 
long-term contract by the agency; the company pays all costs of the traineeship; from language 
schools to and vocal and dance lessons in return for his or her hours of practices—which may 
take up to years and long-term affiliations after their debut. However, the debut process is very 
competitive and only few trainees get opportunities to appear on television (Lee & Jin, 2019). 
Besides, successful trainees are often required to live in dormitories and maintain panoptic 
lifestyle controlled by the company (Elfving-Hwang, 2018). Such a labor-intensive manufacturing 
system has been criticized by many critics as slave contracts (Lee & Jin, 2019; Chong, 13 
February 2020). 
58 
that the current flow of globalization in cultural industries consolidates the dominance of 
US cultural products and challenges an individual state’s authority in its cultural domain. 
Driven by new media technologies and the penetration of smart devices, the power of 
American media corporations and platforms in the global media production and 
distribution chain is becoming more dominant than ever (Raboy & Padovani, 2010; Jin, 
2015; Jin, 2020b). Although there are different perspectives in interpreting the dynamics 
of local responses to the dominant and global cultural force led by US-based media 
conglomerates, there are various eclecticisms in the cultural production of locals 
depending on how much individual organizations can negotiate with US cultural capital 
and overcome various structural advantages which US cultural businesses enjoy in the 
global market (Kraidy, 2002; Haynes, 2016). This also leads to the homogenization of 
cultural products from local industries to follow US mainstream products as a standard 
(Throsby, 2010). Then, globalization becomes an opportunity for US-based media 
conglomerates to further penetrate in many countries.  
However, it is premature to interpret neoliberal globalization as a complete 
reincarnation of cultural imperialism because it also provides spaces for local cultures to 
promote their distinctive cultural characteristics (Throsby, 2010). Although US-led 
transnational cultural forces enjoy their comparative advantages in the global market and 
seek to reinforce their dominant position, it is still worth noting that there are a number of 
stakeholders in the cultural domain which counter, collaborate, and respond to 
globalization and lead local movements in defending, appropriating, and absorbing such 
foreign infiltrations (Ritzer & Stillman, 2017; Jin, 2020b). Indeed, despite the 
overwhelming power of US media conglomerates in global markets backed by 
technological and funding power, there are a series of regional players that hold a strong 
presence in local markets, competing with US cultural products. Although many locally 
produced cultural goods and services are heavily influenced by the influx of US popular 
culture, local producers succeeded in blending global and local characteristics into their 
products, gained successes in their domestic markets, and even exported products and 
genres to overseas markets, including the US market (Artz, 2015).  
For instance, Japanese television producers have consolidated their market 
power in many Asian markets and succeeded in exporting their original television 
formats such as Funniest Home Videos (TBS) and Iron Chef (Fuji TV) to many countries 
including the US. Also, in collaboration with US companies such as Disney and Warner 
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Bros., Japanese animation studios such as Studio Ghibli and the genre of manga comics 
penetrated global markets (Artz, 2015; Chalabi, 2015). Meanwhile, we can observe that 
telenovelas—a serialized soap opera produced in Latin America with similar stylistic and 
thematic genre and narrative characteristics such as improbable storylines, melodrama, 
and romantic liaisons—have become a major television genre in the US (Miller, 2010; 
Ribke, 2017). Thanks to the popularity of telenovelas, Rede Globo, a Brazilian media 
conglomerate and the largest telenovela production studio in the world, announced to 
launch streaming service Globoplay in the US in 2020 (Hopewell, January 17, 2020). In 
this regard, the growing popularity of Korean pop music in the global marketplace could 
be another case exemplifying how local cultural products penetrate the US and other 
Western domestic markets (Yoon, Min & Jin, 2020).  
Examples of Japanese television formats, telenovelas, and K-Pop indicate that 
there is a growing number of ‘contra-flows’, originated from the peripheries of global 
cultural industries that penetrate the US and Western marketplaces, contrasting the 
dominant flows emanated from the US and several Western countries (Thussu, 2007). 
Although it is evident that production and distribution activities of local producers and 
distributors are connected to global trends largely managed by US-based media 
conglomerates, the ascent of non-Western cultural exports and their penetration into the 
US market demonstrate that globalization of cultural milieus is rather a multidirectional 
and complex than an omnidirectional phenomenon, which presumes un-reflexive 
Western dominance and the following cultural homogenization (Sigismondi, 2020).  
Furthermore, many producers and distributors in local cultural businesses have 
introduced new types of ‘hybrid’ popular culture through blending cultural forms and 
styles of US popular culture with local characteristics. Describing the mixing of cultures, 
Bhabha (1994) explains that cultural hybridity refers to ‘a third space’ that is something 
new and different cannot be explained with the dichotomy of same and other but has 
characteristics of making the dominant culture estranged through signifying ‘in-between’ 
and is a space where new forms of meaning and production are created. His ideas 
presume pivotal roles of local forces in creating and developing ‘in-between’ cultures. 
The concept has been vital to the reconsidering of the cultural binaries between the 
West and the Rest.  
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In terms of interpreting interactions of global and local forces that formulate 
cultural hybridity, Kraidy (2002, 317) argues for an understanding of the process as “a 
communicative practice constitutive of, and constituted by sociopolitical and economic 
arrangements”, which is subject to “the mutually constitutive interplay and overlap of 
cultural, economic, and political forces in international communication processes (ibid, 
333).” In this regard, cultural hybridity and its outcomes should be understood as more 
than a mere mixing of different cultures. To simply understand cultural hybridity as a 
mixing of (West-driven) global culture and local culture is often criticized for depoliticizing 
the formation of local cultures, without considering contexts of cultural production. 
Without considering that the structure of global cultural production is highly 
asymmetrical, ideas of cultural hybridity can be exploited as a means of celebrating the 
Americanization of culture, which refers to “commodifying cultural phenomena and 
colonizing language and thereby generating a culture which people learn to treat as 
objective reality (Jarvis, 2007, 59)”, given that the structure of global cultural production 
is highly asymmetrical. To examine the epistemological and political implication of hybrid 
culture requires an understanding of the forces which shape forms and styles of hybridity 
as it creates a third space that “displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new 
structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood 
through received wisdom (Bhabha, 1990, 211)”.  
When it comes to the local-global encounter, the hybridization of different 
cultures is largely twofold. According to Kraidy and Murphy (2003), the process 
accompanies both fusion and fragmentation of culture. While different forms, identities 
and styles of heterogeneous cultures are blended, this also disrupts a fixed notion of 
culture (Yoon, 2018). This process embeds both the homogenization of local cultures 
and the birth of a unique culture, which is an outcome of transformative local practices 
through creating indigenized modernity different from the West’s (Iwabuchi, 2002). 
Again, the outcomes of hybridization and their ontological meanings would depend on 
political-economic and social contexts surrounding the cultural domain and its 
stakeholders (Kraidy, 2002). Hybrid cultures are the outcomes of longstanding 
negotiations among stakeholders in cultural production—both local and global producers 
and distributors, audiences, and governments (Ribke, 2017).  
Despite controversies over interpreting some contemporary local cultures as 
hybrid, we can observe the rise of new cultural genres, forms, and styles in many 
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markets. For instance, the dominance of Bollywood movies in South Asian film markets 
and their penetration into Western markets. A portmanteau derived from ‘Bombay’ and 
‘Hollywood’, Bollywood refers to Hindi cinema with unique genre characteristics well-
known as Masala—mixed genres of action, comedy, melodrama, and romance with 
musical numbers and dance sequences, that became popular in the 1970s (Richards, 
2011). Although many of these elements are influenced by Western cinema, Indian film 
producers asserted local sensibilities and indigeneity to their films. Rather than 
distinguishing Western and Indian characteristics, Bollywood represents a new hybrid 
cultural form that reflects both global and local political-economic and sociocultural 
characteristics (Wright, 2009). In this regard, regardless of personal backgrounds, 
Bollywood has become almost a way of life for many Indian audiences (Barat, 2020).  
Thus, globalization not only fosters cultural assimilation and reinforces cultural 
imperialism but also promotes different cultural identities and diversities in local areas 
(Giddens, 2002; Ampuja, 2012). Depending on local characteristics, it may trigger new 
cultural practices from local spheres by mixing distinctive mentalities and other unique 
characteristics with Western cultures as contra-flow. Then, globalization should be 
understood as the nexus of transnational and national forces, while neoliberal regimes 
and orders strongly privilege US cultural products and their hegemony. If so, a question 
remains: How should we understand the state’s position in its cultural domain in relation 
to neoliberal globalization as a key role in mobilizing national forces? 
2.4.2. Prevailing Position of Nation-states in Cultural Industries 
As aforementioned, the paradoxical nature of free-market mechanisms and 
political tensions against neoliberalization need the state to intervene in the market and 
control stakeholders even though it contradicts neoliberal ideals of limited government 
and the prevalence of free capital and enterprises. While keeping close ties with 
economic elites who include private corporations and financial institutions, the state 
takes steps on reregulating industries and the market while also propagating neoliberal 
ideologies of competition to citizens (Nijs, 2016). Given that neoliberalization is a political 
project of consolidating the power of economic elites through re-establishing the 
conditions for capital accumulation, the state’s position cannot be reduced to that of a 
‘bystander’, and instead is invested in the neoliberal project as it benefits the state 
interests as well as those of the governing elite (Harvey, 2005). This also applies to 
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cultural industries in which production and distribution systems become more penetrated 
by transnational market forces; state sovereignty prevails despite some changes (Ong, 
2006; Dreiling & Darves, 2016).  
Indeed, many local cultural markets are under the control of US-led media 
conglomerates that enjoy a variety of advantages over local competitors such as 
competitive price, cutting-edge technologies, human resources, international distribution 
chains and marketing systems. It is also true that many states have been forced to 
deregulate their domestic market, which resulted in consolidating the dominance of 
private businesses in communication markets and further commercializing their intrinsic, 
aesthetic, and cultural values (Yúdice, 2003; Jin, 2020b).  
Despite such dominance, however, the state cannot withdraw itself from its 
cultural domain and let foreign players rule its cultural market considering its political and 
economic importance. For centuries, culture has been mobilized by the state to 
legitimize its authority and rules over its citizens as a means of cultivating a national 
identity, propagating the ruling class’ arguments, and uniting the population, etc. 
Throughout modern history, rulers with Enlightenment backgrounds—who seized 
political and economic power following the industrial revolution and the print revolution 
that transformed the political-economic system characterized as agrarian, feudal and 
divinely ordained kingship—strove to link its population by constructing a collective 
identity to legitimize its rules (Gellner, 2006; Anderson, 2016[1983]).  
This creation of a collective identity that would unite their population and 
distinguish them from others would become the main narrative of its citizenship. In this 
regard, they mobilized nationalism— “primarily a political principle which holds that the 
political and the national unit should be congruent (Gellner, 2006, 1)” to mobilize 
exclusive connectedness among citizens and inspire their loyalty. For them, culture—
including heritages, history, language, and religion—was instrumental to mobilizing such 
emotional and exclusive connectedness with common concepts as core characteristics 
of nationhood because it was widely shared in the public and represented distinctive 
local characteristics. As long as the nation is an “imagined political community—and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson, 2016[1983], 4)”, the state 
has endeavoured to cultivate, formalize, and sometimes even fabricate culture as a 
means of letting citizens conceive themselves as members of this imagined kinship with 
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faith.17 This has been the foremost political responsibility of the state’s cultural policies 
and it has strived to mobilize culture as a means of normalizing and socializing its 
population as ideal citizens along with state expectations (Miller & Yúdice, 2002).  
Moreover, in recent years, culture has come to the fore as instruments for the 
state to solve various problems in the socioeconomic realm. Along with neoliberal 
reforms in the public sector which were accompanied by budget cuts, suspension of 
public works, and privatization of public services, public authorities expect 
socioeconomic benefits from supporting culture (Yúdice, 2003). In this regard, 
policymakers strove to find instrumental values of cultural artifacts, which urged a 
number of cultural creators and entrepreneurs to participate in public projects such as 
urban revitalization, civic education, and multicultural citizenship, etc.  
In particular, as the rise of the term creative industries in many policy dialogues 
exemplifies, market opportunities in the realm of culture led policymakers to further 
instrumentalize their cultural resources as potential ‘cash cows’ to drive the post-
industrial economy. Generally speaking, the term creative industries refers to “those 
industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a 
potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of 
intellectual property” that include “advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, 
crafts, design, designer fashion, film and video, interactive leisure software, music, the 
performing arts, publishing, software and computer services, television and radio 
(Department of Culture, Media and Sport, 2001, 5)”.  
While there are not many differences between the creative industries and cultural 
industries in terms of categorizing their boundaries, ‘creative industries’ implies a more 
 
17 In relation to this, Anderson (2016[1983]) highlights how novels, which were full of familiar 
cityscapes and environments which their readers could identity, contributed to making emotional 
bond among themselves. Alongside other literature genres and newspapers, he explains the 
revolution of printing that enabled bulk printing followed by a mass literacy, triggered a cognitive 
paradigm shift in the population to feel connectedness and define something common in many 
American and Asian societies. Meanwhile, Gellner (2006[1983]) describes economic changes led 
by the industrialization necessitated to standardize and homogenize its population as potential 
labor. Moreover, labor-intensive characteristics of new industries fostered urbanization, which 
also made the population’s lives more interconnected in many European societies. Despite some 
differences—Anderson highlighted nation-building as an outcome of societal process which could 
yield positive power to unite populations while Geller put emphases on it as an elite project of 
fabrication, both are compatible as long as they deny the nation as a primordial concept. They 
agree the nation is a socially constructed entity rather than heavily influenced by the elite. 
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pragmatic, economistic, and policy-oriented approach than cultural industries as it 
officially declares the market value of a cultural product as the value system of 
policymakers in the name of intellectual property (Flew, 2012; Banks, 2017). In relation 
to this, by including software businesses and other industries which previously were not 
considered as cultural industries, the term implies the prioritization of the monetary value 
of an individual’s creativity over other intrinsic values embedded in cultural artifacts 
(Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005). Despite the vagueness of the term, many countries 
including the United Kingdom, Australia, Korea, Canada, and France have proclaimed 
their nations as creative nations and promised to cultivate their creative industries as 
potential strategic industries to drive their respective economies (Kong, 2014).  
In addition to this, despite reluctance in accepting or promoting strong statehood, 
advocates of neoliberalism prefer to utilize nationalist sentiments from the population as 
an antidote to cut-throat competition in society (Harvey, 2005). In that sense, cultural 
assets serve as key catalysts for the state to stimulate such feelings. Such an 
instrumentalist approach to culture, in which the state puts more emphasis on social and 
economic benefits of culture than its intrinsic values like aesthetic quality and creativity 
as the touchstones for supporting culture, has become a mainstream policy imperative of 
designing and implementing cultural policies (Miles, 2007; Behr, Brennan & Cloonan, 
2016; Fung, 2018).18 All these practices and influences push the state to maintain a 
presence in the cultural domain and defend it from foreign penetrations. 
Today, many countries argue that culture is instrumental in shaping a distinctive 
national identity that distinguishes a society from other nation-states and contributes to 
legitimizing its sovereignty over a population (Miller & Yúdice, 2002; Raboy & Padovani, 
2010; Iosifidis, 2016). Based on widespread anxiety over the penetration of US media 
conglomerates with overwhelming financial firepower and technological advantages into 
their cultural domain which might wipe out local businesses and homogenize local 
identities, various states have resisted ideas of the free flow of information (Yúdice, 
 
18 Artistic creativity, which shapes the fundamentals of intrinsic values of cultural artifacts, 
involves “imagination and a capacity to generate original ideas and novel ways of interpreting the 
world, expressed in text, sound, and image (Throsby, 2010, 15)”. In this regard, intrinsic values of 
culture are consisted of aesthetic, authentic, historic, spiritual, and symbolic values, etc. This is 
different from value-judgement of commercial goods (Kong, 2014; Marks, 2017). Given that 
cultural assets play pivotal roles in communicating symbolic ideas and promoting the freedom of 
expression, they cannot be same as other creative activities which merely seek to people to 
purchase their products (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005).  
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2003). 19 In a similar vein, they have strived to carve out exceptions on cultural goods 
and services when they set out protocols for international trade (Garner, 2016). The 
backlash against US-led globalization projects for cultural industries can be seen from 
both less developed countries or countries ruled by authoritarian regimes, but also many 
Western European countries with advanced market economies such as Canada and 
France, arguing their right to develop and preserve culture and cultural policies as they 
play pivotal roles in promoting diversity and developing identities which are foundational 
to their societies (Gagné, 2019; Goff, 2019).20 
Granted, the impacts of globalization on cultural industries differ from society to 
society depending on each one’s institutional contexts (Flew, Iosifidis & Steemers, 
2016). No matter the outcome, however, many countries still define culture as their core 
interest and strive to defend and promote their local businesses. To protect their 
domestic cultural products, many states impose a variety of actions to control foreign 
imports and promote local products in their domestic cultural markets (Gagné, 2019). 
 
19 Notably, a number of countries in the South expressed that the free flow of information would 
reinforce structural and technological imbalances in information flows between the US (and its 
few allies including the United Kingdom) and other countries. For them, it would reinforce the 
dominance of the Western-based media conglomerates in their societies and reproduce a core-
periphery relationship between the West and others that would lead to further imperialism 
(Masmoudi, 1979). In relation to this, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) introduced the International Commission for the Study of 
Communication Problems, so-called MacBride Commission named after an Irish politician Sean 
MacBride who served as the chair, in 1978 to develop schemes of the global flows of information. 
In 1980, the Commission submitted its report, which strongly endorsed to democratize the 
structure of flow of information through strengthening independence and self-reliance of individual 
states. In detail, the report suggested developing countries to “take specific measures to establish 
or develop essential elements of their communication systems (UNESCO, 1980, 255)” through 
supporting domestic news agencies and cultural producers and demanding fairer distributions of 
media resources such as the electro-magnetic spectrum and stationary satellites that should be 
“shared as the common property of mankind (UNESCO, 1980, 258)”.  
While the report’s recommendations received widespread support from many countries, several 
Western countries, led by the US and the United Kingdom, strongly condemned the report as an 
abrogation of organization’s basic duties of promoting the right to communicate and protecting 
free coverage activities of journalists to government control of the media, which resulted in 
withdrawals of the US (1985) and the UK (1986) from UNESCO (Thussu, 2015). Despite 
backlash from UNESCO, the US government continues to argue the free flow of information and 
abolish state interventions from media and cultural industries in international trade negotiations 
(Jin, 2020b). Meanwhile, many of the MacBride Commission’s suggestions were included in 
UNESCO’s following multilateral agreements like the Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Cultural Expressions in 2005 (Garner, 2016). 
20 In the fear of cultural homogenization, Canada and France have argued cultural exception, 
demanding that cultural goods and services should be exempted from their trade negotiations. In 
detail, the French government mobilized this principle in trade negotiations, including a proposed 
trade agreement between the European Union and the US (Garner, 2016).  
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This includes quota systems on foreign imports and domestic cultural products in the 
distribution system as well as tariffs on imported cultural goods and services (Jin, 2011a; 
Garner, 2016).21 Moreover, the state protects its cultural production with indirect 
regulatory methods including introducing different technology standards, consumer 
protection policies, and rating systems to filter foreign cultural products (Jin, 2017). 
Then, if the state implements free-market and profit-driven logics to its cultural 
industries, it is only because further commercialization and marketization benefit state 
interest (Freedman, 2008; Jin, 2013). In relation to this, Cerny (2000) argues that 
globalization increases the state’s roles in the economy to promote the competitiveness 
of domestic industries and adjust marketization.  
Apart from restrictions on imported cultural products, there are ways for the state 
to retain its authority and exert its influence on domestic cultural production. Alongside 
trade regulations, the state can manage the entire production and distribution chain with 
regulations and can exert influence over the content of cultural products. For example, 
the state manages the rating system for audiovisual products affecting the content of 
various products in distribution systems. Public authorities can restrict or prevent the 
circulation of content for indecency or obscenity, and despite controversies over the 
definition of what is considered obscene and limitations on freedom of expression, such 
measures of prior restraint are generally understood as constitutional (Havens & Lotz, 
2017).  
In addition to content regulation, the state involves in cultural production by giving 
subsidies or presenting tax benefits to local producers and distributors who produce 
cultural goods and services. Moreover, it often directly engages in producing cultural 
goods and services through the cultural ministry and public organizations. For instance, 
when it comes to the broadcasting industry, public broadcasters function as the main 
carriers of locally produced television content in many countries, including Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Ireland and so forth (Taras & Waddell, 2020; Verboord & Kristensen, 
2020). Moreover, public organizations in the motion picture world deeply engage in 
promoting domestic films by commissioning, funding, and marketing individual film 
 
21In relation to this, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a legal agreement 
prescribes rules of international trade, granted exceptions in cinema films. For instance, 
according to its Article IV, there is a provision which allows contracting parties to impose internal 
regulations in domestic film markets such as screen quotas (World Trade Organization, n.d.).  
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production (Druick, 2014; Jin, 2020a). Despite criticism of restricted budgets, limited 
authority, and bureaucratic approaches to cultural production, public institutions serve as 
major patrons of local cultural production, which is key to defending local producers from 
US-based big capital. 
In conjunction with existing industrial regulations, public authorities manage the 
media environment by regulating the structure of cultural businesses. For instance, 
many countries regulate cross-ownership in media businesses—a single corporate 
entity’s ownership of multiple media companies—as a way of maintaining the diversity of 
voices and preventing monopoly in media. In addition to this, the state has the right to 
license broadcasters on the basis that airwaves are deemed as natural resources that 
should be managed by the state to allocate them fairly (Lee & Jin, 2018). Meanwhile, 
some countries require distributors in the domestic market to broadcast and screen a 
certain amount of film, music, and television produced by domestic producers. 
Combined with other special treatment for domestic cultural producers, including 
subsidies, tax benefits, and other institutional supports, these measures have been vital 
to protect and promote local producers (Spalding, 2016; Leiva & Albornoz, 2020).  
The state even engages in technological development, which is the main 
stimulus connecting different cultural productions and integrates the production chain 
into a single global one. With funding, laws, regulations, infrastructures, and promotion 
programs, the state constantly intervenes in developing technologies for the sake of its 
interests (Sadowski, 2020). Indeed, the state still has the mandate of adopting standards 
of various technologies used in mobile broadband, radio spectrum, and ultra-high-
definition television, etc. For instance, by constructing high-speed broadband network 
and setting detailed standards of broadband technologies that service providers should 
satisfy, the Korean state safeguarded domestic telecommunication businesses and 
played a decisive role in the rapid growth of the nation’s Internet penetration in the 
2000s (Oh & Larson, 2011; Jin, 2017).22 It also sets details of net neutrality—the 
principle which Internet service providers should treat all data, hosts and users the same 
without any discrimination—which are fundamental to the development of global cultural 
 
22 In detail, the government imposed a series of regulation for limiting infiltrations of foreign 
industrial actors by introducing the Wireless Internet Platform for Interoperability (WIPI), a 
distinctive standard for domestic wireless mobile internet in the early 2000s. Although the 
government lifted the mandatory use of WIPI in 2009, this was effective in terms of delaying the 
entry of foreign telecommunication players (Jin, 2017). 
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industries. For example, the Trump administration repealed net neutrality in 2018 making 
broadband providers enable to influence Internet traffic by blocking or slowing down 
websites or charge extra fees on certain web hosts, which many of their measures are 
illegal in Canada (Zimmer, 2018).  
Given that technologies are socially constructed artifacts, the state influences 
technological development to reflect its interests through technology governance 
(Nuechterlein & Weiser, 2013; Briggs & Burke, 2020). Moreover, the state is directly 
involved in the technological domain to secure its political and economic interests, such 
as hacking data from other countries (Follis & Fish, 2020). This results in re-setting 
borders within digital space and shows how the path of technological development is 
influenced by the state (Tawil-Souri, 2015). Such direct and indirect engagement of the 
state and its public organizations are vital to local producers and distributors who 
compete against US media conglomerates armed with financial muscle and cutting-edge 
technologies.  
Considering all this, the conceptualizations of both neoliberalism and 
globalization, as well as the active practices of both in society—including in cultural 
industries—cannot be generalized across states and cultures as they are subject to local 
influences and characteristics. This provides a space for the state to redefine 
neoliberalism and globalization as a means of implementing both in society and various 
industries, leading to characteristics that would depend on local contexts and the state’s 
political, economic, and social interests. Then, it becomes premature to conclude that 
neoliberal globalization of cultural industries driven by US media conglomerates and the 
US government neutralizes the state’s sovereignty in the global market. Rather, the state 
continues to engage in its cultural domain by re-establishing relationships with private 
companies and capital which reshape the mechanisms of cultural production at both the 
national and global levels (Flew & Waisbord, 2015). Despite the flow of neoliberal 
globalization in which forces urge the state to retreat from its cultural governance, many 
states still retain their policy instruments and give orders to their cultural assets (Jin, 
2013; Flew, Iosifidis, Steemers, 2016). Therefore, by mobilizing domestic regulations 
and infrastructures which provide a customized environment for local players and protect 
them from their competitors with overwhelming capital and technological capacities, 
states continue to play a role as an important stakeholder in both national and global 
cultural industries. That said, the following chapters explain how the state persists in this 
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role through exercising its political-economic power over cultural industries which 
become more multilayered by global forces.  
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Chapter 3.  
 
The Korean Developmental State’s Development of 
Cultural Industries 
3.1. Introduction 
Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the Korean state has 
strived to increase ethnic and national consciousness and to mobilize its population in 
the name of national development. In this regard, like other newly developing countries 
that gained independence in the aftermath of World War II, the Korean government 
considered culture an instrument to manage its citizens by promoting proper lifestyles 
and work ethic and propagated a ‘righteous’ historical perspective to the population 
(Miller and Yúdice, 2002). In addition to this, as a result of the Korean War (1950–1953), 
fierce ideological competitions between North Korea and South Korea contributed to the 
exploitation of culture for consolidating authority on the part of both regions to gain the 
upper hand in the ongoing conflict. Finally, the authoritarian regime which ruled the 
nation from 1961 to 1987 also regarded culture as an instrument to establish its 
otherwise vulnerable legitimacy as the nation’s leadership. These factors justified the 
Korean state’s mobilization of all available resources seen as necessary to develop the 
nation, and culture was not an exception (Kim G., 2018). Such distinctive historical 
moments played major roles in the formation of the backbone of the Korean 
developmental state, whose legacies continued after the nation’s democratization in 
1988 and are still seen in contemporary Korea today.  
Based on the explanation, the chapter introduces the history of Korean cultural 
policies from the 1960s, when the Korean state began to design and implement policy 
measures in the cultural realm. First of all, the chapter defines the concept of the 
developmental state in the Korean context. Then, it explains the trajectory of the nation’s 
cultural policies from 1961 to 2021 in relation to the developmental state. Throughout the 
chapter, it concludes that Korean cultural policies are inextricably linked to the nation’s 
legacies of the developmental state, whose policies aimed to mobilize all available 
resources in the name of national interest and developing the nation. This relationship 
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between the state and the cultural realm is deeply embedded in the rise of the Korean 
cultural industries.  
3.2. An Overview of the Developmental State Model in East 
Asia and the Korean Developmental State 
3.2.1. The Model of the East Asian Developmental State 
Developmentalism is an economic theory that emphasizes the state’s capacity 
and authority to develop its economy by handling market forces. In that sense, the 
developmental state refers to a centralized state with preeminent authority in relation to 
the private sector to secure its development objectives (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990). 
The developmental state presumes active roles of the state to create and regulate the 
nexus of the national economy and politics that support sustained industrialization and 
mobilization of resources (Haggard & Moon, 1993). In the name of national interest, the 
developmental state takes the role of an active coordinator for mobilizing resources and 
managing stakeholders to develop a national economy by implementing measures and 
policies, influenced by entrepreneurial perspectives, that lead to large-scale changes. 
The state’s intervention in the industries through various policy measures and control of 
various stakeholder interests in the socioeconomic realm led to an increase in the scale 
of production (Chang, 2001). In this regard, the developmental state can be explained as 
a type of state that prioritizes economic development over other public policies in the 
belief that state-led industrialization is more effective than market-driven approaches 
(Amsden, 1989; Haggard & Moon, 1993; Suh & Kwon, 2014).  
A successful developmental state is often characterized by autonomous and 
competent bureaucracy, political leadership based on executive dominance, close 
relationships between state agencies and leading figures in the industries, a large pool 
of policy measures that give impetuses to economic growth, and the state’s political 
ability to insulate the decision-making surrounding economic policies from diverse 
stakeholders in terms of managing resources and instruments (Haggard, 1990). In 
particular, the developmental state operationalizes the concept of economic 
development in terms of competitiveness, growth, and productivity, rather than public 
welfare. It intervenes in the market by mobilizing resources and disciplining economic 
actors through various policy sets such as financial incentives and protections from 
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foreign capital to accomplish its missions (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990). Thanks to a 
body of competent bureaucrats, the state was able to govern the market and construct 
synergic connections with private companies who expected the co-existence of market 
competitions and active administration (Chan, Clark & Lam, 1998). For example, the 
Korean government has regularly called monthly meetings with high authorities from 
banks and other industries to consolidate its close relationship with them and to manage 
their strategies for both domestic and foreign markets so that they could reduce 
transaction costs and adopt new technologies in industrial fields (Amsden, 1989). 
Much of the concept of the developmental state is based on Keynesian 
economics which emphasizes the roles of a strong state in controlling the flow of 
demand and supply in the belief that the market is an unstable system (Radice, 2008). If 
so, the state’s presence becomes important when striving for long-term economic growth 
by managing various stakeholders in the market to stabilize the economic system by 
nurturing infant industries (Hirschman, 1958). In this regard, scholars presume the 
institutional arrangements as a driving force in explaining the rapid growth of East Asian 
countries (Moon & Prasad, 1994). For instance, In the 1950s, the Japanese government 
recognized its role in creating competitive advantages in the market not only by 
incubating new businesses but also by pushing them toward innovations in the global 
economy. As markets were supervised by the state, such an interventionist approach 
might conflict with tenets of economic rationalism; however, this was an effective method 
to boost industries that otherwise required rapid technological progress and high labour 
productivity in a short period of time (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990).  
Under the strong guidance of their respective governments, several East Asian 
states including Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore transformed their economies with 
export-oriented cutting-edge technologies and capital-intensive businesses (Haggard, 
1990). In response to the success of East Asian economies, Ward (1990) argues that 
the state’s additional investment in several key industries and forcing them to address 
global competition through cutting-edge technologies and other aspects of high 
productivity triggered by state interventions were adequate measures for export-oriented 
countries. Such successful economic development challenged the conventional wisdom 
of free-market-led industrializations (Castells, 1992). 
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Despite such achievements in economic development, it is still worth noting that 
the roles of the Korean government as a developmental state have been contested in 
Korean society. Most of all, many opposition politicians and activists who fought for 
democracy argued that state-led developmentalism served as an ideology for rulers to 
legitimize the suspension of the liberal order and to dissolve contradictions and 
disparities in Korean society with heavy-handed methods that will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs (Chang, 2019). In detail, the way in which politicians secured and 
maneuvered space for bureaucrats to maintain the state’s autonomy to manage the 
economic system is often accompanied by soft authoritarianism that suppresses 
different voices from stakeholders (Wade, 1990).  
3.2.2. A Brief Introduction of the Korean Developmental State and Its 
Approach to the Cultural Domain 
The Korean developmental state can be understood as “systematic and 
comprehensive action plans for a certain period of future to rationally utilize resources so 
that the state can accomplish its missions defined from its economic plans (Kang, 2001, 
5)”. Park Chung-hee, who served as the head of state from 1961 to 1979, launched a 
series of masterplans to develop the economy with top-down, state-directed policy 
frameworks. Arguing that the market-driven economic growth would contradict the 
state’s intentions, he legitimized the developmental system as state-guided capitalism in 
which the state leads economic and industrial development (Park, 1970).23 The Park 
administration established the Economic Planning Board (EPB) in 1961 to design and 
direct the development plan and allocate the budget. As the main architect of 
constructing the developmental state, the position of EPB was strong since it 
implemented valorization schemes, set up international economic policies, and 
administered policy-makings of other governmental agencies to align with its 
developmental plans. While the Korean economy recorded a remarkable success in the 
1960-70s under the direction of Five-year economic development plans, such style of 
 
23 Despite his notes, one of the core characteristics of Korean developmental state is its close 
cooperation between family-owned business conglomerates known as Chaebols. This is partly 
due to how the nature of the developmental state is based on negotiations of goals and policies 
with private sectors and the support of growth through resource allocation. Such close ties were 
based on the state’s allocation of resources and negotiations with major companies. 
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governance resulted in the mobilization of the entire government system to prioritize 
economic development over other agendas.  
As a former army general who took power in a 1961 military coup, followed by 
the presidential election in 1963, the Park administration continued to use authoritarian 
rule and military resources to enforce measures to achieve the developmental state’s 
missions in the name of efficiency alongside economic bureaucracy led by technocrats, 
who were often bureaucrats with technological expertise. Thanks to such measures, the 
state bureaucracy became strong enough to resist pressures from private sectors and 
political oppositions and improved its control over capital mobilization (Kim H-A., 2011). 
Such a concentration of executive power toward economic development could be 
characterized as a developmental state since the state often transcended the various 
interests of different social forces in terms of formulating and implementing development 
strategies (Evans, 1995). The state-led developmentalism and its five-year 
developmental plans, which were renewed until 1986, succeeded in industrializing the 
Korean nation with heavy-chemical industries and export-led structures.  
Despite its success, this development model brought serious side-effects to both 
the economy and society. For example, while the state’s stance on mobilizing and 
allocating resources to develop the industry was useful for boosting businesses in a 
short period, only a handful of private companies could enjoy the resulting benefits. Such 
a concentration led to structural imbalances between several major conglomerates and 
other small-medium businesses where the entire economy became dependent on their 
performance. This resulted in ‘back-scratching’ alliances between politicians and a 
handful of conglomerate leaders, resulting in serious corruption (Doucette, 2015). In 
addition to this corruption, much of the state’s mobilization was based on forcing low-
wage policies and long working hours on the labour force with minimal welfare and 
protections. This approach provoked labour disputes between workers and companies, 
but the state maintained their restrictions toward labour that weakened the rights of 
employees (Lee, 2015). 
As long as the developmental state was a human artifact, the design and 
implementation of the developmental state demanded a series of political and 
sociocultural devices to legitimize such mobilization of resources. Since the economic 
development was considered as core to political campaigns of ‘the modernization of the 
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fatherland (Jogukgeundaehwa in Korean)’ through political campaigns, it was necessary 
to design ideological devices to legitimize such a definition and prioritization of the 
economic development as the dominant means of modernization. Moreover, as long as 
the state suspended the constitutional rights of the citizenry, such as freedom of 
expression, and exploited labour in the name of economic success, there was a need for 
ideological measures to support an authoritative governing style of the state. This 
became the foundation of Korean cultural policies in the 1960s (Lee, 2019a).24  
Legacies of the developmental state, particularly in the cultural domain, are still 
prominent in Korea’s contemporary industries. Since the 1990s, the state has utilized 
different strategies to develop cultural businesses and promote their cultural goods. 
Depending on each administration’s political orientation and changes in the international 
market, the state used both hands-on and hands-off measures to mobilize culture as a 
tool of accomplishing its political and economic ends (Jin, 2011b). On one hand, liberal-
progressive administrations under the presidency of Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh 
Moo-hyun (2003–2008) understood culture as vital to propping up the nation’s 
democracy. Since many leading figures from cultural fields who participated in these 
administrations had a long history of fighting against previous authoritarian governments, 
they believed the state should not interfere with culture or the arts (Kang H., 2015; Lee, 
2019a). In addition to this, a series of neoliberal reforms that led the state to withdraw 
from public sectors and instead introduce free-market system measures in economic 
policies also influenced the reluctance of these administrations to directly participate and 
manage their cultural sector (Ryoo & Jin, 2020).  
In this regard, both the Kim and Roh administrations emphasized the virtues of 
creativity and diversity of culture and implemented more indirect and passive methods to 
develop industries, such as lessening the entry barrier of private capital into cultural 
businesses, reducing protectionist measures on the domestic market, and introducing 
private-led public funds to support cultural products instead of direct subsidies (Kim J. 
 
24 In this regard, the term developmental state in Korea is hardly accepted as an ideologically 
neutral concept in Korean society considering its legacies of authoritarian rule in past decades 
that resulted in suppressing democracy. At times, the model of developmental state brings up 
deficiencies in democracy and legitimizes the exploitation of labor in the name of economic 
development. Moreover, connections between politicians and businesspeople established 
unhealthy, collusive political-economic cartels that brought serious corruption to Korean politics 
and society (Woo-Cummings, 1999).  
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S., 2011; Jin, 2020a). Also, in proclaiming the autonomy of culture, they supported arts 
and culture through autonomous councils that were managed by cultural experts. 
Considered as arm’s length principles, public funds were distributed by experts and 
practitioners in the cultural domain to secure institutional autonomy of culture and 
prevent interventions from the paymaster (Gray, 2012; Lee, 2019a). In relation to the 
Korean Wave, both administrations chose strategies for managing potential anti-Korean 
sentiments overseas in which the popularity of Korean cultural products might be seen 
as another cultural invasion like the entry of Hollywood had been understood in the 
region (Kim & Jin, 2016). Despite such measures, the state continued to intervene in 
cultural industries by encouraging more investment from major capital and negotiating 
with various stakeholders in the cultural domain as a facilitator.  
On the other hand, conservative administrations led by Lee Myung-bak (2008–
2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013–2017) were more active in utilizing culture, focusing on 
its potential political and economic contributions to the national economy. Recognizing 
the popularity of Korean pop idols and television series in foreign countries, both 
administrations established governmental organizations such as the Korea Creative 
Content Agency (KOCCA) and the Presidential Committee for Cultural Enrichment 
(PCCE) to develop strategies and programs to develop various cultural businesses and 
encouraged investments from major conglomerates. In the name of producing content 
with high commercial viability in the global market, these administrations were directly 
involved in the entire production chain of cultural goods, taking more proactive and direct 
measures such as providing subsidies on designing content and its production as well as 
promoting domestic cultural products in the distribution market (Ryoo & Jin, 2020). In 
this regard, the state itself became a patron of producing and distributing cultural 
products globally (Lee, 2019a).  
Meanwhile, both Lee and Park believed that the Korean Wave would benefit the 
nation’s international reputation and improve its international competitiveness. 
Accordingly, they often mentioned the success of Korean cultural products in public and 
focused their administrations’ efforts toward utilizing popular cultural goods for 
strengthening the soft power of the nation. Given that much of soft power rests on a 
nation’s cultural resources, the popularity of Korean cultural products in global markets 
was a vital tool to pursue various political agendas aimed at projecting Korea’s political-
economic power in the global arena (Nye & Kim, 2013). Not surprisingly, such 
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usefulness legitimized conservative administrations’ ability to wield its influence over 
cultural industries with more direct methods in the name of cultural diplomacy and 
national branding (Nye, 2008; Republic of Korea Government, 2008; Kim & Jin, 2016). 
Such a utility of culture for political projects led the nation’s cultural ministry and its 
affiliated organizations to urge artists and entrepreneurs in the field to produce content 
with high chances of success in the global market. This became another reason for the 
state to employ hands-on measures on directing its cultural industries to follow its 
guidelines. As both the Lee and Park administrations strived to instrumentalize culture 
for developing the national economy and fostered marketization of cultural values, their 
presences in the cultural domain were more significant than their liberal-progressive 
predecessors. Such an instrumentalist and interventionist approach often collided with 
figures in the cultural domain and brought the state’s oppression of anti-governmental 
cultural producers. 
In short, much of the development of the Korean cultural industries was achieved 
by various interventions by the Korean state. Indeed, the state played pivotal roles in 
creating strategies for developing industries, mobilizing resources, and introducing 
preferential schemes to support businesses, directing companies and artists and 
promoting their cultural works in the market, etc. Despite some differences based on 
how each administration responded to neoliberalism and globalization and its political 
tendency, all administrations after the 1990s showed strong willingness toward 
developing cultural industries and recognized that state action would be vital to building 
up these emerging businesses. The following sections explain the major development 
strategies of each administration since the 1990s and how their approaches to cultural 
industries are connected to the nation’s legacies of the developmental state.  
3.3. Cultural Industry Policies in Pre-Korean Wave Era: The 
Birth of Cultural Industry Policies under Roh Tae-woo 
(1988–1993) and Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) 
Administrations 
After a series of nationwide democracy movements in 1987, the Korean 
government promised to reform the constitution and political system towards full 
democracy, including a direct presidential election system. Due to the fragmented 
opposition vote, Roh Tae-woo, a former army general, was elected as president by 
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popular vote. As part of political democratization, the Roh administration lifted and eased 
censorship on cultural products such as the publisher registration system and ‘the Basic 
Press Law’ that restricted freedom of expression (Jin, 2011b; Lee, 2019a). Also, market 
liberalization was intensified during Roh’s presidency. For instance, the Roh 
administration attempted to have Chaebols—family-owned large conglomerates which 
dominated the nation’s economy—focus on their core businesses to reduce competition 
and excessive investment. Due to fierce backlash, however, the state’s attempt to reform 
Chaebols failed despite the public’s skepticism stemmed from regular uncoordinated 
diversification, unethical economic activities, and corruption among Chaebol-run 
businesses (Uttam, 2014). Major tycoons including Hyundai and Samsung criticized the 
inefficiencies and incompetence of Roh’s economic team. This signified the power 
Chaebols held against the ruling political elites (Jin, 2011b). 
The state’s retreat from the political-economic sphere in line with the 
democratization and the rise of private stakeholders served as a catalyst for further 
industrialization of the cultural domain. In 1990, the Roh administration established a 
separate ministry for cultural affairs for the first time—the Ministry of Culture (MOC)—
and initiated a series of cultural policies which aimed at disarticulating the pre-existing 
government’s propaganda from the state’s approach to the cultural domain. In line with 
political democratization, providing the population more access to culture would be at the 
core of the state’s new agenda in its cultural policies. This became detailed in its 
masterplan, ‘Ten-year Plan for Cultural Development’ in 1990. To provide more 
accessibility to culture, the administration promised to provide more art education in 
schools and to expand infrastructures for artists who worked in both rural and urban 
areas, including increasing subsidies to traditional cultural heritages. Also, in line with its 
recent Olympic Games in 1988, the Ministry promised to promote Korean culture 
overseas and host various events to position the nation as a hub of Asian culture 
(Ministry of Culture, 1990).  
While the administration put emphasis on culture and the arts as a means of 
improving quality of life, a number of measures presumed that the state would 
spearhead the proposed changes rather than cultural workers or the market. Unlike 
other countries that discussed ways how to preserve people’s rights to create and enjoy 
culture, this plan was introduced without a consensus of cultural workers, who were 
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ready to develop relevant schemes to respond to the state’s new framework despite not 
being initially consulted (Lee, 2019a).25  
Meanwhile, the administration introduced several measures to liberalize the 
cultural market. For instance, because of trade disputes with the US, the Roh 
administration abolished the exclusive rights of domestic film companies to import and 
release foreign films in 1988, which allowed the direct distribution of imported films (Jin, 
2019). Although several conglomerates showed interest in opening cultural businesses, 
there were few major players during Roh’s tenure, which resulted in the state taking the 
lead in reorganizing the cultural milieu after the democratization. In other words, as long 
as both the market and cultural activists did not have enough authority to fill the power 
vacuum in the cultural domain due to their inefficiencies and incapacities, the state could 
continue to architect the field. Although much of Roh’s plan was not successful due to 
the suspension of certain measures, such as the local self-governing system—which 
was scheduled to be introduced in 1991 but was waived until 1995, Roh’s approach 
implied that legacies of the developmental state would prevail after the democratization. 
The succeeding Kim Young-sam administration saw detailed plans of industrializing 
cultural industries emerging from the Korean state in earnest (Jin, 2016). 
In 1992, a long-time democratic activist and the ruling party candidate Kim 
Young-sam was elected as Roh’s successor. Inaugurated in early 1993, he began to 
implement a series of measures to deregulate the economy in line with discourses of 
neoliberal globalization. Based on his criticisms of previous authoritarian governments, 
which developed the economy at the expense of civil liberty and democracy, he 
 
25 When it comes to disseminating cultural works to the public, societies debated whether to adopt 
the democratization of culture or cultural democracy as the keynote for their cultural policies. At 
one hand, based on universalism which characterized human nature with universal norms, 
supporters of the democratization of culture demanded that the state would have to disseminate 
qualified cultural works to audiences who had not have enough chances to access them due to 
lack of financial means or knowledge. On the other hand, advocates of cultural democracy 
understood the subjective and relational nature of actors in the cultural domain and argued to 
promote the rights of individuals to prefer certain culture freely and recommended that policies 
should guarantee free choice through providing relevant distribution channels and information. 
Depending on the model, the state’s roles in cultural policies would be different—the 
democratization of culture model would ask the state to generate supply for cultural works by 
increasing overall capacity of the population via propagation and education directed from the 
state, and cultural democracy would minimize the amount of intrusion into cultural goods and 
services so that the public would express their cultural capabilities throughout the society 
(Evyard, 1997).  
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proclaimed that his administration would manage the economy based on the principles 
of free markets such as competition and deregulation with highlighting freedom of 
individuals (Kim, 1993; Kwon & Kim, 2014). Directed by the World Trade Organization—
which proclaimed free-market trade as the main tool for economic development and 
argued for the state to abolish restrictions on trade and other inadequate 
macroeconomic and monetary policies that harmed the market—his cabinet introduced 
policies to open the market and cut back the role of government (World Trade 
Organization, 2009; Jin, 2011b).  
In addition to this, Kim established the Presidential Committee on Globalization 
and began to materialize his plans for globalization. While Kim’s emphases on 
globalization was a response to the United States and its Western allies pressuring the 
Korean government to open its domestic market, he believed that globalization would 
bring new opportunities to incentivize domestic players to innovate their businesses, 
which would be crucial to revitalizing the economy (Kang, 2000). As an outcome, the 
administration announced to both partially and fully liberalize 47 industry sectors, which 
had originally been under the state’s direct control, by 2000 (Baek, May 22, 2017).  
However, the state continued to direct private companies on how to restructure 
their businesses. Despite its emphasis on market liberalization and deregulation, the 
administration kept its interventionist standpoint to implement neoliberal ideas in both 
policy contexts and the market. In the name of globalization, Kim and ministers in his 
cabinet often convened meetings with heads of conglomerates and provided guidelines 
to them on how to restructure their businesses in line with the state’s missions, such as 
foreign investments, price freeze on daily necessities, and the development of new 
businesses that the state preferred. Although the administration removed or relaxed 
regulations in the market, the state still had some degree of authority over such 
regulations through the state’s inspection agencies and government-run banks. In this 
regard, even if Chaebols gained more power, they still had to respect the state’s 
leadership in the economic realm (Baek, June 4, 2017).  
The co-existence of both market liberalization and state-interventionist 
tendencies was also seen in changes to cultural industry policies. During his tenure, Kim 
eased censorship on cultural products and the media. For instance, in 1995, the 
administration lifted the pre-rating system on popular music that had been abused to 
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censor songs and singers. In the following year, it also replaced the same system on 
films with a newly implemented rating system. Many local newspapers and broadcasters 
were established, and a handful of journalists who had been laid off by authoritarian 
regimes were reinstated to their companies. Considering Kim’s political background as a 
political activist against authoritarian regimes in the 1970s and 1980s, such measures on 
liberalizing the press were natural consequences (Kwon & Kim, 2014). Moreover, they 
accorded with the state’s emphases on liberalizing the market (Kim D., 2018). 
Throughout these measures, the administration sought to expand cultural industries and 
integrate its cultural businesses into the global market (Jin, 2006).  
Meanwhile, the Kim administration employed state-interventionist strategies to 
develop the nation’s cultural industries. In 1994, the Presidential Advisory Council for 
Science and Technology suggested a strategic plan for developing high-tech media 
content production, particularly in the film industry, noting that Hollywood blockbuster 
Jurassic Park’s total revenue exceeded the sales of 1.5 million cars manufactured by 
Hyundai Motors (Kim, 1994; Shim, 2008). Based on his recognition that “it would be 
inevitable to open the market to foreign cultural products (Kim, 1995)”, the Ministry of 
Culture and Sport (MCS) installed the Cultural Industry Bureau to develop strategies for 
globalization and market liberalization of cultural industries in 1994. The bureau was 
formed with four divisions, and each division would develop policy schemes to promote 
films, videos and music, publishing, and policy planning, respectively.  
In the belief that cultural products could be more profitable than other products 
from manufacturing businesses such as automobiles, policymakers in MCS were eager 
to industrializing cultural businesses that had been under the state’s protection as tools 
of preserving traditions and propaganda (Shim, 2006; Ryoo & Jin, 2020). As a result, the 
National Assembly established several legal frameworks to support cultural businesses, 
such as the Promotion of the Motion Pictures Industry Act in 1995 and amended the 
Culture and Arts Promotion Act to include cultural industries within the boundary of 
culture and arts so that MCS could support the development of cultural businesses. That 
said, while the state continued to deregulate and open the cultural market, it also 
introduced several legal frameworks like the ‘Motion Picture Promotion Act (1995)’ so 
that the state would be able to support cultural industries by providing subsidies and tax 
benefits (Han, 2010).  
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When it comes to raising investment, the Kim administration invited 
conglomerates to reshape the cultural industries and to mobilize private money. Indeed, 
the entry of Chaebols, including CJ, Hyundai, Samsung, SK, and Tongyang, into the 
market contributed to increasing revenues and the number of employees, notably in 
broadcasting and film businesses. For instance, Hyundai set a joint venture with 
France’s Canal Plus and entered the film distribution industry, and CJ invested 300 
million USD into Steven Spielberg’s DreamWorks (Kang I., 2015). Meanwhile, Samsung 
strived to produce several films like Shiri, the first Korean blockbuster film about the 
confrontation between South and North Korea, with a total cost of 8.5 million USD (Shim, 
2008; Jin, 2006, 2019). Such a method of developing cultural industries, which the state 
mobilized conglomerates for promoting a new industry, was nothing new compared to 
the pre-existing industry promotion policies. This meant that the state’s viewpoint on its 
cultural milieu began to change as industrial policies from previous policies aimed at 
preserving cultural artifacts and controlling popular culture with censorships, with new 
policies crafted around the expectation of economic benefits and the export of cultural 
products.  
The Kim Young-sam administration’s roles in and approach to developing cultural 
industries were important as it recognized the economic potentials of culture and began 
to promote the industrialization of popular culture, laying the key groundwork for what is 
now contemporary state cultural policy (Yim, 2002; Ryoo & Jin, 2020). In retrospect, 
authoritarian governments understood cultural products as tools for propagating their 
political agendas and controlling the population, which became the basis of 
policymaking. However, such a repressive approach became obsolete after the political 
democratization period when the Korean state introduced a new framework for cultural 
policies that would better fit into a system of more democratic governance and satisfy 
the nation’s new cultural identity in the post-authoritarian era (Yim, 2002). In this regard, 
in line with the administration’s masterplan of economic globalization and creating new 
industries with information and communication technologies, emphasis on the economic 
potentials of culture saw a profound shift in attitudes toward cultural policies from 
regulation to promotion (Kwon & Kim, 2014). 
As mentioned, the Kim administration’s approach to developing cultural 
industries had characteristics of both market liberalization—which Kim sought to 
introduce with his agenda of globalization—and state-led developmentalism, which were 
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legacies from the previous authoritarian period. On the one hand, such characteristics 
reduced censorship of cultural products, including films, popular music, publication, and 
television programs, etc. Moreover, to attract investment of major financiers, including 
Chaebols, entry barriers into the cultural industry market were lowered, removing 
remnants of authoritarian government restrictions meant to control the domestic media 
market (Kwon & Kim, 2013; Kim D., 2018). Granted, in line with the administration’s 
plans of economic globalization, these measures triggered further commercialization in 
cultural production and brought about industrialization led by major market forces.  
In the meantime, the administration continued to be involved in developing 
cultural industries through setting masterplans, utilizing public and private resources, 
and providing both direct and indirect support. The administration reorganized the 
cultural ministry by establishing several sub-branches that would deal with industrial 
planning and support (Kwon & Kim, 2014) and reclassified audiovisual production as a 
manufacturing business. This meant that producers would be able to apply more 
subsidies, tax exemptions and other institutional supports that had previously only been 
available to manufacturing companies since they had been recognized as key sectors 
leading the nation’s export-led economy. Such measures allowed cultural producers to 
receive loans from major banks as their outcomes could be recognized as products with 
commercial viability (Parc, 2017). Furthermore, unlike other countries that focused on 
subsidizing creators, the Kim administration also constructed various infrastructure and 
introduced new distribution channels (Jin, 2011; Parc, 2017).  
Finally, Chaebols’ entry into film and television businesses was managed by their 
close cooperation and alignment with the state’s masterplans. While the administration 
advocated for the roles of market forces in industry development, it retained regulatory 
power to manage the direction of Chaebol activities in this burgeoning industry so that 
their entries into cultural production would benefit the state’s purpose of developing 
economy. In relation to market liberalization, the state not only deregulated barriers for 
foreign capital and the influx of foreign cultural products but also promoted major 
companies in cultural production to pioneer overseas markets (Kwon & Kim, 2013; Ryoo 
& Jin, 2020). Granted, these measures on cultural industry policies and support in the 
industries with interventionist approaches were vital to increase the nation’s cultural 
exports, which became the fundamental framework of the Korean Wave in the mid-
1990s.  
84 
Hence, despite the Kim administration’s emphases on globalization and the 
following steps to deregulate and liberalize the market, the state never withdrew its roles 
as an architect in shaping a new industry. Rather, by cooperating with pre-existing big 
players in the nation’s economy and with its political-economic leverages in trade 
negotiations and domestic regulations, the state continued to manage economic actors 
in ways that served its primary interests (Jin, 2016; Lee, 2019a). The administration’s 
approach to culture, by emphasizing economic potential, established the growth of the 
cultural industries. Also, while it highlighted the roles and contributions of market forces 
and private sectors in developing cultural industries through deregulating the cultural 
domain, the administration collaborated with Chaebols and other private stakeholders so 
they would serve to benefit the state’s mission of economic development. That said, 
Kim’s approach followed a utilization of neoliberal arguments for the sake of the state’s 
developmental interests (Ryoo & Jin, 2020). In the aftermath of the nation’s financial 
crisis in 1997–1998, Kim’s liberal successor Kim Dae-jung was forced to carry out 
neoliberal reforms, which became another pivotal moment in the state’s developing 
cultural industry policies. 
3.4. Cultural Industry Policies in the Korean Wave Era 
3.4.1. The Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998–2003): Foundation of 
the Korean Cultural Industry Policies with Neoliberal 
Imperatives  
In the aftermath of the nation’s financial crisis, Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) was 
elected president. Under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the new 
Kim administration implemented a series of neoliberal reforms, including deregulations in 
the labour market, liberalizations of the financial market, and privatization of public 
organizations to revive the economy.26 Bitten by the credit crunch, many financial 
institutions and several manufacturing conglomerates went bankrupt. This led the 
administration to introduce the ‘knowledge-based economy’ as a new narrative of its 
 
26 In relation to this, Jin (2011) explains that political factors also contributed to privatizing 
government-owned corporations. Kim promised to privatize state-owned enterprises including the 
Korea Telecom (KT), the state-owned telecommunication service provider, as a way of raising 
government revenues and enforcing anti-corruption policies on the public sector. During his 
presidency, this telecom mogul became fully privatized. This brought an opening of the nation’s 
local phone market to private players. 
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economic policies to replace bankrupted businesses and develop high value-added 
information and technology-oriented industries that would be fueled by venture 
companies (National Economic Advisory Committee, 2000). While the administration 
continued to carry out a large-scale restructuring of major conglomerates, it distributed a 
large budget to knowledge-based industries with interventionist policies to recuperate 
the nation from economic downturns (Yim, 2002; Jin, 2017; Lee, 2019a).  
In this regard, Kim recognized its cultural industries as high value-added 
businesses (Kwon & Kim, 2014). Kim often considered himself as the ‘President of 
Culture (Munhwadaetongryeong in Korean)’ and showed off his insight about the 
importance of culture. After his inauguration, he had a conversation with high-ranking 
officials and urged the necessity for supporting the cultural industries as follows, 
If the strength of a nation depended on its economy and military force in 
the 20th century, economy and culture will determine the nation’s strength. 
Cultural industries, in particular audiovisual media, have great added value. 
Their values are like those of automobiles or shipbuilding… Cultural 
industries not only gain profits but also promote Korea’s image to the world. 
In terms of competing with others, national image, as well as quality of 
goods, is crucial. (Kim, 1998).  
Based on his visions, the administration began to design and implement various 
programs to support the cultural domain. In 1999, it established the Korea Film 
Commission (KOFIC) as a core public agency to support its film industry. In 2000, The 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) introduced a five-year plan named ‘Cultural 
Industry Vision 21’, which was the Korean state’s first comprehensive policy framework 
to develop its cultural industries. Citing an American consultant Peter Drucker’s 
emphasis on the role of cultural industries in national economies in the coming century, 
the Ministry stressed that cultural industries were core pillars of the knowledge-based 
economy and the promotion of these businesses would be a key agenda of the 
administration to increase the nation’s competitive edge. Defining cultural industries as 
“industries relevant to produce, distribute, and consume cultural products that refer to 
commodities and services which accumulate cultural elements to create economic 
added value (MCT, 2000a, 5)”, the Ministry necessitated introducing supporting 
programs such as the Cultural Industry Promotion Fund to nurture industries in the belief 
that “there should be fundamental changes in planning and implementing objects, 
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methods and goals of cultural policies as the cultural domain becomes more important in 
society and the economy (MCT, 2001, 2).” 
In detail, it categorized five industries—audiovisual (including animation, 
broadcasting, and film), game, music, publishing, and cultural goods (e.g., character-
related businesses, fashion, and souvenirs)— and introduced strategies for developing 
each category, which included the establishment of marketing agencies to promote 
exports, the construction of infrastructures, restructuring distribution platforms, and the 
foundation of education programs. In 2001, MCT announced ‘Content Korea Vision 21’ 
to emphasize digitalization in the cultural industries. Along with pre-existing measures, 
the plan introduced the establishment of the Korea Culture and Content Agency, a state-
managed comprehensive executive agency under MCT to implement and manage 
government-funded programs to develop and promote domestic cultural businesses and 
whose annual budget would be 100-billion KRW (90.5 million USD). Also, the 
administration would invest another 100-billion KRW for the Informatization Promotion 
Fund managed by the Ministry of Science and Technology in developing digital cultural 
content.27 While both plans implied the institutionalization of supporting cultural 
industries similar to the state’s previous plans of promoting different industries, MCT’s 
budget reached 1% of the national budget in 2000. Public agencies established during 
Kim’s tenure executed various programs for developing the cultural industries and 
promoted their cultural products overseas (Shin, 2005).  
While such interventionist methods were related to the developmental state’s 
way of developing the industry, the Kim administration implemented market-friendly and 
less-interventionist hands-off methods to shape the fundamentals of its cultural 
 
27 According to the Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries enacted in 2009, the 
Korean government defines the term ‘content’ as “data or information, such as codes, characters, 
voice, sounds and images (Article 2-3)” and the term ‘cultural content’ as “content where cultural 
factors are embodied”. This legal foundation also provides definitions for ‘digital content’ and 
‘digital cultural content’ as “data or information, such as codes, characters, voice, sounds, and 
images, which are produced or processed in digital format to raise the effectiveness of the 
preservation effectiveness of the preservation and use thereof (Article 2-5)” and “digital content 
where cultural factors are embodied (Article 2-6).” Given that term content industries implied the 
disjuncture of content from materialized media conditions and the rebranding as intellectual 
properties along with digitalization, the Korean state’s use of the term ‘content’ in policy contexts 
is based on an assumption of combining culture with the digital environment, expecting synergies 
between cultural industries and information and communications technologies (Jin & Otmazgin, 
2014). Not surprisingly, this indicated the state’s strong willingness of exploiting culture as 
commodities (Lee, 2019a). 
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industries. Based on his political orientation as a liberalist, he proclaimed the arms-
length principle with the rhetoric of ‘support but not intervene’, which the state would not 
be involved in allocating government subsidies or intervene in cultural work of creators 
as arbiters of taste, and this rhetoric would be the motto of the administration’s approach 
to the cultural domain. During his presidency, the administration abolished film 
censorship in 2001 (Shin, 2005; Jin, 2019). It also sought to implement neoliberal 
cultural policies, aimed at avoiding direct interventions but also freeing the cultural 
market with indirect and inactive supports. In a similar vein, it continuously engaged in 
reshaping the media and cultural industries with several hands-off measures (Jin, 2016; 
Lee, 2019a). Also, the administration gave considerable autonomy and freedom to its 
agencies so that they could support cultural entrepreneurs and their projects with less 
intervention from the state (Kwon & Kim, 2014).  
Unlike his conservative predecessors, this long-standing opposition politician was 
critical of Chaebols, and this brought withdrawals of top-tier conglomerates from the 
media industry in the name of restructuring their non-core businesses from the market. 
Believing that Chaebols formed cartels with major newspaper outlets and distorted the 
public opinion, the administration made conglomerates like Hyundai and Samsung 
disclaim ownership of their newspaper subsidiaries like Munhwa Ilbo (Hyundai) in 1998 
and Joong-Ang Ilbo (Samsung) in 2001. Alongside this restructuring, Kim argued the 
necessity of media reforms aimed at securing the freedom of editors from the ownership 
and uprooting unfair commercial activities of major newspaper outlets in the market 
(Kim, 2001a). He also strived to diversify the broadcasting market by promoting the entry 
of new local producers and independent production studios.28 Given that the nation’s 
broadcasting market had been dominated by two terrestrial broadcasters which were 
under the state’s control, this measure implied that the Korean state would also employ 
market-led methods to promote competition as a way of improving the industry’s overall 
competitiveness (Jin, 2016).  
Kim was also the first president who officially used the term Korean Wave. 
During his remarks addressing the nation’s Independence Day in 2001, Kim (2001b) 
proclaimed that “The Korean Wave in East Asia including China and Vietnam makes us 
 
28 According to the ‘Broadcasting Act Enforcement Ordinance’ mandated network broadcasters—
which dominated the broadcasting market—to broadcast 40% of their programs from independent 
producers (Ryoo & Jin, 2018). 
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propel the development of cultural industries, which are chimneyless businesses vital to 
economy.” Considering that politicians and the media interpreted the popularity of 
Korean cultural products in the region with cultural nationalism, such an expansionist 
explanation provoked anti-Korean sentiments from neighbouring countries. This led the 
administration to decrease its direct support to its cultural industries so that exports of 
cultural products would not be seen as a cultural invasion (Ryoo & Jin, 2020).  
In short, during his tenure, Kim and his administration pursued neoliberal reforms 
and strove to transform the country’s economic structure into a more market-driven 
system (Yim, 2002). However, in terms of carrying out reforms and developing new 
industries, it continued to employ state-interventionist measures derived from past 
legacies of the developmental state due to the unpredictable nature of the cultural 
industries, in which most of them would hardly survive in the global market without the 
state’s support (Chang, 2019; Lee, 2019a). Such a tendency was also identified in the 
administration’s cultural industry policies (Ryoo & Jin, 2020; Chang, 2019). While the 
administration kept introducing interventionist plans, such as the ‘five-year plans’ of 
developing cultural industries and established public agencies to plan and execute 
supporting programs to develop this burgeoning industry, its goals were to globalize the 
cultural domain with market-driven fundamentals. This was often exemplified by the 
administration’s efforts of abolishing direct interventions in the industry, such as 
censorship, diversifying stakeholders, and lessening the market power of first-tier 
conglomerates. Hence, the administration expected to have the cultural domain driven 
by fairer market principles with fewer interventions on the part of the state. Despite all 
this, such measures of freeing the market with less-interventionism did not mean that the 
Korean state lost interest in these fast-growing businesses with political-economic 
potentials (Kwon & Kim, 2014). Many of Kim’s tendencies toward the cultural industries 
were succeeded by his liberal replacement Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008).  
3.4.2. The Roh Moo-hyun Administration (2003–2008): A Further 
Restructuring of Cultural Industries with Neoliberal Doctrines 
After taking office in 2003, Roh appointed several liberal-progressive figures from 
cultural fields as the heads of MCT and its affiliations to plan and implement cultural 
policies and programs. For instance, Lee Chang-dong, a film director who won the Best 
Screenplay Award at Cannes Film Festival, was appointed as the Minister of Culture and 
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Tourism. Following this, the Roh administration recruited people from the progressive 
party to manage its cultural organizations such as the Arts Council Korea, the National 
Museum of Modern and Contemporary Art, and the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute 
(KCTI) (Lee, 2007, February 23). While Roh continued to support the arm’s length 
principle towards cultural policy much like his predecessor, he invited liberal-progressive 
non-governmental organizations and artists who had been marginalized from 
mainstream cultural politics to policy dialogues (Lee, 2019a). By doing so, the 
administration expected to further cultural diversity, reinforce local cultures, and expand 
infrastructures as a means of promoting participatory democracy (Park K-M., 2013).  
Under the arm’s length principle, both the Kim and Roh administrations 
institutionalized a British-style arts council to create an autonomous funding system and 
a policy realm managed and executed by artists and experts themselves with self-
regulations, rather than being managed by politicians (Lee, 2019a). In particular, the Roh 
administration attempted to include perspectives and participation from liberal-
progressive artists who were deeply related to the president’s political backgrounds as a 
human rights lawyer and his vision of designing post-authoritarian politics through and 
with civil society (Park Y-A., 2014). 
Apart from his demand of instrumentalizing culture for political objectives, Roh 
also recognized the potential of cultural industries for the economy. In this regard, MCT 
announced the ‘Cultural Industry Policies Vision’ in 2003 as the Roh administration’s 
long-term policy framework for developing cultural industries. Unlike his predecessors, 
however, he put more emphasis on the roles of market systems in leading the 
development of these burgeoning businesses. The following statement delivered by Roh 
himself during the Ministry’s briefing session about this policy framework in December 
2003 characterized how his administration would approach the development of these 
businesses:  
We have a tendency that the government will provide economic supports, 
give money [to develop the business]. That is going to happen. Funding is 
important, but I believe it should be distributed to businesses that can 
budget effectively with proper structures and resources in the 
market…What the government can do is only invest some seed money and 
trigger some trickle-down effects. It is the market’s role to generate capital 
[to develop cultural industries] (Roh, 2003). 
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Rather than paying direct subsidies or other ‘hands-on’ measures for developing 
industries, Roh pursued more ‘hands-off’ approaches, arguing that the development 
should be led by private sectors including Chaebols, creators, and entrepreneurs in the 
market. He believed that the state should focus on building ‘soft infrastructures’ such as 
introducing education programs, enforcing copyright laws in the market, raising private-
public funds, building cultural infrastructures in local areas, and deregulation (Roh, 2003; 
MCT, 2004b). Moreover, the administration felt burdened by the changing nature of the 
international trade regime that argued for a reduction of the state’s direct support on 
cultural goods and services (MCT, 2004b).  
In 2005, the Ministry introduced ‘C-Korea 2010’, a comprehensive cultural 
industry policies framework that would replace the Kim administration’s ‘Cultural Industry 
Vision 21’. Aimed at becoming part of the top-5 powerhouses of cultural industries, the 
plan indicated that MCT would transform the nature of cultural industries in a market-
friendly manner, based on a governance system among corporations, universities, and 
public organizations, etc. According to the plan, MCT (2005b) specified itself as a 
regulator who would adapt regulations to the digital environment and globalization so 
that industries would upgrade their distribution systems to global standards, a market 
developer who would promote its cultural products overseas, and a patron who would 
craft strategies for developing new industries such as eSports and build infrastructures 
such as education programs and other technological development. Finally, it officially 
proclaimed that the Korean Wave would be used as branding to promote the nation 
through launching the Han Brand.29 Unlike the government’s previous plans of 
developing cultural industries that assumed direct state subsidies and interventions, ‘C-
Korea 2010’ positioned the development of major cultural sectors such as films and 
music as being led by the market dynamics.  
One of the most remarkable schemes that indicated Roh’s reluctance to direct 
support and other state-interventionist measures was the introduction of ‘fund of funds’ 
(FoFs) in 2005 and the Special Purpose Company (SPC) in 2006. FoFs referred to a 
pooled investment fund in which the portfolio consisted of investing in other funds 
 
29 In 2002, the Korean government established the National Image Committee chaired by the Prime Minister 
aimed at improving the national image overseas with cultural heritage and popular cultural products. 
However, the Committee was criticized for its administrative methods since it convened once a year without 
implementing follow-up measures to Ministries (The Presidential Office, 2009).  
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instead of bonds or stocks (Kim Y-J., 2014). Following the Special Measures for the 
Promotion of Venture Businesses enacted in 2005, MCT allocated its budget for 
subsidizing industries as seed money in the form of FoFs to attract venture capital to 
invest in cultural works.30 Meanwhile, an SPC was a limited financing investment 
company that operated temporarily only for conducting a project and distributing profits 
to investors and staff after project completion, which would make the financing system 
more transparent and facilitate the division of profit more efficiently (Ju, 2017).  
In this regard, FoFs indicated that the state’s subsidies would be managed by 
market dynamics and SPCs would transform the structure of cultural industries towards 
more project-based methods (Lee SM, 2018). Indeed, after introducing FoFs in 2005, 
MCT repealed its Cultural Industry Promotion Fund in 2007, a major funding scheme of 
the Korean state designed to support creators and entrepreneurs. In the belief that the 
state’s main role in developing cultural industries would be facilitating investment capital 
to produce cultural goods and services, the administration withdrew its hands-on 
methods from the market. Besides, the growing concerns of neighbouring countries that 
recognized the penetration of Korean cultural products as a cultural invasion contributed 
to further hands-off methods (Kim & Jin, 2016).31 In 2006, the National Radio and 
Television Administration of China, an affiliated organization under the State Council of 
China that censors, monitors, and manages all media products distributed in the country, 
demanded that broadcasters suspend broadcast of Korean television in response to the 
growing popularity of Korean television dramas like Miss Mermaid (2002-2003), and See 
and See Again (1999) in China. In relation to this, there were accusations toward 
 
30 Following the Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture Businesses, MCT’s investments 
in venture capital were managed by a public company called Korea Venture Investment 
Corporation (KVIC) as a ‘mother fund’. Once an FoF is set, KVIC proposed the contribution from 
the market in the form of raising private funds. MCT and its several affiliations, including the 
Korea Film Commission (KOFIC), utilized FoFs to finance cultural works. In terms of distributing 
profits, private investors had priorities to gain revenues and the Ministry would reinvest the 
remaining fund as future seed money (mother fund). As of 2014, the total amount of 10 major 
FoFs were approximately 280 million USD (Kim, 2014). 
31 In the early stages of the Korean Wave, both the Kim and Roh administrations aimed at 
managing anti-Korean sentiments against the popularity of Korean cultural products in the East 
Asian region. That said, Roh and Kim used rhetoric of ‘cultural exchange’ and ‘cultural diversity’ 
to reduce tensions and introduced several measures toward promoting cultural diversity, such as 
the establishment of the Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE) in 
2003 and the Asia Culture Center in 2005 (Kim & Jin, 2016). Despite their emphasis on 
interpreting the Korean Wave as an interactive cultural phenomenon, cultural policy frameworks 
prioritized the marketing of cultural products abroad (Kang H., 2015).  
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Chinese audiences who enjoyed Korean television as ‘unpatriotic’ (Park, January 9, 
2006). Meanwhile, several far-right activists in Japan began to introduce Kenkanryu 
(嫌韓流, anti-Korean Wave), urging citizens to be aware of the cultural invasion from 
Korea, as several K-Pop stars - such as BoA and TVXQ, and Korean television 
melodrama series became popular in Japan (Onishi, November 19, 2005).  
Despite its hands-off approaches to its cultural industries, the Roh administration 
continued to involve itself in the activities of the nation’s cultural entrepreneurs by 
creating ‘soft infrastructures’. For instance, MCT set up a unit within its branch and 
established the Korea Copyright Commission to protect the copyright of domestic 
cultural businesses in both domestic and foreign markets during Roh’s presidency. The 
Commission opened branches overseas including in China, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Vietnam to safeguard intellectual property rights of cultural industries in these 
markets. Meanwhile, the Ministry established a series of task forces to nurture the next 
generation of businesses in the cultural industries; cultural technologies, gaming 
businesses, and new media, respectively (Kwon & Kim, 2014). For instance, many of the 
Ministry’s ‘soft infrastructures’ construction efforts became materialized when the Korean 
government signed the free trade agreement with Southeast Asian countries in 2007, 
stipulating the responsibility of preserving intellectual property rights of Korean cultural 
products (Republic of Korea Government, 2007).  
In addition, the administration emphasized the importance of the convergence of 
culture and technologies, or cultural technologies.32 According to MCT (2004c)’s report 
of ‘Creative Korea [Changeuihanguk in Korean]’, the convergence between culture and 
technology would be vital to improve the nation’s overall industrial competitiveness 
which would be necessary to transform further to a knowledge-based economy. During 
his tenure, the Roh administration promised to support the digitalization of its cultural 
 
32 In relation to this, Woo Jong-sik (2004, August 27), who served as the President of the Korea 
Game Development and Promotion Institute under the Roh administration, defined cultural 
technologies as “technologies necessary to develop cultural industries in a narrow sense, and all 
technologies including not only science and engineering technologies but also knowledge and 
knowhow of humanities, sociology, design, and art in a broad sense.” While he acknowledged 
that culture and technology have conflicting meanings, he insisted that dynamics of cultural 
industries became more complex due to the rise of digital technologies. In this regard, he 
categorized “software, the Internet, wireless telecommunication, computer, content (film, 
broadcasting, game, music), lifestyle culture (fashion, toys, craft, sport), art industry (visual and 
space art, performance), cultural heritage, tourism, medical and welfare businesses” as relevant 
to the administration’s cultural technologies.  
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products and train technical specialists in universities (Roh, 2007). Furthermore, Roh 
asked the Ministry of Science and Technology (MST) to consider including cultural and 
tourist businesses as part of its major strategic industries which would then enable 
entrepreneurs in the cultural industries to access public funds for developing information 
and communication technologies (Roh, 2003). Following these suggestions, MST 
introduced a 1 billion KRW fund for promoting eSports businesses. This again indicated 
legacies of developmental state strategies in that the state would mobilize its pan-
governmental resources to support industries. 
In short, the Roh administration succeeded in furthering much of his 
predecessor’s approaches to the nation’s cultural domain, such as arm’s length 
principles. However, contrary to expectations from liberal-progressive artists and 
creators in the field who endorsed Roh, his cabinet further deregulated and implemented 
market logics in governing the cultural domain. Perhaps most concerning was the 
Korean government’s reduction of its film screen quota from 146 days to 73 days in 
return for automobile markets when it signed the free trade agreement with the United 
States (Jin, 2019). Given that major figures in film businesses endorsed Roh, it was not 
surprising that the administration’s measures on opening its domestic market to 
Hollywood provoked a serious backlash from the cultural domain (Jin, 2008). Despite the 
administration’s strong preference for liberal-progressive political agendas and hostile 
relations with conservative media outlets, such a controversial attitude on cultural 
industries through the implementation of market-friendly schemes exemplified the 
paradox of ‘leftist neoliberalism’ during Roh’s tenure, signifying the administration’s 
neoliberal practice toward political and economic issues while the president and his 
aides used many rhetorical expressions from the liberal-progressive camp. However, the 
administration’s legacy of market-driven measures on the cultural domain for the sake of 
economic benefits with political autonomy marked a turning point when Lee Myung-bak, 
a Conservative politician, won the Presidency in 2007.  
3.4.3. The Lee Myung-bak Administration (2008–2013): A Reiteration 
of the Developmental State in Cultural Industry Policies with 
Neoliberal Characteristics 
Unlike the previous Roh and Kim administrations which set up several 
frameworks to develop cultural industries in line with market dynamics, the Lee Myung-
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bak administration expected to instrumentalize the nation’s cultural resources for its 
political and economic missions. When Lee assumed the reins of government in 2008, 
the Presidency introduced its ‘100 state affairs’ that the cabinet would accomplish during 
his tenure. Despite his emphasis on “developing our competitiveness in our contents 
industry, thereby laying the foundation to become a nation strong in cultural activities 
(Lee, 2008a)”, there were only two policies relevant to the cultural industries—the 
convergence of information and communication technologies and the broadcasting 
sector, and the promotion of cultural content businesses. As a former businessperson, 
Lee promised that his administration would be ‘business-friendly’ and asked bureaucrats 
to plan and implement policies that the market preferred. However, the methods that the 
Lee administration employed in developing industries were more state interventionist 
than previous liberal administrations.  
Criticizing Roh’s approaches as insufficient to improving the quality of cultural 
products, the Lee administration necessitated more measures to raise the 
competitiveness of domestic cultural commodities in the global market by providing 
comprehensive policy packages geared toward promoting export and finding more 
materials with potential for commercialization (MCST, 2008b). Compared to the previous 
Roh administration in which cultural industry policies focused on developing 
infrastructure, providing education services, and improving distribution systems, Lee’s 
conservative cabinet implemented more interventionist measures into the cultural 
domain. 
In this regard, after Lee’s inauguration, the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism 
(MCST) installed the Commission on Content Korea, an advisory board to develop 
strategies for cultural industries. The Commission highlighted various potentials of 
content as “living national brands” and their contributions to improving the national image 
(MCST, 2008c). The Commission reported its ‘Strategies and Visions of Content 
Industry’ to the president and emphasized the content industry, which refers to 
businesses manufacture cultural goods and services through digital methods, as high 
value-added businesses that would satisfy the tenets of ‘Low-Carbon and Green 
Growth’—a key economic principle of the administration. Indeed, the Commission 
requested the development of computer graphics, virtual reality, the convergence of 
broadcast and telecommunications, and online gaming. While most of the Commission’s 
proposals were based on the convergence between cultural industries and the nation’s 
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strong information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure and industries, it 
also recommended the administration cultivate Killer Content, a type of cultural content 
that had significant ripple effects throughout the economy.33 Arguing that they would be 
vital to developing strategies for national branding and economic development, it asked 
the administration to expand the Korean Wave and its impacts on “improving the image 
of Korea, purchasing Korean products, and attracting more tourists to Korea (MCST, 
2008c, 18)”. 
In 2011, MCST introduced ‘the First Basic Plan of Promoting the Content 
Industry’, a comprehensive policy framework for developing cultural industries. As its title 
indicates, the plan aimed at transforming the nature of the cultural industries into more 
digital and online-based ones, with the plan’s core program was dubbed ‘Smart Content 
Korea’. In the belief that the future of global cultural markets would be driven by smart 
devices with digital content, one of the Ministry’s key objectives with the promotional 
plan was to support the digitalization of domestic cultural products and content 
customized for an online environment and the development of state-of-the-art 
technologies. Alongside schemes of developing the digitalization of cultural industries, 
the plan also included state sponsorship of cultural businesses in foreign trades, as well 
as job creation as its keystones (Content Industry Promotion Committee, 2011).  
When it comes to developing Killer Content, MCST (2008c) announced its intent 
to invest 50 billion KRW (45.2 million USD) for the next five years to find cultural 
archetypes that could be used as original sources for storytelling. Also, it would directly 
invest an additional 1 trillion KRW (892 million USD) by 2012 to commodify original 
storytelling sources with a goal of creating a ‘Second Mickey Mouse’ industry, and to 
construct the production system of ‘Killer Content’. In relation to this, MCST and Korea 
Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) hosted the ‘National Storytelling Competition 
[Daehanminguk Story Gongmo Daejeon in Korean, currently the Korea Content Awards]’ 
in 2009. When its judges released the winners of the competition, they mentioned 
 
33 Up to date, a number of mega-hit cultural products, including films, television series, and 
animation, etc. received funding and other supports from the government. A recent example of 
Killer Content would be Descendant of the Sun (2016), a television series broadcast by Korean 
Broadcasting System (KBS) that was exported to more than 30 countries. In relation to this, the 
Export-Import Bank of Korea, a state-owned bank and an export credit agency, expected the 
success of this television series would result in more than a trillion KRW (equivalent to 892 million 
USD) in revenue based on the increased export of consumer goods and the number of tourists 
and their resulting ripple effects (Export-Import Bank of Korea, 2016). 
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“potential popularity, the possibility of foreign exports, and their level of brilliance 
(KOCCA, 2010, May 1)” as their judging criteria. In the name of “institutionalizing and 
routinizing creativity and innovation (MCST, 2009b, 11)” in cultural industries, these 
schemes implied that the state would be involved in selecting and valuing certain cultural 
products particularly for their competitiveness in the global market.  
One of the most significant outcomes that signified the administration’s 
interventionist approach was its establishment of KOCCA in 2009. Based on an 
amendment of the Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries in 2009 that 
provided a legal ground for the state to support cultural industries, MCST established 
KOCCA to “efficiently support the advancement and development of cultural industries 
(Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries, Article 31, 2009)”.34 As the 
state’s key organization in managing cultural industries, KOCCA was responsible for 
planning and implementing promotion policy packages for animation, broadcasting, 
character development, cultural technology, comics, fashion, games and the music 
industry as well as relevant human resources development and overseas promotion 
services.35 In effect, along with other public organizations like Korea Trade Insurance 
Corporation, KOCCA was directly involved in the production of various content, including 
the comedy film Last Godfather (2010), and discovered original materials such as the 
animation Red Shoes and the Seven Dwarfs (cinematized in 2019). Again, such direct 
intervention by the state in cultural industries to marketize their outcomes through 
mobilizing various resources resembled how the developmental state promoted the 
industries before the 1990s. 
In relation to improving infrastructure, the Lee administration took more 
interventionist actions to reshape the fundamentals of cultural industries. For instance, in 
2009, the ruling Conservatives amended several laws to allow cross-media ownership of 
 
34 Before the establishment of KOCCA, MCST had several affiliations such as the Korea Game 
Agency (established in 1999), the Korean Broadcasting Institute (found in 1989), and the Korea 
Culture and Content Agency (established in 2001), which each of them was responsible for 
supporting relevant businesses. However, the Lee administration integrated all agencies into a 
single one, arguing that the new comprehensive agency would cope with changes in the era of 
content industries along with media convergence and digitalization. 
35 Given that the organization’s amount of budget (288 billion KRW, equivalent to 257 million 
USD) was 7.7% of that of the entire Ministry (3.71 trillion KRW, equivalent to 3.3 billion USD), the 
affiliation’s status in MCST was crucial as a core public organization in the entire government 
administration system (KOCCA, 2012; MCST, 2012). 
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newspapers and broadcasting and lower the barrier to entry of foreigners and large 
conglomerates into the media market.36 Unlike previous administrations that maintained 
such restrictions in the media market to preserve its diversity, the Lee administration 
emphasized the necessity of following the global trend of media convergence and the 
economics of scale by restructuring the media and cultural industries through a series of 
deregulations including the cross-ownership of newspapers and broadcasters as well as 
increasing the number of foreign stakeholders (Kim D., 2018). Following the 
administration’s amendments, the Korea Communication Commission (KCC) granted 
four leading newspaper outlets licenses for new comprehensive programming cable 
channels with several preferential measures - including newly allowed mid-program 
advertising, with broadcasting set to begin in 2011. Such interventionist measures 
geared toward restructuring the market through amending regulations and introducing 
new players into the market with preferential treatments echoed how the developmental 
state advanced the industry through mobilizing public and private resources and 
favouring them in the name of efficiency (Kim D., 2018).  
Meanwhile, the Lee administration showed its strong will to instrumentalize the 
Korean Wave to project the nation’s political-economic power to the world. Indeed, in the 
Lee administration’s ‘100 agenda’, national branding and cultural diplomacy through the 
Korean Wave were stated as key strategies of the administration. MCST became 
responsible for branding the nation and began developing strategies of cultural 
diplomacy, joining projects that had previously been the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) (Republic of Korea Government, 2008). 
Simultaneously, MOFAT and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) were involved 
in planning, discussing, and executing cultural industry policies as they were vital to 
MOFAT’s public diplomacy programs and MKE’s promotion of design industry as part of 
national branding, both of which were major missions of the Presidency (Republic of 
Korea Government, 2008). Indeed, Lee established the Presidential Council on National 
Branding in 2009 and consistently stressed the importance of public diplomacy and 
national branding as the nation’s top strategy for both diplomatic and economic 
 
36 These laws included the Broadcasting Act, the Act on the Guarantee of Freedom and Functions 
of Newspapers, etc. (so-called the Newspaper Act), and the Internet Multimedia Broadcasting 
Business Act. Following the amendment, many restrictions on conglomerates would be able to 
acquire up to 50% ownership in newspapers and foreigners could own up to 60% of 
comprehensive programming cable channels and news channels (Kim D., 2018).  
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imperatives. Also, MCST established units within the Ministry dedicated to working on 
cultural trades and popular culture with a focus on protecting the intellectual property of 
cultural products overseas and implementing promotional schemes for popular cultural 
industries in both domestic and international markets. Such pan-governmental measures 
indicated that the administration would employ hands-on approaches to develop these 
various industries (Kim & Jin, 2016).37  
During Lee’s tenure, he strongly argued for his cabinet to utilize the Korean 
Wave, highlighting its potential for improving the nation’s global image and supporting 
various state agendas of export promotion, middle power diplomacy, and tourism, etc. 
As a result, many governmental organizations apart from MCST began launching 
programs to conduct their business in line with the global popularity of Korean cultural 
products. For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs established 
the Korean Food Foundation in 2010 to promote Korean food as a means of 
strengthening the nation’s soft power. Indeed, during his tenure, Lee often highlighted 
the contribution of the Korean Wave to both the national economy and the nation’s soft 
power in the global arena as follows,  
Korean broadcasts have already become worldwide, and the diffusion of 
Hallyu [the Korean Wave in Korean] exemplifies their fruits of history. With 
broadcast content that edges up to Asians and beyond the region, we 
enrich our national branding and national image. Also, our broadcasting 
channels which transmit all over the world give national pride to Korean 
businessmen and overseas Koreans (Lee, 2008b). 
In short, unlike his predecessors, the Lee administration implemented more 
interventionist strategies to develop cultural industries and utilize their outcomes for its 
political and economic agendas. As cases of amending media laws and establishing 
KOCCA indicate, MCST and other governmental organizations were directly involved in 
 
37 In relation to this, the Lee administration introduced the Content Industry Promotion Committee 
under the Prime Minister’s Office in 2010. According to the Content Industry Promotion Act 
(2010), the committee would coordinate the efforts of developing cultural industries from various 
governmental ministries including the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of National Defense, 
Ministry of Security and Public Administration, Ministry of Knowledge Economy, Ministry of Health 
and Welfare, Ministry of Employment and Labor, Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, 
Korea Communication Commission, Fair Trade Commission, and MCST. The Committee 
expanded during the Park Geun-hye administration, when the presidency added the Small and 
Medium Business Administration to represent interests of small businesses. Such an organization 
indicated that how the administration estimated cultural industries as new driving forces of the 
national economy (Content Industry Promotion Act, 2010). 
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industrial changes. In the name of developing Killer Content, they also provided some 
guidelines and directions for manufacturing cultural goods and services to cultural 
entrepreneurs through subsidies and other benefits. Then, the administration utilized the 
popularity of Korean popular culture as a way of projecting its soft power to the region 
and the world while also continuing to materialize cultural works for economic 
development. Based on political-economic utilities of cultural works, the administration 
employed conventional methods of the developmental state’s industrial policies to direct 
the cultural domain so that it could accomplish Lee’s agendas. Many of Lee’s 
interventionist methods were again continued throughout the next administration, led by 
his party rival, Park Geun-hye (2013–2017).  
3.4.4. The Park Geun-hye Administration (2013 – 2017): The 
Proclamation of ‘the Creative Economy’ with a State-
developmentalist Approach 
After winning the 2013 presidential election, Park declared that cultural 
enrichment—along with economic revival, national happiness, and peaceful unification—
would be key pillars during her tenure. In detail, cultural enrichment consisted of three 
categories: expanding participation of the population in cultural activities, the promotion 
of culture and arts, and the convergence of culture and industries. As the daughter of 
Park Chung-hee, a main architect of the Korean developmental state, she believed that 
the development of new industries would be fulfilled only through the state’s active 
interventions and guidelines rather than free market capitalism (Jin, 2016). To highlight 
her strong interests in the cultural domain and to emphasize the necessity of fostering 
cultural industries, she organized the Presidential Committee for Cultural Enrichment 
(PCCE), an advisory body to develop strategies for enhancing culture’s position in 
society as well as further instrumentalizing cultural resources for political and economic 
objectives, continuing the Lee administration’s instrumentalization methods.  
As the main executive branch, MCST empowered its Cultural Content Industry 
Office, the key department in planning and implementing cultural industry policies, by 
shifting the Bureau of Media Policies to the Office’s control. By doing so, the Ministry 
expected that the Office would be able to oversee both production and distribution of 
cultural industries (MCST, n.d.). MCST implemented schemes to lead the development 
of cultural industries in concert with KOCCA. Meanwhile, PCCE advised policy schemes 
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to satisfy people’s cultural enjoyment, such as Culture Day—opening cultural facilities to 
the public for free of charge or at a discount on the last Wednesday of every month. 
Park believed cultural goods and services were considered key assets to 
revitalize the economy. In particular, Park’s proclamation of the ‘Creative Economy’ as 
her administration’s key national agenda showed how much the state expected 
contributions of culture and its creativity in relation to economic policies. Describing the 
term as “the convergence of science and technology with industry, the fusion of culture 
with industry, and the blossoming of creativity in the very borders that were once 
permeated by barriers (Park G-H., 2013)”, the Park administration established a series 
of pan-governmental programs to foster the convergence between technologies and 
cultural resources.38  
Despite the ambiguous use of the term, the administration nonetheless 
established a series of pan-governmental task forces and urged private companies to 
follow its lead to pursue various types of convergences among technologies, culture, and 
pre-existing manufacturing businesses. While the Minister of Science, ICT and Future 
Planning (MSIF) became chair of the ‘Creative Economy Private-Public Initiative’, the 
Minister of Culture, Sport and Tourism had the power to chair projects relevant to 
cultural industries. Given that the Minister of Culture, who was ranked as 9th among 
ministers, had less political power than both the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic 
Affairs (1st) as well as the Minister of MSIF (3rd) who served as ex officio members of 
this council, such a measure in which the Minister of MCST would chair a pan-
governmental committee meeting was an extraordinary decision (Government 
Organization Act, 2016).  
When it comes to stimulating cultural industries, the Park administration 
continued to use many of Lee’s hands-on measures, such as developing original cultural 
sources and commercializing them (MCST, 2016b). Following Lee’s ‘the First Basic Plan 
of Promoting the Content Industry’, MCST announced ‘the Second Basic Plan of 
 
38 Park’s definition of the ‘Creative Economy’ was different from that of John Howkins (2001). 
Although Howkins (2001, 8)’ definition— “the transactions of creative products that have an 
economic good or service that results from creativity and has economic value”—was also based 
on connections between cultural creativity and economic innovation, his use of the term was 
more inclined to reinterpret values of cultural goods and services with market values. Most of all, 
he believed that creativity should be distributed through free market, which was contrast to Park’s 
state-interventionist approaches to industrialize cultural creativity.  
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Promoting the Content Industry’ in 2014. While much of the First plan succeeded, the 
Second plan put more emphasis on the importance of individual creativity as a 
fundamental of the ‘Creative Economy’, and the convergence of cultural goods with 
ICTs, both of which were key tasks of the administration. In addition to this, following 
Park’s keynotes of state affairs, the plan included several schemes to increase cultural 
enjoyment in local areas. Compared to the Lee administration’s initial plan, the second 
plan included programs that expanded financing for cultural production from both the 
government’s budget and private capital, fostering the convergence of cultural industries 
and cutting-edge ICTs, training cultural entrepreneurs, finding new original sources, and 
developing new foreign markets, among others. The administration’s masterplan also 
presumed that the state would lead the development of the cultural industries, including 
the entire supply chain of cultural production. By mobilizing its available assets from the 
entire government system, the administration sought to develop its cultural resources as 
a means of advancing the economy through newly equipped cutting-edge digital 
technologies, which would be the essence of the Korean version of the ‘Creative 
Economy’ (Content Industry Promotion Council, 2014; Kim, 2017). 
As the ‘Creative Economy’ became the national agenda, the Park administration 
mobilized private capital to follow the state’s imperatives and stressed the contribution 
and potential of culture in the agenda. One of the key programs that the administration 
implemented to promote the ‘Creative Economy’ was to establish ‘Creative Economy 
Innovation Centers (CEIC)’ in each province (17 centers in total) to trigger technological 
innovation in local businesses and support start-ups and small businesses as core 
elements of the administration’s masterplan of the ‘Creative Economy’. Then, the 
administration matched individual conglomerates to each center one-by-one depending 
on its core business so that it could provide technical assistance to small and medium-
sized enterprises. Among the 17 centers, four of them were established to develop 
cultural businesses: computer and video games, film and television, and tourism.39 Such 
 
39 CEICs were established as a part of the administration’s ‘Three-year Plan for Economic 
Innovation’ which Park announced during her New Year Press Conference in January 2014. As 
the administration’s comprehensive economic policy framework, it included regulatory reforms in 
the public sector, along with introducing schemes of developing the ‘Creative Economy’ including 
“the convergence of culture with science and technology and ICT (Park G-H., 2014)”. As the main 
executive organ of implementing government policies of promoting the ‘Creative Economy’, each 
CEIC would be in charge of different business labelled as ‘creative’ by the central government 
and supported by relevant conglomerates. In this regard, major corporations including Samsung 
(Daegu and Gyeongbuk CEICs, cutting-edge electronics and textiles), Hyundai-Kia Motors 
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a method of developing industries through mobilizing private resources, in particular 
Chaebols, echoed again strategies of the developmental state (Kim, 2017).  
In addition to CEIC, the presidency also announced an initiative called ‘the 
Culture Creation and Convergence Belt (CEL)’, an industrial cluster for cultural 
entrepreneurs located in the Metro Seoul area. The administration argued that the 
cluster would provide training and funding for cultural producers and distributors to 
promote various types of convergence across different genres and technologies. Along 
with the participation of major players in cultural industries such as CJ and LOTTE in film 
businesses, Samsung and LG in the fashion industry, major gaming and platform 
businesses (Naver, Kakao, Nexon), and music (SM, JYP, and YG Entertainment), MCST 
introduced plans to establish four complexes in Seoul to foster the digitalization of 
cultural industries. The following statement from Park indicated the intention of CEL, 
My administration has laid the foundation for future economic growth from 
the cultural industries, which would be a core element of our future 
economy. Beyond Asia, the Korean Wave has already penetrated into 
Europe and South America, and into the world. It promotes the brand of 
‘Korea’ and raises our national dignity…CEL will be a creative platform that 
plays pivotal roles in the cultural content industry (Park, 2015).  
As mentioned above, the popularity of Korean cultural products in global markets 
was a driving force that influenced the administration’s consideration of cultural 
industries as essential to the future economy as well as the nation’s diplomatic power. 
Like Lee, Park often utilized the Korean Wave as a means of strengthening soft power 
by bringing along K-Pop idols or celebrities on her international trips. Furthermore, she 
used the term ‘Korean Wave’ at a number of domestic events to inspire a strong feeling 
of national pride from the public. In this regard, both the Korean Wave and cultural 
industries were mobilized to accomplish the administration’s economic missions and 
were strong apparatuses that were used to reinforce statist ideologies (Kim & Jin, 2016).  
Not surprisingly, such an instrumentalization of culture devalued intrinsic values 
of culture, subjecting culture to market values and political efficacy. In the name of 
 
(Gwangju CEIC, hydrogen-fueled automobiles), and LG (Chungbuk CEIC, cosmetics and 
biomedical equipments) took responsibility of co-managing each CEIC. Among 17 CEICs, four 
CEICs located in Seoul (CJ, lifestyle businesses), Busan (LOTTE, film and audiovisual products), 
Jeju (Kakao, software and tourism), and Gangwon (Naver, big data and tourism) would develop 
strategies and technologies relevant to cultural industries in cooperation with local authorities and 
businesses. 
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economic efficiency, both conservative administrations during the late 2000s and 2010s 
utilized hands-on measures on the cultural domain and were directly involved in 
selecting cultural materials that would receive various benefits from the state. During the 
Lee and Park administrations, many of the hands-on interventionist schemes that they 
developed to instrumentalize culture utilized coercive measures. While those who 
supported the administration’s plans of developing cultural industries received 
preferential treatments through a ‘Whitelist’, a number of artists and businesspeople who 
stood against the conservative administration’s political and economic schemes were 
blacklisted and excluded from the state’s public funding schemes.40 As Kim Gi-chun, 
Park’s former chief secretary, argued that “movies and plays that mock President and 
slander the administration should be corrected because they harm the national pride 
(Kim, May 14, 2017)”, the administration understood culture as an instrument for 
accomplishing its political and economic missions, rather than promoting intrinsic values 
of culture and the arts.  
Not surprisingly, such an extremist instrumentalist viewpoint was deeply 
connected to legacies of the developmental state that instrumentalized all the nation’s 
resources in the name of economic development and oppressed those who stood 
against the administration’s leadership. These actions were against the constitution that 
prescribed culture as a medium of artistic and political expression essential to a 
democratic society. Moreover, corruption scandals involving Park’s aides over MCST 
and KOCCA’s subsidy programs for cultural entrepreneurs in 2016 eventually led to 
Park’s impeachment in 2017. As a result, many of Park’s administration’s programs for 
the ‘Creative Economy’ cultural industries were eventually suspended.  
 
40 In response to an anti-government protest in 2008, the Lee administration began to ‘adjust 
balance of power’ in the cultural domain by favoring conservative figures and disadvantaging 
liberal-progressive figures in cultural politics. To seize the hegemony, the administration covertly 
blacklisted a number of artists and celebrities and excluded them from the state’s subsidy 
program and pressured broadcasters and film productions not to cast them on their programs and 
movies. The number of blacklisted personnel skyrocketed during the Park administration from 82 
to 9,473 (MCST, 2019d).  
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3.4.5. The Moon Jae-in Administration (2017–2022): The Revival of 
Hands-off and Market-oriented Measures  
After Park’s impeachment in 2017, Moon Jae-in, a liberal-progressive politician 
who served as a chief secretary of Roh Moo-hyun, was elected president. Upon his 
inauguration, MCST investigated the Blacklist scandals of previous administrations and 
promised to prevent the recurrence of such incidents by reinforcing arm’s-length 
principles in MCST’s support schemes. Given the circumstances that previous programs 
for developing and utilizing the Korean Wave were implicated in corruption scandals, the 
Moon administration was reluctant to promote the Korean Wave in official dialogue in the 
early phase of his term. Instead, the Moon administration’s comprehensive framework of 
cultural policies, ‘Culture Vision 2030: Culture with Humans’, emphasized autonomy, 
creativity, and diversity as its principles for cultural policy including cultural industries 
(MCST, 2019c). While Moon’s MCST succeeded much of Park’s legacies, such as 
promoting the convergence of culture and technologies and constructing more cultural 
infrastructure, the Ministry argued that pre-existing public schemes would not be 
effective for promoting new ideas vital to convergence as they only focused on individual 
successes, and schemes to support culture should be managed by cultural workers, 
artists, and the market.  
Compared to conservative predecessors, MCST under the Moon administration 
redefined its role of managing the high risks of cultural entrepreneurs in the market and 
investing in industrial research and technological development, rather than directly 
involving in producing cultural products (MCST, 2019b). Although some of Lee and 
Park’s interventionist measures like hosting the ‘National Storytelling Competition’ and 
establishing a cluster among businesses, public institutes, and universities at Seoul (a 
part of Park’s CEL project) continued under the Moon administration, Moon set 
additional policy goals aimed toward improving unfair practices in the market and 
protecting the rights of cultural producers (MCST, 2017b). Unlike previous 
administrations, MCST’s measures of promoting industries were focusing on attracting 
the market to invest in cultural businesses, rather than direct support. For instance, it 
introduced a 450-billion-won (407 million USD) public-private ‘Adventure Investment 
Fund’—a more aggressive type of ‘fund of funds’ which incentivized venture capitalists to 
invest in cultural works and entrepreneurs that were evaluated as high-risk and had 
otherwise been turned down by private investors—to finance cultural production with 
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strong incentives from the administration (MCST, 2019e; MCST, 2020). Along with the 
‘Adventure Investment Fund’ as a new financing scheme to support start-ups and 
entrepreneurs in cultural production, the Ministry promised to improve regulations 
surrounding the protection of intellectual properties and fair trade while utilizing cultural 
resources as a means of increasing tourism. Such a shift from the previous 
interventionist approach also signaled the new administration’s reluctance of involving 
the state directly in the cultural domain.  
Granted, this tendency did not mean that Moon’s administration avoided utilizing 
culture as a means of economic development. In particular, the growing recognition of 
Korean cultural products in the global market triggered the Moon administration to utilize 
culture as a tool for its economic development schemes, such as the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution that referred to “an intellectual revolution based on hyperconnectivity 
triggered by artificial intelligence and big data (Presidential Committee on the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution, 2017)”. Like his predecessor who instrumentalized culture for the 
‘Creative Economy’, Moon’s MCST (2017) introduced its ‘Content Industry Medium- and 
Long-Term Vision’ in late 2017 to replace the previous ‘the Second Basic Plan of 
Promoting Content Industry’. the policy highlighted the position of the cultural industries 
in Moon’s economic agenda and proclaimed that the development of cultural 
technologies—a practice that had been used by the Roh administration—would be a 
major mission of the Ministry’s plans for supporting cultural industries. Alongside other 
programs for protecting copyright, training artists, and providing financial incentives, the 
Ministry reified its contribution of developing cultural technologies by investing in the 
convergence of cutting-edge technologies such as augmented reality and virtual reality, 
cultural products, and research and development of private sectors. 
Throughout this process, a number of cultural activists, who were albeit critical of 
exploiting culture as a means of the state’s political-economic objectives, were involved 
in developing Moon’s cultural policies, and many of MCST’s plans were eventually 
based on understanding culture as potential commodifiable products. Such a 
perspective was materialized by the Ministry’s constant use of intellectual property (IP) 
and copyright. For instance, the Ministry launched a new policy framework for copyright-
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based industries called ‘Copyright Vision 2030’ in 2020.41 Highlighting the contributions 
of copyright-based industries to the national economy, particularly contributions of export 
products, the Ministry promised to repair copyright laws and regulations, liberalize 
royalty fees, establishes branches overseas, and enforce foreign governments to protect 
the copyright of Korean cultural products, among other promised outcomes.42 Although 
many of these measures were aimed at promoting the autonomy of cultural works and 
artists, establishing fairer rules in the market, and protecting the copyright of Korean 
content in international markets, the Ministry stated that “copyright would motivate our 
cultural development and take a key role on the nation’s economic growth (MCST, 
2020)”. The use of terminologies in MCST’s policy contexts clearly indicated this liberal-
progressive administration’s ongoing willingness of appropriating cultural values subject 
to market values.  
In a similar vein, the Moon administration also revealed its desire to utilize the 
Korean Wave as a means of economic development. Inspired by the global success of 
K-Pop idol group BTS and Bong Joon-ho’s Parasite (2019), MCST introduced the term 
‘New Korean Wave’ to explain the global success of new mega-hit cultural products and 
utilize them as a way of revitalizing the national economy (MCST, 2020b).43 On one 
hand, MCST began to rebrand its Korean Wave policies as ‘Good Korean Wave 
[Chakhan Hallyu in Korean]’ to diversify its global distribution networks and reduce 
potential hostilities against Korean cultural products from neighbouring countries who 
 
41 Based on the Copyright Act, the Korea Copyright Commission defines core copyright industry 
as consisted of “businesses that solely serve in the creation, production, manufacture, 
performance, broadcast, communication, exhibition, distribution, and sales of pieces and other 
protected objects (Kim SH., 2018, 25)”. They include publishing, literature, music, play, opera, 
film, video, radio, television, photograph, software, database, visual and graphic art, and 
advertisement. The entire copyright industry includes both core copyright industry and relevant 
business that utilize or contribute to outcomes of core copyright industry.  
42 According to MCST (2020c), Korean copyright-based industries experienced a rapid growth in 
the last decade. Their amount of exports skyrocketed from 890 million USD in 2010 to 6.6 billion 
USD in 2018, and improved trade balances in copyright industries market from a deficit of 0.8 
billion USD in 2010 to a surplus of 1.4 billion USD in 2018.  
43 Such a MCST’s use of term ‘New Korean Wave’ was far from Jin (2016) who used the term 
‘New Korean Wave’ to explain the rise of second generation Korean Wave (Hallyu 2.0)—
characterized by changes of mainstream genres that trigger the popularity (from television 
dramas and films to K-pop and video games), social media-driven technologies as main vehicles, 
changes of consumer demographics (from East Asian to other regions), and cultural industry 
policies (from hands-off policies to hands-on policies). 
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regarded the popularity as another potential cultural invasion.44 For instance, the 
administration announced plans to strengthen cultural exchange programs such as the 
Republic of Korea-the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Film Fund and 
ASEAN-ROK Film Cooperation Organization (ARFO) to develop industrial infrastructures 
of international co-production that would improve the sustainability of the Korean Wave 
(MCST, 2019e). On the other hand, MCST would continue to host exhibitions and 
festivals that promote Korean popular culture both domestically and overseas to foster 
tourism businesses and expand its market worldwide. It also released plans to develop 
customized promotion strategies to attract more audiences from different areas (MCST, 
2019e; MCST, 2020a).   
Hence, despite the outward political orientation of the current administration, the 
Moon administration recognizes the potential of cultural industries for economic 
purposes and continues to instrumentalize culture. Despite the use of different rhetoric, 
Moon’s instrumental perspective on culture is not much different from his conservative 
predecessors. While Lee and Park directly engaged in the cultural domain with 
interventionist measures, Moon is reluctant to actively involve the state in cultural 
activities and industries, as seen from the administration’s emphasis on arm’s length 
principles. Instead, by employing less state-interventionist hands-off measures, the 
administration sought to attract private capital and more market logics as its major policy 
framework of cultural industries.  
3.5. Conclusion 
The development of Korean cultural industries indicates that the state has played 
a key role in planning strategies and mobilizing resources considered essential to 
promote the cultural industries, which are high-risk and capital-intensive businesses. 
Since the early 1990s, the Korean state recognized the potential of cultural products as 
tools for developing the economy. The state introduced a series of comprehensive 
masterplans and founded public organizations, including research institutes, public 
 
44 According to the Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange, a MCST-affiliated 
organization which conducts researches and programs about promoting the Korean Wave and 
managing potential negative sentiments toward Korea in overseas, “Good Korean Wave 
(Chakhan Hallyu in Korean)” refers to the Korean Wave which mechanism is based on 
multilateral cultural exchange, not in a unilateral way (KOFICE, n.d.).  
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funds, and support agencies—to plan and enforce schemes of promoting these 
industries, which once had been considered as vehicles of delivering political 
propaganda to the population before the democratization. Throughout various 
administrations, the government fully employed its available assets, from both public and 
private sectors, to allocate and support major players to expand their business and 
entrepreneurs who sought opportunities in the cultural domain. In addition to this, the 
state engaged in the entire production chain of cultural products with various policy 
methods, from classical methods such as tax benefits and public subsidies to promotion 
activities for its cultural exports in global markets and the guarantee of cultural goods to 
private investors.  
Many of the Korean state’s measures for developing its cultural industries, 
including subsidies on producers in the field, tax benefits, deregulation for private capital 
to attract their investment in the burgeoning industry, and other practices demonstrate 
that state intervention remained effective and viable in developing cultural industries in a 
short time. In collaboration with Chaebols and state-owned banks, the state effectively 
utilized both public and private resources to develop its cultural industries. As cultural 
industries were high-risk and capital-intensive businesses, the state urged and invited 
major conglomerates to launch their cultural businesses with a variety of incentives. 
Although many of them withdrew from the cultural industries in the aftermath of the 
nation’s financial crisis, their presence in the market was vital to exploring the business 
potential of cultural products, as cases such as Samsung’s production of Shiri, and 
Hyundai’s entry into the cable television broadcast indicated. After their withdrawal from 
industries, other conglomerates like CJ and Lotte made inroads into the cultural market 
and became major players in Korean television, game, and film industries. Such 
participation by major conglomerates in the cultural industries under the leadership of 
the state was obvious outcomes of a developmental state (Kwon & Kim, 2014).  
As mentioned, depending on each administration’s political orientations and 
economic situation during their various tenures, the state sometimes employed methods 
based on state-developmentalism and other times implemented measures driven by 
neoliberal imperatives. On one hand, liberal-progressive administrations preferred less-
interventionist methods as they corresponded with both their political reluctance to 
intervene in cultural production and economic policies that emphasized roles of the 
market. In this context, emphasizing the self-perpetuating environment of cultural 
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industries, the Roh administration not only reduced screen quotas but also outsourced 
much of the function of allocating subsidies for cultural producers to semi-private 
financial organizations in the form of FoFs. On the other hand, conservative 
administrations undertook more active and interventionist measures of implementing 
their cultural industry policies in the field. Despite their preference for neoliberal virtues 
that could be widely seen in their economic and social policies, they preferred to engage 
in cultural production with more detailed planning and investment through public 
agencies like KOCCA. By doing so, they sought to utilize outcomes as tools of 
accomplishing political and economic agendas in a more explicit manner (Lee, 2013). In 
this regard, both the Lee and Park administrations’ policy frameworks are considered as 
developmental neoliberalism, in which the state utilizes strong state-interventionist, 
hands-on measures to accomplish its neoliberal agenda (Ryoo & Jin, 2020).  
Of course, it is important to not over-dichotomize and schematize the Korean 
state’s approach and assume that conservative administrations only utilized hands-on 
measures and liberal-progressive administrations only introduced hands-off measures. 
Considering the consistency of policy schemes and policy effects, all administrations 
have continued many schemes that had been implemented by previous administrations. 
For instance, although Fund of Funds (FoFs) were introduced by the Roh administration 
(liberal-progressive), his conservative successors continued expanding funds and 
consolidated the funding scheme as the state’s major financing scheme for cultural 
workers. Meanwhile, the incumbent Moon administration also continued his conservative 
predecessors’ hands-on methods through increasing the budget of KOCCA and 
maintaining many MCST’s hands-on programs such as the Korea content Awards 
(previously known as the National Storytelling Competition)—which are awards for best 
original storytelling content across different genres in the nation’s cultural industries. 
Rather, this means that both conservative administrations and liberal-progressive 
administrations have favored using hands-on and hands-off measures, depending on 
political orientation, market conditions, and respective viewpoints on promoting cultural 
businesses. This reflects the Korean state’s overall stance of blending neoliberal, 
market-led policy initiatives with its conventional state-interventionist methods as a 
developmental-state in promoting cultural industries (Ryoo & Jin, 2020).    
Despite different approaches by liberal and conservative administrations to 
develop cultural industries, both direct and indirect state interventions in promoting 
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cultural industries and utilization of cultural products for their political and economic 
objectives indicate the state continues to exert its influence on the cultural domain which 
is otherwise operated by market forces. Regardless of each administration’s political 
orientation, all administrations after the 1990s played entrepreneurial roles in developing 
systematic support for cultural industries and utilized culture as a means of revitalizing 
the national economy (Lee J-Y., 2012). And ideas of commodifying culture and 
measuring its values with market values became dominant in policymaking processes. 
This meant that the fundamentals of cultural industry policies became more subject to 
tenets of neoliberalism. The development of cultural industries confirms the state’s 
position as a patron in cultural industries (Jin & Otmazgin, 2014; Lee, 2019a).  
Hence, as policy measures of conservative administrations strongly demonstrate, 
the state utilizes neoliberal, pro-market, deregulatory schemes for supporting cultural 
industries to serve its masterplans of economic development and other political 
objectives. Even in liberal-progressive administrations when they implemented hands-off 
and market-led measures to support the cultural industries, bureaucrats and politicians 
endeavoured to create the right environment that would maximize policy effects, such as 
managing anti-Korean Wave sentiments overseas, improving laws to protect the 
intellectual rights of creators and small enterprises, and categorizing cultural businesses 
as high-tech, strategic industries so that producers were eligible to apply to funds from 
other ministries, etc. Liberal-progressive administrations retained capacities to manage 
their selective interventions, apart from their reluctance to utilize hands-on methods (Suh 
& Kwon, 2014).  
The trajectory of Korean cultural industry policies after the Korean Wave reflects 
how the state retained capacities to intervene in the development of the nation’s cultural 
industries—even as many of their mechanisms were highly influenced by the global 
market. In other words, the state is still able to control its neoliberal measures—which 
presume the state’s retreat from the market—and utilize practices of neoliberal 
globalization for its political and economic objectives, namely economic development 
(Suh & Kwon, 2014; Ryoo & Jin, 2020). Under the state’s strong leadership of mobilizing 
and managing public and private resources, developing infrastructures, and skills 
training and development, the cultural realm became more commercialized, 
commodified and instrumentalized to serve the nation’s political and economic 
interests—either by less-interventionist measures from liberal-progressive 
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administrations which left power to the market or more-interventionist schemes by 
conservative administrations where the state would commodify culture. Based on the 
explanation, the following chapter examines how policymakers understand their roles in 
developing cultural industries. 
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Chapter 4.  
 
The State’s Prevailing Presence in the Development 
of Korean Cultural Industries 
4.1. Introduction 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the rising tide of neoliberal globalization in 
cultural production has challenged the state’s position in the cultural domain. US-based 
media conglomerates continue to retain their distribution power in global markets and 
the power of US-based social media platforms overwhelms local competitors (Jin, 2015; 
Lobato, 2019). Impacts of the prominence of US cultural products on local cultural 
spheres have profoundly recharacterized local cultures—from the birth of various hybrid 
genres between Western (de facto American) and local cultural characteristics to the 
coproduction of local cultural products with Western media capital (Ganguly, 2019). 
Meanwhile, the pressure to open cultural markets increases in the name of free trade 
driven by the US government and several international organizations (Leiva, 2017; 
Murdock & Choi, 2018; Thussu, 2018). Not surprisingly, the influx of global and 
neoliberal forces into local cultural production fosters exploitation of local culture as a 
means of profit-making and reduces cultural value to transferrable exchange value in 
markets as commodities (Yúdice, 2003).  
Despite such an intensified penetration of US-led transnational capital in local 
markets armed with doctrines of neoliberal globalization, the state’s attitudes toward its 
cultural industries maintain importance as such attitudes decide the importance and 
protection of such industries in various national contexts. Indeed, despite the growing 
pressures toward opening markets to foreign capital and companies, many countries 
continue to argue that they are entitled to protecting and prioritizing domestic cultural 
businesses as well as a right to control foreign imports (Goff, 2017; Jaramillo, 2019). In 
this regard, understanding the state’s reactions to global forces and neoliberalization in 
the cultural domain is still important not only because of its position in protecting local 
culture but also because culture is a sine qua non for the state to secure its political-
economic interests. 
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In relation to this, the development of Korean cultural industries is a case that 
demonstrates how local cultural businesses challenge foreign penetration in domestic 
markets, expand market shares overseas, and most of all, how the state contributed to 
such businesses’ development (Kwon & Kim, 2014; Jin, 2016; Lee, 2019a). In 
retrospect, the state mobilized both direct and indirect methods to develop cultural 
businesses. Direct methods included implementing various administrative actions such 
as licensing, regulations, tax favours and subsidies to develop promote cultural 
businesses. To expand the base of the nation’s cultural market, the government 
introduced new distribution systems in cultural production. For instance, in the case of 
the broadcasting industry, it allowed Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), a private radio 
and television broadcast, to begin its service in 1991 for the Seoul metropolitan 
region.45 Then, it continued introducing more distribution platforms for television 
producers such as the cable channel system in 1995, satellite broadcasting system in 
2000, and Internet Protocol television (IPTV) in 2007, and four nationwide generalist 
cable television networks in 2011 (Kim D., 2018).  
Along with this introduction, the state lowered barriers of entry for new players 
through deregulation, preferential treatment, and exceptional clauses on legal and 
regulatory frameworks. In relation to this, the Korean government abolished restrictions 
on the cross-ownership of newspaper and television services in 2009, which allowed the 
nation’s major newspaper outlets to expand their business to broadcasting by 
establishing generalist cable television networks. Meanwhile, the state improved 
measures of protecting the copyright of cultural goods, which had been a major concern 
of film and music producers and distributors (Kwon & Kim, 2013). In addition to this, the 
state effectively controlled an influx of foreign cultural products into the domestic market 
to give enough time for local producers to raise their competitiveness (Jin, 2020a). Last 
not but least, the Korean government provided a series of benefits for creators and 
entrepreneurs in cultural industries such as including tax benefits, low-interest loans, etc.  
 
45 Until 1980, there had been a series of private radio and television broadcasters, such as 
Tongyang Broadcasting Company (TBC, television and radio) and Dong-A Broadcasting System 
(radio, DBS). However, they were nationalized by Chun Doo-hwan, an army general who took 
power in a coup d’etat in 1979 and became President the following year, as a part of his plans of 
suppressing the press (Kim D., 2018).  
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On the other hand, the Korean state indirectly also mobilized ‘(in)visible hands’ to 
support cultural businesses, methods which had repeatedly been used when promoting 
other industries as a developmental state. In terms of financing cultural entrepreneurs, it 
requested major banks, which the government was a major stakeholder, to mobilize and 
invest in various projects or provide low-interest loans alongside the state’s direct 
subsidies. Besides, upon the state’s request, leading figures in Korean pop idol music 
(K-Pop) such as major entertainment CEOs Lee Soo-man (SM Entertainment), Park Jin-
young (JYP Entertainment), and Yang Hyun-suk (YG Entertainment), participated in 
training and supporting start-ups in cultural businesses. In a similar vein, media 
conglomerates such as CJ ENM and Lotte Entertainment, which were major distributors 
of Korean films, took part in nurturing cultural creators and start-ups with training, 
technological support, and even financial investments (Kim, 2017). Along with detailed 
directions targeted toward developing the cultural industries, the state’s explicit 
mobilization of private resources as a means of financing and supplying resources for 
state projects reflects the legacies of the developmental state that mobilizes both private 
and public resources and allocates them for the sake of developing certain businesses 
under the state’s leadership (Jin, 2011b; Lee, 2019a).  
In addition to this, the Korean state took initiatives in promoting cultural industries 
by constructing necessary infrastructures that would be the cornerstone of various 
businesses. To transform the nation’s economy with cutting-edge technology and higher 
value-added businesses, the state launched plans for high-speed broadband Internet 
and wireless networks in the 1990s (Oh & Larson, 2011). As part of the plan, the Korean 
government developed a series of projects aimed at developing various information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) and building telecommunication infrastructures. 
While state-owned enterprises such as Korea Telecom and publicly-funded research 
institutes were main participants during development, the state also requested the 
nation’s leading conglomerates including Samsung and Hyundai to take part in projects 
as a means of diversifying their businesses and mobilizing capital in return for fixed 
returns from the public sector (Jin, 2011b; Lee J-Y., 2012).46 Although cultural industries 
 
46 For example, in 1994, the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) implemented a 
plan called Korea Information Infrastructure (KII), a nationwide telecommunications superhighway 
project aimed at wiring high-speed broadband with 1 Gbps service (10 Mbps for mobile services) 
for 14 million residents by 2013. Based on its blueprint, MIC requested major conglomerates to 
participate in the project in return for commercialization of Internet services (Lee & Jung, 1998). 
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were not included in the state’s masterplans of building digital infrastructures nationwide, 
many of their outcomes—such as one of the largest high-speed Internet market 
penetration in the world and mobile phone penetration—became pivotal in advancing the 
nation’s cultural businesses. Given that digital technology brought about new business 
models and new modes of production and consumption, this would pioneer new markets 
(Freedman, 2008; Jin, 2017). In this regard, from infrastructure to individual financing, 
the state’s presence in developing the cultural industries remains highly visible.  
The case of Korean cultural industries exemplifies how the state retains and 
maintains power and control in its cultural businesses despite industrial structures as 
well as various cultural products becoming more transnational and export-oriented in the 
wake of the Korean Wave. Despite the legacies of the developmental state that the state 
mobilizes resources and allocates them to certain actors to develop its economy, the 
state-led development of Korean cultural industries and their globalization demonstrate 
the appropriation and repositioning of the Korean state in response to powers of 
neoliberal globalization. Based on interviews with policymakers affiliated with the 
Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism (MCST) as well as cultural workers in the field, 
this chapter analyzes the relationship between the Korean state and cultural industries.  
The chapter consists of three sections. The first section discovers a genealogy of 
the state’s engagement in developing businesses, focusing on the roles of MCST’s 
approach to cultural industries. While much of the section is based on the history of the 
development of cultural industries in policy contexts, it sheds light on how such legacies 
have been naturalized in current policy schemes. The second section investigates how 
the Korean state utilizes the global popularity of Korean cultural products. It highlights 
how the state reinterprets Korean cultural products as tools for various political-
economic goals as well as the increased stateless and transnational characteristics such 
 
As a result, the Ministry spent 6.2 billion USD and the private sector invested 16.5 billion USD to 
the project. Unlike other countries such as the US in which superhighway projects depended on 
private sectors, the Korean state’s presence was crucial in constructing the nation’s Internet 
infrastructure as it guaranteed supply provided by state authorities to private sectors (Indeed, the 
high dependence on the private sector delayed the US’ deployment of nationwide broadband 
services as there was no consensus between the US government and private actors were 
responsible for constructing and managing networks (Pelton, 1994)). In relation to this, Lee 
(2012) explains that state-led supply policies could be succeeded in places which have strong 
legacies of an interventionist state. After KII’s success, the project became a precedent for 
several Internet Infrastructure plans such as Australia’s National Broadband Network Plan (NBN) 
and the US’ broadband initiative during Obama administration (Lee K-S., 2012).  
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cultural products take on to achieve the state’s goals. The final section examines the 
relationship among cultural businesses and producers, globalization, and the state. It is 
true that the production and distribution system of Korean cultural industries are shaped 
by market logics and that its structure has become export-oriented and dominated by a 
handful of private conglomerates. Despite all this, however, the state exerts its political 
and economic power to control or manage cultural production in the market depending 
on its viewpoint on culture. Throughout this chapter, I explore the nexus of the state and 
neoliberal globalization in the Korean cultural industries.  
4.2. The State-led Development of Korean Cultural 
Industries: Legacies of the Developmental state in 
Cultural Industry Policy Schemes 
4.2.1.  “From Restriction to Promotion”: A Paradigm-shift in the 
Implementation of Cultural Industry Policies in the 1990s 
It was 1989 when the Korean government established the Ministry of Culture 
(MOC) finally became an independent governmental branch, and cultural affairs were 
considered subtasks of other branches such as education and public information, and 
were understood as tools of delivering the state’s political propaganda.47 In this regard, 
for many policymakers who had understood cultural products as political tools to be used 
to maintain power, the nation’s democratization and the following establishment of an 
independent governmental branch became an opportunity to re-establish the state’s 
approach to culture. In relation to this, Participant F, who served as a former high-
ranking official in MCST, explained their interpretation of the meaning of MOC’s 
establishment as follows: 
“I believe it was when cultural policies were finally set up to promote culture, 
art, cultural industries as an independent policy field. Before then… even 
 
47 Until 1968, the Bureau of Culture, one of nine bureaus of the Ministry of Culture and Education, 
managed the preservation of cultural heritage and infrastructure and the supervision of the arts, 
music, theatre, dance, craft, and play (Mungyobujikje, Presidential Decree No. 189, 1949). Then, 
the Ministry of Culture and Public Information became responsible for cultural affairs. However, 
according to the Presidential decree that defined mandates of cultural affairs, the Ministry’s 
responsibilities were primarily focused on censoring, guiding, and licensing the production and 
trade of cultural products (Munhwagongbobujikje, Presidential Decree No. 10585, 1981). Most 
importantly, the state’s approach to culture put emphases on utilizing it for propagating its political 
ideologies and controlling the population. 
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Roh himself was like Chun Doo-hwan… [who understood culture] as a tool 
for promoting the administration. Then, the Ministry had been called the 
Ministry of Culture and Public Information, which meant culture had been 
considered as an instrument of propagating [the regime]. In this regard, the 
establishment of MOC was a turning point of strengthening culture’s 
presence in policy contexts (Participant F).” 
Meanwhile, the Summer Olympics in Seoul in 1988 was another turning point for 
the state to restructure its cultural policies (Park K-M., 2013). If democratization 
incapacitated the state’s political interventions in the cultural domain, the Olympics 
prompted the state to question how to promote Korean culture and what would be 
distinctive Korean culture in the era of globalization. As Participant F recalled, “the 
Olympics provided a momentum for policymakers to discuss and reflect ‘what is our 
culture?’” As bureaucrats had been asked to prepare both opening and closing 
ceremonies—as the Olympics were not only sporting events but also cultural mega-
events that could show off the host country’s cultural assets and resources to the world. 
Considering that numerous states used the televised spectacle of the Olympics as an 
international imprimatur to project national values and present their cultural power to the 
world, the 1988 Olympic Games brought a paradigm shift to cultural policymakers who 
were asked to design new approaches to culture with a blank slate (Mulcahy, 2017).  
After the Olympics, Roh appointed Lee O-young, a literary critic who directed 
both ceremonies, as the head of a new governmental branch that would be exclusively 
responsible for cultural affairs in 1990. Lee, who had no experience in politics or 
administration, attempted to transform the MOC and its bureaucratic system and change 
a heavy and bureaucratic atmosphere strongly evident in the organization. While the 
Ministry established the Korea National University of Arts as a hub of the nation’s culture 
and art education and loosened the inspection and censorship system, Lee demanded 
policymakers to disrupt the existing hierarchy that had made the organization rigid and 
risk-averse. Instead, he proposed cultural sensitivity as a new principle of policymaking 
to prepare for post-authoritarian and post-bureaucratic policy imperatives (Park K-M., 
2013; Nam, 2019). About this, Roh introduced a new direction for cultural policies, 
aiming at promoting cultural creativity and diversity to encourage the public’s 
participation and enjoyment of culture with an arm’s length principle in which the state 
would support culture without interventions (Roh, 1990b).  
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Despite Lee’s efforts to reform the bureaucratic system and collaborate with 
artists and creators in policymaking, many of Lee’s attempts were not successful due to 
the MOC’s budgetary deficits and various types of bureaucratic inefficiencies rampant in 
the organization. Most of all, since logics of economic development dominated policy 
discourse and relevant projects were given priority over allocating public resources, the 
Ministry’s missions to promote culture often ended in empty talk. Such a marginalized 
position of the Ministry within the government system made it incapable of implementing 
its masterplan (Nam, 2019).48 Participant F recalled how cultural policymakers had to 
persuade Ministry of Finance (currently the Ministry of Economy and Finance, MOEF) 
bureaucrats into supporting culture: 
When MOC was firstly established, we always became a lower priority in 
terms of budget. We had to promote culture as ‘advantageous to promote 
democracy’ [the budgetary authority] … Later, we promoted that support 
for culture would benefit the economy. We even translated a book which 
covered ‘how much arts and culture would induce economic development’ 
to persuade [the Ministry of Finance] (Participant F). 
In addition to this, Participant C, who works at an MCST’s affiliation, explained the 
subordinate position of the cultural ministry: 
There is a common narrative within MCST…It has a mother-in-law [MOEF]. 
Whenever cultural policymakers request a budget for support programs 
and giving subsidies to the arts and cultural sector. Then, the Ministry of 
Finance rejects almost every project… The top priority of our institute is to 
provide data and evidence when cultural policymakers give briefings on 
new projects to MOEF as well as the legislature (Participant C). 
Both Participant C and Participant F’s explanations indicate that the fate of the 
nation’s cultural ministry and its projects for the cultural sector was in the hands of 
MOEF bureaucrats who had the right to finalize the entire government system’s budget 
proposal. Considering the position of the Ministry of Finance, which had been the 
duumvirate of designing and implementing the nation’s developmentalism along with the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB), such a structure of the government system—that the 
 
48 For instance, until 2000, the Ministry’s budget was less than 1% of the entire administration’s 
expenditure budget. In 2000, the National Assembly made an appropriation of 0.963 trillion KRW 
(761 million USD) to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT), which exceeded 1% of the 
administration’s total annual budget for the first time. In the following year, the National Assembly 
earmarked 1 trillion KRW (892 million USD) for MCT (Nam, 2019). As of 2020, the Ministry 
manages 6.4 trillion KRW in total (5.7 billion USD), including the budget and related public funds, 
which is still less than 2% of the state’s total budget (Kim, 2019).  
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economy ministry has mandates to approve the cultural ministry’s budget—meant many 
projects by the cultural ministry had to benefit other Ministries (especially MOEF).49 In 
other words, the reconceptualization of the nation’s cultural policy after the nation’s 
democratization had to be instrumentalist by nature as long as it was required to satisfy 
the inclinations of budgeteers who had been accustomed to mobilizing resources in the 
name of development (Lee SM, 2018). 
Meanwhile, the US’ heavy pressure to open the domestic market continued to 
increase. For instance, lobbied by the Motion Picture Export Association of America 
(MPEAA, currently the Motion Picture Association of America, MPAA), the US Trade 
Representative (USTR) highlighted the liberalization of the film market as a core issue of 
trade negotiation with Korea (Jin, 2020a). As a result, Korea agreed to allow foreign 
media conglomerates’ direct distribution of US films and music in 1988 (Ko, 1994, 
September 29). This not only worsened the heavy dependence on US companies in the 
domestic market but also threatened to put many film producers out of business 
because much of the production costs came from redistributing Hollywood films in 
theatres (Ko, 1994, September 29; Jin, 2020a).50 In addition to this, the Korean 
government further opened its film market to Hollywood by lifting quotas on screening 
foreign films in theatres by 1994 (Hong, 1990, December 24).  
Granted, these measures brought strong backlash from cultural workers who 
argued that market liberalization would result in subordinating the nation’s cultural 
industries in the hands of US capital. Along with trade liberalization, foreign investments 
 
49 In 1994, the Economic Planning Board and the Ministry of Finance were integrated into the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy. Led by technocrats and a handful of economists who theorized 
the state-led and export-led economic development model, both branches were instrumental in 
planning and administering logics of developmentalism and played pivotal roles in mobilizing and 
allocating private and public resources in the name of economic development. Since the Ministry 
had authority to allocate and organize national budget, supervise all public organizations, collect 
tax along with establishing and executing economic policies, its presence in the government 
system was enormous. In order to disperse the Ministry’s excessive power in the government 
system, Kim Dae-jung administration spun it off and established an independent branch 
responsible for managing budget (the Ministry of Planning and Budget) in late 1990s. However, in 
the name of efficiency, Lee Myung-bak administration reintegrated two Ministries into the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance in 2008, which continues up to date.  
50 As a result, major Hollywood conglomerates including UIP, 20th Century Fox, Warner Bros, 
Columbia Tristar, and Buena Vista began to establish their branches in Korea and began to 
distribute their films directly to Korean theaters. This brought a surge in screening foreign films 
(mostly Hollywood films); from 24 films in 1983 to 321 films in 1989. Meanwhile, only 5 films 
managed to grab spots in the top 100 video rental list in 1993 compared to 90 Hollywood films 
(Jin, 2011b; Jin, 2020a).  
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in the media industry continued to increase in the 1990s. As transnational corporations 
became more prominent in the cultural market, the state had to implement 
countermeasures to protect its cultural businesses.51 In relation to this, Participant E, 
who works as an analyst at a financial institution managed by MOEF, explained how this 
pushed the Korean government to engage in developing cultural industries. 
Before the enactment of the Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural 
Industries in 1999, [the policy discourse] had been dominated by 
protectionist logics. There were the screen quota and wide anxiety over an 
influx of Japanese cultural products [among bureaucrats.] In those days, 
there was a common understanding ‘if US or Japanese cultural products 
penetrate into the market, our culture might be assimilated.’ [Among 
policymakers], there were concerns of ‘Americanization’, ‘Japanization’, 
and ‘the demise of Korean culture’, and what the term ‘culture’ meant was 
purely ‘cultural’ (Participant E).  
When Kim Young-sam was sworn in as President, his cabinet implemented a 
more provocative approach to instrumentalize culture. Inspired by the worldwide success 
of Jurassic Park, which garnered profits equal to that of selling 1.5 million Sonatas, a car 
brand made by Hyundai, the Presidential Advisory Council on Science and Technology 
published a policy report on the potential of culture to act as higher value-added 
businesses with huge ripple effects (Shim, 2006). Called the ‘Sonata Effect’, the 
presidency established a task force for promoting cultural industries in 1993. The 
advisory board consisted of 30 members and was responsible for several key tasks: 
basic principles and policy tasks of promoting cultural industries, the improvement of 
laws and regulations, globalization of traditional cultural products, the development of 
cultural products with cutting-edge technologies, and international promotion of Korean 
cultural products and training specialists for managing cultural infrastructures. The 
majority of members consisted of professors and technologists along with several 
businesspeople and bureaucrats (Kyunghyang Shinmun, September 2, 1993).  
Such an approach where the state began to reinterpret culture as an instrument 
for economic development, was deeply connected to Kim Young-sam’s political 
orientation. Indeed, since his inauguration, Kim strongly emphasized the liquidation of 
authoritarian legacies and attempted to replace them with more liberalistic standards and 
 
51 In regard to the backlash against opening the film market, the national assembly proposed Act 
on the Promotion of Film s in 1989. After years of negotiations, the government agreed to loosen 
film classification, simplify registration of film production, and create film promotion fund in 1995 
(Ahn, 1995, December 9). 
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measures. Under his leadership, the Ministry of Culture and Sport (MCS) criticized the 
state’s previous approach to culture that had been based on excessively tight 
regulations, derived from the colonial period, and consolidated by authoritarian 
governments. Instead, the Ministry made a case for change that would redefine the 
state’s roles from a controller to a patron through deregulation and promotion of an 
individual’s cultural activities (Korea Culture and Arts Foundation, 1994). Compared to 
previous administrations that had paid attention to traditional folk culture or pure arts, the 
Kim administration’s approach to culture with an emphasis on the promotion of popular 
culture was different (Moon, September 3, 2020). In relation to this, Participant F 
explained that the emergence of popular culture in policy contexts implied changes to 
the state’s attitude toward recognizing popular culture, which was an outcome of political 
democratization.  
Despite its liberalistic slogans, however, to develop cultural industries that would 
be in the hands of artists and private stakeholders was not an easy task. Because of the 
high degree of uncertainty about gaining profits in the market as audiences’ reaction to 
products is neither known in advance nor easily influenced afterward, as well as high 
initial costs of developing and producing content, to begin developing cultural industries 
without effective market essentials and resources would be difficult (Havens & Lotz, 
2017). Most of all, since culture had been suppressed by the state’s authoritarian rule for 
decades without enjoying autonomy, it was questionable whether the cultural domain, 
including creators, producers, and distribution systems would have enough potential to 
lead the development and survive in a fiercely competitive market. In other words, the 
conditions of promoting the cultural creativity of individuals and generating revenue 
through producing and distributing outcomes based on market dynamics and managed 
by the cultural domain itself, which would potentially be a textbook process of developing 
cultural industries, were insufficient and vulnerable in the Korean context. To promote 
the cultural industries, it was both inevitable and necessary for the state to be involved in 
developing cultural businesses to promote them as new growth engines of the national 
economy. In other words, such industrial characteristics incentivized the state to 
restructure the market and build foundations for cultural businesses. 
In this regard, the way that the state utilized promotion for this sunrise industry 
was path dependent. Based on his predecessor’s plans, the Kim administration 
announced a ‘Five-year Plan of Cultural Promotion’ in 1993, the state’s first masterplan 
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dedicated to developing cultural industries. While much of the plan echoed the previous 
one, it officially proclaimed a goal to develop cultural industries, notably the development 
of audiovisual businesses, new media, publishing, and gaming businesses. To 
materialize the plan, MCS established the Cultural Industry Bureau under the Ministry in 
1994 as the main organization to plan and implement policies and programs to develop 
cultural businesses (Kyunghyang Shinmun, September 2, 1993; Ahn et al. 2017). Its 
establishment reflected a widespread desire among the administration, as Lee Min-
sup—the head of the Ministry—proclaimed that “audiovisuals, which had been only 
considered as part of culture, would be recognized as part of industries that had been a 
long-cherished ambition of cultural figures (Seo, October 21, 1994, stress added)”.  
In accordance with the five-year plan, the bureau began to implement several 
schemes to promote cultural industries. Most of all, it categorized audiovisual 
businesses as part of the manufacturing industry in 1994. This meant that they would be 
entitled to get financial and tax benefits equivalent to benefits that manufacturing 
businesses received. In a similar vein, it defined audiovisual and graphic technologies as 
‘cutting-edge technologies’ so that they would receive public funds from the state. In 
addition, schemes to construct infrastructures such as the national film studio, integrate 
culture with cutting-edge media technologies through training technological experts, 
building databases, and overhauling relevant regulations such as the protection of 
intellectual properties were also initiated (Arts Council Korea, 1993; Ko, January 21, 
1997). In relation to this, the Ministry introduced a bill called the ‘Framework Act on the 
Video Industry Promotion’, which provided a legal basis for promoting audiovisual 
businesses, which was passed in the National Assembly in 1995. Last but not least, the 
Kim administration recognized Chaebols as major funding sources and encouraged 
them to invest in cultural businesses. Arguing that the industrial structure—which had 
been led by small-scale businesspeople—could not progress without further investment, 
the state strongly demanded major conglomerates enter the industry (Kim, May 17, 
1994). To facilitate their entry, the number of regulations that had restricted the entry of 
large companies into media and cultural markets was lifted.  
Along with economic needs, Kim expected that cultural industries “would 
contribute to the nation’s Segyehwa (globalization in Korean) (Kim, October 10, 1997)”, 
another core political slogan of his administration, to replace old legacies from 
authoritarian governments and further integrate the nation into the world. Kim believed 
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this would be realized through liberalization of the market and society and the 
development of advanced technologies and new industries. For him and his cabinet, 
cultural industries, of which success would be based on individual’s freedom of 
expression and creativity and outcomes could achieve tremendous income and 
international fame, would be ideal businesses to satisfy their political goals (Maeil 
Business Newspaper, September 1, 1995). In this regard, Participant H, who served as 
a senior executive in the Ministry, explained the primary existence of the Cultural 
Industry Bureau. 
Since Kim Young-sam administration, the government had begun to stress 
the importance of cultural industries… [Before growing to the Bureau], the 
team had been a mere division called as Cultural Commodity Division 
under Culture Policy Bureau. [The Bureau] meant the Ministry equipped a 
stable system to implement policies for promoting cultural industries 
(Participant H). 
The nation’s political democratization in the late 1980s saw the Korean 
government shift away from its traditional approach of controlling and regulating cultural 
production, riddled with authoritarian rules and strict censorships on cultural products 
and artists, and the mobilization of cultural materials for state propaganda. This shift saw 
the establishment of the MOC as an independent governmental branch to replace 
previous schemes and develop new strategies for a post-authoritarian society. Despite 
its marginalized position in the central government, cultural bureaucrats initiated several 
schemes for developing the creativity of individual artists and producers in the field. 
Meanwhile, several external factors, such as intense trade pressures to open the 
domestic market, led to political leadership’s interest in the economic potential of 
industrializing culture becoming mainstream in policy planning. Such political and 
economic changes became fundamental structures of the nation’s cultural industry 
policies. 
In spite of the tides of neoliberal globalization and the growing presence of 
market forces in cultural production, the state continued supporting and engaging in the 
development of the cultural industries. Considering the legacies of the developmental 
state and the notably strong role of bureaucrats in formulating businesses with the power 
to mobilize private and public resources, there are distinctive characteristics that 
demonstrate the state’s continuing strong presence in the development and 
maintenance of Korean cultural industries. Through several examples and cases, the 
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following sections discuss how the state has engaged in promoting the cultural industries 
and how policy practices were utilized in a market subject to the flows of neoliberal 
globalization.  
4.2.2. Strong Presence of Elite Bureaucrats in the Development of 
Korean Cultural Industries 
Since the mid-1990s, the Ministry of Culture and Sport began to implement 
industrial logics in its policies, seeking new opportunities to produce cultural goods 
(Moon, 2020, September 3). The Culture Industry Bureau (CIB), a new branch under the 
Ministry, became responsible for investigating the economic potentials of cultural 
businesses. In detail, the Bureau consists of four divisions: Film Promotion Division, 
Game and Record Division, Publishing Promotion Division, and Cultural Industry 
Planning Division. In relation to this, Participant N, a senior bureaucrat at the Ministry, 
considered the establishment of the Bureau as a pioneering outcome as “major Western 
states began to pay attention to industrial aspects of cultural industries in the late-1980s 
at most”. The Participant recalled expectations held during the Bureau’s establishment 
as follows, 
The main impetus of cultural policy could be summarized as ‘from 
restriction to promotion’…Such a shift toward promotion was important as 
films, games, and popular music had been major targets of such 
regulations, like the restriction of direct distribution of foreign films, and the 
mandatory sequencing of ‘public songs’ in music albums and preliminary 
review of lyrics… In this regard, the Bureau would focus on promoting ‘for-
profit’ cultural industries that had the potential for self-reliance [without the 
state’s support] that would be led by private businesses (Participant N). 
Following CIB’s foundation, the Ministry began to mobilize its resources in 
expectation of CIB’s success. It not only made commitments to fund this new branch but 
also assigned high-ranking bureaucrats to materialize the state’s ambitions of 
developing the nation’s cultural businesses as an up-and-coming industry. In the belief 
that cultural industries would not develop successfully solely in the hands of private 
businesses, CIB stipulated the state’s support for cultural businesses through enacting 
the Culture and Arts Promotion Act. Following this legislation, the Bureau introduced 
masterplans for several sectors—including film, publishing, and television—that included 
professional training, infrastructure development such as industrial clusters and theatres, 
technological support, and subsidies for cultural production projects. In this regard, CIB’s 
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main tasks were more than deregulation of censorship and other restrictions placed on 
producing and distributing activities of cultural production. It functioned as both a major 
think-tank for the Ministry to develop policy measures on promoting cultural industries 
and the main implementing agency responsible for administering policies. 
Many of these plans were to be interrupted or suspended due to the nation’s 
financial crisis in 1997–1998. As a few leading manufacturing conglomerates that drove 
the national economy went bankrupt during the financial crisis, the newly elected Kim 
Dae-jung administration had to fuel future growth engines of the Korean economy with 
new industries. Also, Kim recognized the economic potentials of cultural industries and 
understood that popular culture would be beneficial to pioneer new overseas markets for 
other industries (Nam, 2019). Under the Kim Dae-jung administration, CIB was 
expanded to a key organization in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT), and many 
of its policy measures on developing cultural industries were revitalized. Following the 
presidency’s expectations, the Ministry began to prioritize the promotion of cultural 
industries as a key mission and focused all its resources on the Bureau and its projects 
of developing cultural industries. The following recollection by Participant H well-explains 
the Bureau’s position in the Ministry:  
I believe [CIB is] the place in which staff work the hardest [among the 
Ministry’s bureaus]. It sounds strange…but it scouts the best employees in 
the Ministry and the Ministry assigns high performers to the team. They 
work around the clock… that’s the Bureau. Not everybody can join an 
organization. Only those who received recognition for their abilities could 
be part of the team…So [CIB is] a key branch in the Ministry. In the belief 
that content would play key roles in the future economy, they are self-
respecting (Participant H) 
In relation to this, Participant O, who has participated in a number of supervisory 
committees relevant to cultural industry policies of the Ministry, responded that “the 
Ministry’s bureaucrats are recognized as outstanding human resources within the 
government organization as their entrance scores on the Public Administration 
Examination are higher than those of other ministries.” In this regard, Bureau positions 
are highly regarded when compared to other bureaus in the Ministry, and Bureau 
members are considered elite leaders among other bureaucrats. Such placement of 
outstanding employees to CIB teams that take charge of developing and implementing 
strategies of promoting cultural industries reflects how an autonomous and competent 
bureaucracy is a major characteristic of the developmental state (Johnson, 1982).  
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In a similar vein, the following Figure 4.1 demonstrates how the Ministry—the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism (1998–2008) and the Ministry of Culture, Sport and 
Tourism (MCST, 2008–current)—allocated its budget to each policy sector, including the 
promotion of cultural industries, support for ‘pure’ art, funding for sports infrastructure 
and athletes, etc. The graph shows the prioritization of support for cultural businesses, 
including media and tourism, while support for pure arts, religion, and the promotion of 
local and traditional culture—which had previously been regarded as major elements of 
the nation’s cultural policy—stagnated. Given that budgets are a political outcome that 
demonstrates the state’s commitment to particular projects expressed quantitatively, the 
tracking of the Ministry’s expenditure indicates the willingness to monitor the support and 
development of cultural industries (Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004).  
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Figure 4.1.  Cultural ministry's allocation of its budgets from 2000 to 2020 
(trillion KRW)  
Source: MCT, 1999; 2000b; 2002; 2003; 2004a; 2005a; 2006; 2007; MCST, 2008a; 2009a; 2010; 
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In 1997, the budget for promoting cultural industries was only 6% of the Ministry’s 
total budget (Heo, January 5, 1999). However, starting from the Kim Dae-jung 
administration, the budget dedicated to promoting cultural businesses, split among 
various bureaus, began to expand rapidly. In 1999, the budget for the Culture Industry 
Bureau was 97 billion KRW (86 million USD), 13% of that of the entire Ministry of Culture 
and Tourism—694 billion KRW (616.8 million USD). In 2004, as the size of the nation’s 
cultural businesses expanded, MCT separated into several divisions in charge of 
advertisement, broadcast, and publishing from CIB and established the Culture and 
Media Bureau (CMB) to improve the specialty of bureaucrats and promote media 
convergence of different media (Ahn, May 12, 2004). Combined with CMB’s budget, the 
ratio of both bureaus increased to 18% in 2010 (336 billion KRW out of 1.87 trillion KRW, 
equivalent to 300 million USD) and became 24% (843 billion KRW out of 3.41 trillion 
KRW, equivalent to 753 million USD) in 2020, exceeding each of the budgets allocated 
for pure arts (379 billion KRW as of 2020, equivalent to 338 million USD), sport (247 
billion KRW as of 2020, equivalent to 220 million USD), and other sectors. Considering 
that the Ministry’s budget does not include that of public organizations such as the Korea 
Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) and the Korean Film Council (KOFIC) which execute 
various promotion programs in the field, the state’s support for the cultural industries 
exceeds that of the Ministry’s direct budget for its various branches as a whole.52  
Along with the budget of MCST (as well as its affiliations), the nation’s cultural 
bureaucrats strove to categorize cultural industries as technology-based industries so 
that individuals and corporations in industries would be eligible for various public funds 
supporting cutting-edge technologies managed by the Ministry of Science and ICT—the 
governmental branch which holds the largest research and development funding 
program in the entire government system. Such an approach in which the government 
appropriated the budget dedicated to other ministries through recategorizing cultural 
industries as technology-intensive businesses, not only contributed to digitalizing cultural 
production but also demonstrated the state’s strong interest in developing cultural 
industries (Moon, September 3, 2020).  
 
52 For instance, in the year of 2020, the National Assembly appropriated 476.2 billion KRW (431 
million USD) to KOCCA and 101.5 billion KRW (90 million USD) to KOFIC. Considering the 
legislature appropriated 3.41 trillion KRW (30 billion USD) to the Ministry, the state’s supports on 
the cultural industries through public organizations is significant.  
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In that sense, to develop and implement promotional strategies for cultural 
businesses as a new engine of the nation’s future economy has been MCT and its 
superseding MCST’s top priority for decades. As mentioned in previous chapters, all the 
presidencies after Kim Young-sam announced their masterplans for developing cultural 
industries, all of which focused on developing the industrial potential of cultural 
production so that the state could instrumentalize their outcomes for political and 
economic purposes. Following doctrines from each presidency, the Ministry has 
expanded the Culture Industry Bureau to several branching bureaus. In 2004, the 
Culture and Media Bureau was established alongside the Culture Industry Bureau, and 
the organization became three bureaus in 2017: The Copyright Bureau, Content Policy 
Bureau, and Media Policy Bureau,53 and following the organization’s expansion, more 
bureaucrats were recruited. Given that MCST currently consists of 9 bureaus under the 
first Vice Minister who is responsible for cultural affairs, such a structure represents the 
increasing role of cultural bureaucrats in industrializing culture.54  
While the Ministry’s mobilization of available resources to promote and support 
cultural industries is evident, a question remains: How is the state’s intervention in the 
cultural realm legitimized in a post-authoritarian, democratic era? Responses from 
participants showed three themes in relation to this question. Firstly, bureaucrats point to 
the brief history and relatively small size of the Korean cultural industries as justification 
for their direct engagement in cultural production since they lacked both funding and 
industrial structures. Considering the capital-intensive and high-risk nature of cultural 
industries, cultural bureaucrats believe the state’s active role in protecting and promoting 
cultural production is required to help Korean businesses thrive in both domestic and 
international markets. In that sense, they regarded themselves as not only patrons who 
 
53 In detail, Copyright Bureau is in charge of policies on cultural trade and copyright protection of 
cultural products. Content Policy Bureau is responsible of policies on film, game, and music 
industries as well as the development of strategies to expand the Korean Wave. Finally, Media 
Policy Bureau implements policies on advertising, publishing, and television businesses.  
54 Among 9 bureaus, Culture Policy Bureau and Policy Planning Bureau oversee the entire 
cultural policy framework as well as the management of the Ministry. Emergency and Security 
Management Bureau is an organization that is responsible for setting contingency plans for 
managing the Ministry’s function in times of national crises. Apart from three bureaus set up 
policies on cultural industries, there are Arts Policy Bureau and Regional Culture Policy Bureau—
which each of them is responsible of pure arts sectors and regional cultural infrastructures. The 
second Vice Minister is in charge of public information and sport affairs. 
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support the development of cultural products but also helmsmen guide cultural 
businesses toward development (Cho, December 13, 1999; Lee, 2019a).  
Secondly, some participants point out a long-standing tradition of the nation’s 
market system where the state has been involved in allocating resources among 
stakeholders, rather than yielding to the market. In the developmental state, the capitalist 
market system is often maintained by a hierarchical relationship between the state and 
individual stakeholders in the market, including consumers, corporations, and trade 
unions. Despite the ongoing implementation of neoliberalism, such a mechanism 
continues to operate in the Korean context to manage various types of conflicts among 
market players (Kalinowski, 2015). As long as the state has the authority to distribute 
resources and mediate crises, some actors expect active participation by the state in 
resolving issues regardless of skepticism from others. Such a situation results in the 
state’s continued engagement in the market, which includes cultural industries. In 
relation to this, Participant G explained: 
Unlike other countries, however, in Korea, whenever there is a conflict in 
the market, all stakeholders ask the Ministry to solve the issue without 
attempts of rectifying it by themselves. Industrial associations, which have 
mandates to work out problems, lack trust from their members and often 
force the Ministry to intervene on their behalf. Thus, the government is 
always blamed from both sides; some accuse the state of incompetence 
while others criticize the state as having fingers in every pie (Participant G).  
Last but not least, there is a collective psyche among cultural bureaucrats which 
prioritizes national development, rather than supporting an individual’s cultural 
production or prospering the arts and creativity. According to Miller and Yúdice (2002), 
the state’s cultural policies, as a privileged terrain of hegemony, have political missions 
focused on developing a distinctive national identity that citizens recognize as 
transcending certain interests. By defining the standards of cultural tastes, the state 
expects culture to function as an essential tool of governing the population. As culture is 
believed to be indispensable to manage society, it becomes inevitable for bureaucrats to 
be involved in the cultural realm. Through regulations, support programs for individual 
cultural products, and various cultural institutions such as art galleries, museums, public 
media, and schools, they set up guidelines for producing and consuming culture.  
Such a mechanism becomes more powerful in Korean society as the state 
retains significant power in the cultural realm. In spite of political democratization, its 
131 
promotion of cultural industries was influenced by industrial policy logics and legacies of 
the developmental state. Given that both ideas and practices of the Korean 
developmental state had been driven by a national psyche of ‘living well’, or leaping into 
the ranks of developed countries, the state’s proclamation of cultivating cultural 
businesses as new growth engines for the national economy meant bureaucrats would 
continue to mobilize cultural products as both political and economic tools (Yim, 2002; 
Kang, 2011). For bureaucrats—who were the main architects of realizing political-
economic missions of ‘living well’ through institutionalizing the developmental state 
system in both policies and the market—the pronouncement became an order to direct 
the industrialization of cultural businesses (Kim, 2020). Of course, their interventions into 
culture would differ from that of previous authoritarian governments.  
Korea’s bureaucratic approach to cultural production was twofold. Firstly, 
policymakers of the cultural ministry were granted the initiative in planning policies and 
implementing them in the field. Based on the logic that culture would contribute to the 
state’s political and economic agendas, they set up policy goals and drew up schemes to 
develop industries, established and designated public organizations to execute their 
ideas, and met and encouraged stakeholders—from individual artists to large 
corporations—to follow their masterplans. Regardless of which administration was in 
power at a given time, these roles granted to bureaucrats have not been changed, 
although the presidency set up broad guidelines that characterize the administration’s 
masterplan for promoting cultural industries. As Participant N explained below, 
bureaucrats could retain the power to formulate and implement policy measures, which 
reinforced their position in the field: 
Many of the presidency’s directions are set up by bureaucrats [detached to 
the presidential office from the Ministry] … Then, the Ministry has initiatives 
for policymaking and implementation of policy outcomes… Based on my 
experiences in the Ministry for decades, the Ministry’s voice is strong [in 
policymaking] (Participant N). 
Similarly, Participant J, who works at an MCST’s affiliated organization, added 
that most support programs for cultural businesses and the Korean Wave are overseen 
by the Ministry are fixed—in other words, managed by bureaucrats. In relation to this, 
both Participant G and H explained that all presidents after democratization have been 
supportive of the Ministry’s ideas for industrializing culture as they have recognized the 
potential of instrumentalizing culture. Although each administration had different ideas 
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and objectives for said instrumentalization from exchangeable goods in the market to 
tools of statist ideologies, all their goals presumed the industrialization of culture and 
export promotion of cultural products to foreign markets. Other than a few major 
changes by incoming administrations that would result in prioritizing certain goals over 
others, depending on political orientation, there is no incentive for administrations to 
replace the entire policy framework of instrumentalization, commercialization, and 
industrialization of culture, which has been developed by bureaucrats for decades.  
Secondly, officials in the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) are involved 
in policymaking as they approve MCST’s budget proposals. Throughout history, MOEF 
and its former ministry, notably the Economic Planning Board (EPB), was the main 
architect of constructing the nation’s economic system as the developmental state. Led 
by a small number of technocrats—bureaucrats who manage policymaking with scientific 
and professional expertise rather than political insights, EPB was devoted to 
implementing logics of the developmental state system into the public sector (Wade, 
2018). It also played a key role in building a theoretical foundation of ‘national 
development’ based on state-led developmentalism to legitimize their influence over the 
economy, as well as the society (Kang, 2011). As both legacies of the developmental 
state and the Ministry’s presence are strong in the government structure, MOEF is 
engaged in all government policy development, including cultural policies. Such an 
omnipotent position of the Ministry comes from the right to allocating each Ministry’s 
budget and other resources. This means that cultural industry policies are double bound 
to the tastes of cultural bureaucrats as well as those of MOEF’s technocrats who have 
strong beliefs about the development of the national economy. In relation to this, 
Participant F reflected an antipathy to MOEF’s interference in cultural industry policies. 
To put it bluntly, it means that MOEF participates in cultural affairs. Without 
seeking advice from us, it just decides cultural policies by itself. …MCST 
had no say in every administration’s decision-making process. Why? 
Because presidents had to consider bread-and-butter economics… to ‘live 
well’ had always been their top priority. To stay in power, they had to follow 
the logics of economic ministries (Participant F).55 
 
55 The strong initiative of MOEF’s bureaucrats is another legacy of the developmental state. Up to 
date, vacancies at the Ministry have been regarded as the place for only elites who have the 
highest exam score from the Public Administration Examination. In relation to this, Participant F 
recalls as follows; “Starting from the Park Chung-hee administration, technocrats from EPB ruled 
the entire government system. This continued when EPB became MOEF… As only the most 
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Not surprisingly, the global popularity of Korean cultural products and resulting 
economic and political contributions of the Korean Wave satisfied both bureaucratic 
parties. For MCST’s members, the Korean Wave provided evidence for how culture 
could contribute to the long-cherished mission of ‘living well’ through increasing exports 
and improving the national image and national pride. Expecting that it would improve the 
position of both culture and the Ministry in policy contexts, Participant H recalled:  
The Korean Wave was a piece of exciting news for us. The entire ministry 
was in a festive mood. As mentioned before, in the government system 
which only prioritized economic successes as successful policy outcomes, 
the Culture Industry Bureau was the key organization in the Ministry… We 
have a sense of duty that the success of cultural products, as well as the 
arts, is vital to reinforce our national dignity through improving our national 
image (Participant H). 
For example, inspired by the success of Korean idol group BTS and Parasite—a 
Korean thriller film directed by Bong Joon-ho—in the US market, MCST set up a pan-
governmental Hallyu (the Korean Wave) Cooperation Committee in 2020 that would 
include representatives from 13 ministries. Park Yang-woo, the Minister, emphasized 
that the Korean Wave built confidence in becoming one of the leading countries with 
immense cultural influence. Following his statement, the Ministry established the ‘Hallyu 
(the Korean Wave in Korean) Support and Cooperation Division’ as a dedicated branch 
to manage this cultural phenomenon. In relation to this, Participant M, a cultural 
bureaucrat, explained the Ministry’s reasoning behind the Division’s establishment as 
follows, 
Starting from the current minister, [everybody] regards the Korean Wave 
as the Ministry’s top priority mission… In that sense, the Division gets 
priority in budget allocation, and it is considered as a core team within the 
Ministry along with content [policy] and tourism because they have 
industrial values. We have been looking for new growth engines for our 
economy where export growth became stagnated (Participant M). 
In the meantime, such contributions of the Korean Wave satisfy MOEF’s technocrats. 
Participant M continued, 
When it comes to the budget… we have to discuss with the budget 
authority. Our budget is subject to reviews by MOEF, then the National 
Assembly. However, both recognize the Korean Wave as a top priority. For 
 
brilliant people [in the government system] can work at the Ministry, they have had a sense of 
duty that they would lead the country towards the mission of ‘national development’ with elitism.” 
134 
next year’s budget, the Ministry’s budget review [with MOEF] gave 
preferences to spending on the Korean Wave. I believe there will be not 
much change in budget for cultural production and the Korean Wave 
[regardless of whoever is in power] (Participant M).  
As long as the state recognizes both cultural products and their global popularity 
as instrumental in projecting statist and nationalist ideologies, bureaucrats are obliged to 
direct and engage in cultural production, even if much of the system is already under the 
control of the free-market mechanism. Since the discourse of national development was 
not interpreted as an economic motive but functioned as a political hegemony that 
legitimized the system of the developmental state for decades, this rationalization to 
mobilize cultural products for policymakers’ political and economic motives. In this 
regard, many cultural bureaucrats who I spoke with expressed pride in and satisfaction 
with the Korean Wave because it is an outcome which they strove to accomplish for 
decades. A result of this is that Korean cultural products and the Korean wave continue 
to become impetuses for cultural bureaucrats to participate in cultural production in the 
name of further instrumentalization. 
A recent example that demonstrates this would be the incumbent Moon Jae-in 
administration’s plans of establishing a film production organization between Korea and 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Dubbed the ASEAN-ROK (the 
Republic of Korea) Film Cooperation Organization (ARFO), the organization would 
promote Southeast Asian film through co-production with Korean film studios which 
equip advanced technologies and have more experiences with capital. Arguing that “co-
production between Korean and ASEAN film businesses would make them a global 
trend (Moon, 2020, 58)”, Moon announced his initiatives of film co-production would 
bring prosperity to Asian culture. Granted, Moon’s suggestion was a strategy of the 
administration’s public diplomacy project to attract leaders of ASEAN countries. The 
Korean Film Council (KOFIC), a state-supported and self-administered public 
organization that manages and promotes the nation’s film production, became 
responsible for materializing this initiative. To promote the establishment of ARFO as its 
achievement, KOFIC even broadcast a television commercial to commemorate the new 
organization based on the success of Korean films. In relation to this, Participant I, a 
staff member at an affiliation of MCST, explained the commercial’s success as follows, 
The ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit was held, and [the 
establishment of ARFO] was a major outcome of the Summit. ARFO was 
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KOFIC’s achievement, so [the television advertisement was broadcast] to 
promote the success of Korean films to the public. Without Moon’s 
statement on ARFO, I do not think television advertisements would be 
effective as it costs too much. I believe… it was because of the Summit 
(Participant I). 
In this television commercial, KOFIC promoted the launch of ARFO through 
instrumentalizing Bong’s achievement in Cannes as a memorial achievement of Korean 
films. Given that a television commercial was a highly unusual event for the institution, 
the commercial demonstrates the Commission’s strong willingness to utilize both the 
centennial history of the nation’s film production and Bong’s achievement in Cannes with 
Parasite as a successful outcome representing the state’s political and economic 
missions, particularly its efforts of increasing its regional influence in Southeast Asia—a 
key diplomatic agenda of the Moon Jae-in administration. The way in which Participant I 
connected the success of Korean films in the global market with KOFIC’s success also 
exemplifies a widespread belief among bureaucrats that all national resources, including 
culture, should benefit the state’s grand masterplan of national development, as well as 
the administration’s national agenda. The following sections investigate two major tools 
the Korean state employs to engage in cultural production: Motae Fund (Fund of Fund) 
and the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA). 
4.3. The Korean State’s Methods of Developing Cultural 
Industries: Nexus of Neoliberalism and State-
developmentalism 
4.3.1. Motae Fund (Fund of Fund): The State’s Utilization of the Market 
Mechanism  
In response to the question asking which scheme of the Ministry of Culture, Sport 
and Tourism (as well as its former branches) was the most useful method for promoting 
cultural production, a number of policymakers replied a Motae Fund (fund of fund, FoF). 
A Motae Fund refers to a private-public fund in which the government invests its funds or 
budget in venture capital finance that manages a variety of funds, instead of directly 
investing in a particular company or a specific fund. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism 
introduced an FoF as a funding mechanism for cultural production in 2006, following the 
abolishment of the Cultural Industries Promotion Fund, a major subsidy for cultural 
producers established in 1999. Instead, MCT designated cultural industries as ‘start-up 
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businesses’ to make them eligible to be subject to ‘Act on Special Measures for the 
Promotion of Venture Businesses’, the state’s main legal framework supporting 
technology start-ups as well as FoFs as the main budget program. As an outcome, the 
Ministry introduced FoFs for investing in cultural businesses in 2006 and FoFs for the 
film industry in 2010, which would be primarily funded by KOFIC. As of 2020, FoFs for 
cultural industries are set up with approximately 230 billion KRW (197 million USD) 
alongside FoFs of 45 billion KRW (39 million USD) for films (MCST, 2020d). The 
following Figure 4.2 briefly introduces the management structure of FoFs.  
 
Figure 4.2.  A schematic diagram of Fund of Funds (FoFs) relevant to cultural 
production (the cultural account, the Film account, and the 
Broadcasting account) 
Financiers
•MCST (FoFs for cultural businesses) and KOFIC 
(FoFs related to film production)
•Some FoFs of the Ministry of Science and ICT 
for broadcasting businesses
•Some cultural producers can apply for other 
FoFs managed by other ministries
Fund of Funds
•Managed by Korea Venture Investment 
Corporation (KVIC)
•Select investment associations that KVIC would 
invest in without the state's intervention
Investment associations
•Manage individual equity funds by recruiting 
private capital (e.g. Public 1: 2 Private or Public 1: 
Private 1, etc.)
•select certain companies to manage equity funds 
dedicated to producing cultural products
Individual cultural businesses
•Avoid major conglomerates, focusing on start-ups 
and entrepreneurs
•Includes a paper company (Companies engaged 
in cultural industries, CECI)
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The government firstly invests its budget in Korea Venture Investment 
Corporation (KVIC), a public organization supervised by the Ministry of Small and 
Medium Enterprises and Startups (MSS). Then, KVIC selects investment associations to 
manage specific equity funds and invests the seed money from the government in those 
associations. Once KVIC decides to invest in certain investment associations, these 
associations then recruit private investors to fund their equity funds. All equity funds are 
designated to be invested by venture capital as a means of raising production costs for 
cultural production. In terms of selecting investment associations and their equity funds 
(as well as relevant venture capital), KVIC enjoys autonomy without the Ministry’s 
interventions. If funds become profitable, KVIC and investment associations divide them 
based on the investment ratio, and the Ministry reinvests them in other FoFs. In case of 
loss of investment, the remaining balance would be used to compensate the loss of 
private investors to minimize their risks. In relation to this, Participant E explained the 
FoF’s mechanism of managing public funds in the hands of private capital. 
Since [bureaucrats] were not very aware of the film industry, letting the 
private sphere manage the budget was a smart move… Once the 
government entrusts its budget to KVIC, KVIC announces a series of FoFs 
and invites venture capitalists who have plans to run private equity funds 
matching the amount of investment equivalent to or above that of its 
investment. Moreover, [partners] collect commissions from managing 
equity funds and get earnings…Such favourable conditions increased 
private players’ investment in FoFs, contributed to exponentially producing 
a number of Korean films (Participant E). 
Considering the management system as well as the terms of revenue share, 
such conditions attracted the attention of private capital interested in investing in equity 
funds under FoFs. These private-public funds were essential to cover the production 
costs of different cultural businesses, including animation, popular music, television, and 
webtoons, etc. Among them, film producers became major beneficiaries. Indeed, 
investment associations funded by cultural and film FoFs have spent 1.06 trillion KRW 
(0.94 billion USD) in film production from 2010 to 2019, which composed 25% of the 
total production cost (Im, 2020). In relation to this, Participant E detailed how these 
equity funds attracted private capital.  
I would say that films became the largest beneficiary from FoF, as they 
were needed when investing in funds for film production…because 
investors are allowed to redeem their funds in three months to a year [as 
the duration of film production is generally shorter than other start-ups in 
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other cultural genres]. Huge sums of money went to finance film production, 
which contributed to making an effective industrial ecosystem (Participant 
E).  
In terms of raising production costs, FoFs have become important in the nation’s 
film market, as their annual investment in film production is approximately 133 billion 
KRW (119 million USD)—which consists of more than 30% of the total production cost of 
all Korean films produced per year (Sung, September 18, 2019). Indeed, many 
blockbuster films including Snowpiercer (2013), Miss Granny (2014), Assassination 
(2015), Extreme Job (2019), and Time to Hunt (2020) were supported by FoFs. As FoFs 
become effective schemes in film production, FoFs also become important for producers 
of other genres, including television drama, music, and musicals to raise production 
funds. For instance, venture capitals affiliated with FoFs become major investors for 
musical production companies as well as television drama (Oh, October 8, 2013). In 
relation to this, MCST announced that it would contribute 144 billion KRW (128 million 
USD) to FoFs dedicated to cultural production in 2021 (Kim, January 14, 2021).  
The Ministry’s introduction of FoFs as major funding schemes of cultural 
production meant the government would employ hands-off methods and adopt market-
oriented mechanisms into its development policies. Indeed, both Participant C and 
Participant E pointed out that the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE, currently 
MOEF)’s strongly preferred the state’s indirect support for developing industries when 
considering the government’s financial stability. This also demonstrates the budget 
authority’s reluctance to interrupt the market with the state’s intervention. Such an 
attitude of MOFE reflected neoliberal doctrines which were widespread in the 
policymaking process of bureaucrats who favoured market-driven, less state-
interventionist approaches in policymaking (Ryoo & Jin, 2020). Moreover, given that its 
leading figures had political backgrounds condemning the authoritarian government’s 
interference in cultural production as a non-democratic behaviour, actions of the Roh 
Moo-hyun administration—which replaced the Cultural Industries Promotion Fund with 
FoFs—on delegating management of its subsidies on cultural industries were not a 
surprising outcome (Kim & Jin, 2016; Lee, 2019a). This also coincided with its emphasis 
on the arm’s length principles in promoting the arts.56 
 
56 In detail, the Roh administration emphasized autonomy, decentralization, and the public’s 
participation as key pillars of its cultural policies. In 2003, MCT established the Committee on 
139 
MCT’s introduction of FoFs could be understood as a subtle strategy for 
developing cultural industries (Lee SM, 2018). Although the Roh administration 
expressed an unwillingness to employ direct measures for developing cultural 
businesses, considering the small size of the home market and domestic companies 
compared to foreign competitors with overwhelming market power, the state’s 
withdrawal from the industries would bring a major failure to the nation’s cultural 
production. Besides, despite its market-led schemes for promoting cultural businesses, 
MCT could not fully let market forces develop the cultural industries as they had been 
recognized as a core sector to develop the post-industrial economy.  
In this regard, MCT’s efforts of categorizing cultural production as ‘technologies’ 
in policy contexts represented the state’s consistent involvement in developing cultural 
industries. Before the Roh administration, the Kim Dae-jung administration had already 
chosen cultural industries as a major high-tech industry required to advance the national 
economy in 2001.57 Despite the administration’s emphasis on the importance of cultural 
industries to the economy, the state’s support for cultural production remained 
marginalized compared to other technologies.58 Considering that MOFE continued to 
prioritize the state’s supports for technological development to boost the economy, 
MCT’s legal categorization of cultural industries as technology start-ups and the 
following introduction of FoFs implied that it would not suspend or reduce support for the 
sector. Along with FoFs, the Ministry also allowed paper companies (special purpose 
 
Innovation of Cultural Administration under the Minister. Consisting of external specialists 
alongside bureaucrats, the Committee suggested the reorganization of the Ministry and the 
establishment of cultural policies with figures of the cultural realm. As an outcome, the Korean 
Culture and Arts Foundation, the Ministry’s public agency of subsiding artists, was reorganized to 
the Arts Council Korea (ARKO). Unlike the Foundation’s budget allocation to artists which had 
been decided by the organizational head, ARKO’s decision-making would be based on a 
collegiate system of council members consisting of figures from the art world. The introduction of 
a private-public governance system in policymaking was a major shift in the Ministry’s cultural 
management (Nam, 2019).  
57 In 2001, the Kim administration announced plans to promote six cutting-edge technology-based 
industries that would prosper future lives of people in the nation. Called 6T, this included 
information technology (IT), biotechnology (BT), nanotechnology (NT), environmental technology 
(ET), space technology (ST) alongside cultural production which was called as cultural 
technology (CT). Created by Kwangyun Wohn, a professor at Korea Advanced Institute of 
Science and Technology (KAIST), the terminology has been widely used in policy contexts to 
demonstrate the needs of convergence between culture and technologies (Choi, August 17, 
2004).  
58 As of 2003, the Korean government spent 2.213 trillion KRW (1.9 billion USD) to develop ‘6T’. 
However, only 42 billion KRW (36 million USD) was invested in supporting cultural technology 
(Jeon, 2005, April 7).  
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companies, Companies Engaged in Cultural Industries, CECI) in cultural production to 
facilitate project-based investments, expecting to reduce the risks of private investors. 
Participant C explained the implication of these measures to the field. 
I believe that the most important turning point in our cultural industry 
policies would be the introduction of FoF in funding cultural businesses… 
Venture capitalists made a specialized fund investing in a CECI’s 
production and the fund would be invested by FoF managed by KVIC 
[which could offset some risks with the Ministry’s investment] …Alongside 
KVIC, such type of fund for raising expenses would be an attractive 
investment product for private investors as its turnover was rapid compared 
to other products (Participant C). 
Through inviting private capital and their market logics to govern businesses in 
the form of equity funds, the cultural ministry sought market-led investment mechanisms 
as standards of funding and developing cultural industries. This approach satisfied not 
only the budget authority that favoured less-interventionist industrial policies and indirect 
measures toward the market but also private investors who were finding investment 
outlets. However, it is worth noting that the implementation of market-led initiatives in the 
cultural realm did not result in the state’s full retreat from cultural production as it 
sustained its rights to assess how FoFs are managed. An example would be the 
earnings rate of FoFs. Compared to other equity funds, their returns are not high since 
the Ministry expects funds to be allocated in order to raise production costs made by 
entrepreneurs and start-ups rather than large corporations. Considering private investors 
who expect to maximize their profits, these guidelines become a dilemma for KVIC, as 
Participant E explained.  
If KVIC generates higher returns from FoFs, it is accused of investing only 
in lucrative businesses like [blockbuster] film productions since they are 
designed to support startups and risky projects in which profit-making is at 
stake. However, if the fund suffers a loss, politicians blame KVIC as 
‘wasting the taxpayers’ precious money’… As the last resort, it often aims 
to set rates of return lower than the average. Despite its efforts, FoFs are 
hardly predictable to manage as the box office and movie investment highly 
fluctuate year by year (Participant E). 
The state’s implicit management of funds implies that it continues to oversee the 
direction of funding of cultural production in implicit ways. Apart from FoFs, the state has 
many public organizations that have participated in cultural production. For instance, the 
Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK), a state-owned commercial bank managed by market 
logic, has been a major investor of cultural businesses. In the year 2020, it announced a 
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630 billion KRW (541.5 million USD) investment and a low-interest loan to cultural 
production (Yoon, May 19, 2020). As long as their presence in the market is crucial and 
the state continues to encourage the Bank to support cultural producers, their 
investment is considered as part of the state’s hands-off engagement in the production 
as well.  
Moreover, the Korean state utilizes its state-owned investment funds to support 
cultural industries. Notably, the National Pension Service of Korea (NPS), the third-
largest sovereign wealth fund in the world with 600 billion USD in assets, is a major 
stakeholder of a number of major companies in industries. It is the second-largest 
shareholder of a major K-Pop label SM Entertainment (8.54%) and SBS (9.97%)—a 
major terrestrial private broadcaster. Also, it is a major stakeholder of CJ ENM (5.01%), 
the largest film distributor as well as a major television broadcast and other K-Pop 
agencies including JYP Entertainment (6.12%). Given that NPS’ presence as a 
shareholder has influence over corporate behaviour in Korea, NPS’ investment in 
cultural businesses demonstrates how the state can support cultural production through 
market-oriented measures (Jun, 2016). Along with FoFs and investment from other 
public financial institutions, this indicates how the state still utilizes neoliberal market 
mechanisms for the sake of its developmentalist objectives. such ‘indirect’ methods are 
often also used as a way of direct intervention by the state in cultural production, as 
MCST recently announced that it would require recipients of FoFs to improve the 
working environment for staff such as signing employment contracts and penalties for 
overdue wages, etc. (Kang, December 17, 2018).  
FoFs and other forms of investment from public agencies in cultural production 
reflect what Mazzucato (2015) calls the ‘entrepreneurial state’, which refers to a state 
that shapes and creates the market through the encouragement of private capital 
innovation and socializes risk-takings for the sake of profit. In effect, various investments 
drawn from public agencies but operated by market-oriented mechanisms have 
functioned as catalysts encouraging private stakeholders to participate in cultural 
production (Lee, 2019a). As the profit distribution system of FoFs indicates, the state 
makes up for potential losses of private investors from its share. Such a structure has 
been a strong impetus for private capital to invest in this risky high production cost 
business. It also reinforces the state’s presence in cultural production with implicit and 
hands-off methods as these tools are operated by the market., In addition, the state 
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continues its involvement in the cultural production and distribution process with more 
explicit methods, as the following case of KOCCA demonstrates. 
4.3.2. Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA): The Persistence of 
State-developmentalist Methods in Policy Schemes 
Arguing that the increase of industrial competitiveness of content would be key to 
becoming a cultural powerhouse, the Lee Myung-bak administration demanded a 
convergence among different cultural genres as a focal objective of its cultural policies 
(Lee H-K., 2020). Pursuant to the nation’s Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural 
Industries (2009) that requires agencies to ‘efficiently support the advancement and 
development of cultural industries (Article 31)’, MCST merged several existing public 
organizations that had previously independently promoted each cultural genre such as 
animation, broadcasting, game, and music, into a single agency—which became the 
Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA). Other than film businesses, which continued 
to be managed by the Korean Film Council (KOFIC), KOCCA has played pivotal roles in 
implementing policy actions to promote cultural production.59  
Since its establishment in 2009, the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) 
has provided a number of business projects and funding programs for cultural production 
as the Ministry’s main executive agency. In detail, it has implemented a variety of 
programs to support the production and distribution of various cultural genres, including 
animation, broadcasting, character licensing, comics, fashion, games, music, musicals, 
publishing, and next-generation content like augmented reality and virtual reality 
products. Moreover, KOCCA manages its regional branches overseas to develop 
inroads for Korean cultural products into foreign markets and held roadshows and 
showcases in local markets to promote them. In terms of overseas expansion, the 
 
59 When the Lee administration decided to merge several MCST’s affiliations including the Korean 
Broadcasting Institute (television), Korea Culture and Content Agency (animation and character 
businesses) Korea Game Agency (game) into KOCCA in 2009, KOFIC remained as an 
independent agency. Participant I explained that this was mainly due to different legal frameworks 
and funding revenues that these agencies were bound by. In effect, KOFIC was pursuant to the 
Promotion of the Motion Pictures and Video Production Act while other agencies were pursuant to 
the Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries. In terms of financial sources, unlike 
other agencies dependent on the state’s subsidies, KOFIC had mandates to manage the Motion 
Picture Development Fund—a 3% charge of ticket sales which the Council collects from theaters. 
Last but not least, unlike other cultural products, films were understood as political and artistic 
products in politics unlike others which often treated as commercial commodities.  
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Agency also provides support for domestic businesses in the form of business 
consulting, product localization such as dubbing, subtitling, and translating, etc. It also 
invests in technological development relevant to next-generation content and provides a 
series of training and networking programs for start-ups and individual artists. In relation 
to this, the following organizational chart of KOCCA (Figure 4.3) exemplifies the range of 
the organization’s activities in supporting cultural production in the market.  
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KOCCA consists of nine Directorates. Excluding the Directorate of Organizational 
Management and several teams under the direct control of both the President and Vice 
President that conduct KOCCA’s internal affairs, each Directorate is dedicated to 
implementing programs for promoting individual cultural genres with high commercial 
potential and supporting technological development and overseas promotion of cultural 
products. Both the organizational structure and its programs indicate that this agency 
seeks to manage the entire production chain of all major commercial cultural genres in 
industries, from the production of cultural goods and services and training creators to 
marketing and overseas distribution.  
Many of KOCCA’s programs are dedicated to promoting the production of 
cultural goods and services across different genres that have high economic potential in 
the market with more hands-on and interventionist measures. For instance, under the 
sponsorship of the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund—a public institution that provides 
credit guarantee services for small and medium enterprises’ liabilities, the Agency 
provides credit to each production phase, from planning content to production and 
commercialization. Aimed at reducing risks cultural enterprises face when producing 
cultural goods and services, KOCCA guarantees a return of the production cost up to 1 
billion KRW for promising companies. However, the program’s requirement clarifies that 
pure arts performances are not eligible for funding since their sustainability as 
businesses is uncertain. Given that KOCCA’s annual budget —476.2 billion KRW (411 
million USD) in the year 2020—far outweighs the budgets of MCST’s other affiliated 
executive agencies for promoting pure arts such as Arts Council Korea (ARKO, 272 
billion KRW from the government budget) the Agency’s size reflects how the 
development of cultural industries remains a top-priority agenda within the Ministry.60  
Along with its support to produce cultural goods and services, the Agency is 
involved in promoting Korean cultural products in overseas markets. It also hosts 
international-level business conventions such as Broadcast Worldwide (BCWW) and the 
Asian Contents and Film Market (ACFM)—Asia’s largest broadcast and film content 
 
60 Many of ARKO’s programs are run by the Culture and Art Promotion Fund. Apart from the 
government’s direct subsidy (272 billion KRW (237 million USD in 2020), it also finances from 
commissions collected from bicycle and motorboat racing and rental fees from galleries and 
theaters owned by the organization, and a mandatory fee from landlords who build new 
architecture, remaining balances, etc. The entire amount of funds in 2020 is 543 billion KRW (471 
million USD in 2020) (ARKO, 2020). 
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market respectively—and invites foreign investors and distributors to attract investment 
in and finances for cultural production. In this regard, this state-led agency acts as an 
intermediary introducing foreign buyers and distributors to domestic companies who 
seek foreign markets for their products in various exhibitions. Meanwhile, the agency 
also offers consultations on managing publication rights in foreign markets for producers. 
In relation to this, Participant B, a researcher at an MCST affiliation, highlighted the 
Agency’s presence in foreign exports.  
Other than a few major companies, most experience difficulties in exporting 
their products or distribution rights even if the products are high-
quality…There is no organization like us in other countries. Foreign 
companies are really envious of [Korean companies] and say, “how come 
the state brings companies to exhibitions and introduces them to foreign 
buyers… It is really amazing that the state cultivates new markets.” I think 
Koreans have the frontier spirit with a strong sense of national pride. This 
makes [us] spread something Korean [to overseas] (Participant B). 
KOCCA’s direct involvement in cultural production and their variety of programs 
for creators and companies—including market analysis, credit guaranty and financing for 
producers, the provision of infrastructure for creators, the promotion of cultural products 
in overseas markets, assistance in technological development, and expert training and 
mentorship—demonstrate the state’s strong willingness for developing cultural 
industries. The case of KOCCA, as a state-led agency offering comprehensive packages 
for the production and distribution of cultural products with direct guidance, is rarely seen 
in other countries which assume cultural production should be free from the state’s direct 
intervention. In relation to this, Participant B described the organization below: 
KOCCA connects various stakeholders in the cultural realm including 
audiences, businesses, and creators with the state’s policies and it is 
responsible for ‘promoting’ content… Foreigners often ask: “What makes 
you stick to the job so much? You are public officials.” [To produce data in 
the field and implement customized programs for businesses] we 
frequently conduct surveys on audiences, too… Only KOCCA conducts 
extensive research about audiences on a national scale (Participant B). 
Participant D, a staff member at an MCST affiliation organization who has participated in 
a series of promotion programs of Korean cultural products in foreign markets, echoed 
similar sentiments: 
Many countries have public institutions for promoting cultural industries. 
However, I can say there is no such organization that is strongly driven by 
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the state like KOCCA. At most, some agencies are co-funded by state and 
private investors, including major corporations. But the funding from the 
private sector to [KOCCA’s projects] is minimal as they don’t bring in the 
profit for major corporations (Participant D).  
Granted, the Korean state has been an enthusiastic supporter of developing 
cultural businesses and promoting the nation’s cultural products overseas. In this regard, 
KOCCA represents how the Korean state has formed a centralized structure for its direct 
engagement and support in cultural production, which is rarely seen in other countries. 
Combined with the state’s overwhelming power of allocating resources in the national 
economy which reflects legacies of the developmental state, MCST and KOCCA’s 
influences and impacts on resource allegation in the field was more than minimal (Jin, 
2011b; Lee H-K., 2020). This, therefore, raises the question: why does the state 
continue its hands-on participation in the business of culture through KOCCA and other 
public agencies? Participant G, an executive of an affiliation of MCST, described some 
political and economic rationales that the Korean state employed to justify its 
involvement in developing cultural industries compared to other countries. 
We can let the market develop cultural businesses. There are several 
committees in the United Kingdom that promote cultural industries. 
However, unlike our projects in which individual programs are targeted at 
specific cultural production and creators, UK’s supports for cultural 
production often remains at the level of suggesting the overall framework 
and letting the market work. In that sense, [the Korean government’s] 
programs can be valued as ‘kind’ ones. It is because we believe cultural 
industries are still infant industries that need to grow in the arms of the 
state’s supports. Also, the Korean Wave increases the expectation of 
improving the national brand image (Participant G).  
Alongside KOCCA, many public agencies have been involved in cultural 
production. In 1984, as part of the film promotion plan, KOFIC (then the Korea Film 
Promotion Agency) established the Korean Academy of Film Arts (KAFA), a public film 
school for training a small number of students who are willing to work in the film 
production. To date, the Academy has produced several individuals of distinguished 
talent to the field, including Bong Joon-ho, Choi Dong-hoon, and Im Sang-soo—all of 
whom have led the commercial film market in the nation and have well-regarded 
reputations among foreign critics. Also, KOFIC’s funding schemes and its policymaking 
regarding production and distribution systems have significant impacts on the film 
industry even if the film market, as well as its production system, is run by free-market 
logics (Jin, 2020a).  
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Rather than being a bystander and leaving the task in the hands of producers 
and distributors, the state is also actively involved in advertising and distributing Korean 
cultural products. The Korean state has been eager to mobilize resources from different 
public institutions and encourage major corporations to take part in publicizing the 
nation’s cultural products. In detail, MCST mobilizes cultural organizations—such as the 
Korean Culture and Information Services (KOCIS), which manages 32 Korean Cultural 
Centers worldwide, and King Sejong Institute Foundation which operates 213 Korean 
language institutes in 76 countries—to promote Korean popular culture. Granted, Korean 
Cultural Centers and King Sejong Institutes played pivotal roles in raising awareness of 
Korean popular culture among the local population (Eom et al., 2019). In regard to Bong 
Joon-ho’s Parasite, Participant O, a professor who has participated in a number of 
MCST’s advisory committees for two decades, explained how the Ministry directed 
support for Parasite at the Academy Awards—which have become a milestone for the 
globalization of Korean cultural industries as well as the Korean Wave, Participant O 
recalled MCST’s efforts during Parasite’s ultimately successful run at the Oscars. 
I believe that MCST [and its affiliations] did their jobs at the Oscars. After 
receiving the Palme d’Or award at Cannes, the Korean Cultural Center in 
Los Angeles had several events introducing Parasite to American 
audiences. Alongside the Consulate General in Los Angeles, it also hosted 
a series of receptions for important figures of the Oscars before the 
ceremony. This contributed to Parasite’s wins at the Oscars (Participant 
O).  
As long as culture is recognized as a key instrument of the state to achieve its 
political and economic purposes to develop the national economy and show off national 
power, the state continues to participate in the cultural realm, feeling the need to guide 
creators and entrepreneurs in accordance with its missions. In the era of the Korean 
Wave, the state utilizes not only MCST and its affiliations but also other ministries and 
public organizations to push their agenda of promoting and exploiting the cultural 
industries, regardless of which administration is in power. Ironically and interestingly, the 
Ministry established public agencies because there had been widespread scepticisms 
toward the perceived excessive role of the state in the field and the market. Participant 
A, who has an executive position in an MCST’s affiliation, explained why such public 
organizations such as KOCCA managed programs for promoting the Korean Wave 
instead of the Ministry. 
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There were concerns over the state’s roles in expanding the Korean Wave. 
We had to answer questions like ‘why does the state interfere in the Korean 
Wave?’ which criticized the Ministry’s engagement as a highly nationalistic 
approach… It might also bring concerns over misinterpreting the Korean 
Wave as a patriotic phenomenon, which had been condemned by the 
general audience. Thus, [the Ministry] entrusted their tasks to public 
organizations so that they can continue managing businesses related to 
the Korean Wave without the Ministry’s title (Participant A). 
Of course, as long as KOCCA is a public organization that is supervised by 
MCST, its activities—including the development and implementation of various programs 
and projects to support cultural production—are subject to how each administration 
approaches culture (Lee H-K., 2020). In relation to this, Participant B defined KOCCA’s 
promotion packages as “materialized outcomes of MCST’s policies that are motivated by 
the incumbent President’s perspective on culture and lawmakers at the National 
Assembly who are involved in legislating them.” In detail, Participant G reflected how 
political backgrounds of the presidency influence the Agency’s activities. 
Each administration has its own agendas and appoints the head [of 
KOCCA] who is well-aware of the political stance of the administration. 
Let’s say, conservative administrations put emphasis on the success of 
cultural products in the global market. Then [KOCCA] focuses on projects 
for supporting a few leading corporations in cultural industries to trigger a 
huge success, expecting trickle-down effects from several smart moves. In 
contrast, under liberal-progressive governments, we focus on projects that 
strengthen the abilities of small and medium enterprises or promote 
people’s rights to enjoy culture... (Participant G) 
In this regard, many of KOCCA’s programs for supporting cultural production are 
subject to the administration’s viewpoint of culture and indicate how the state directly 
intervenes in cultural production as a major patron. Indeed, as Figure 4.3 demonstrates, 
KOCCA’s organizational structure and its programs encompass all the major cultural 
genres. Given that the organization is MCST’s main executive body responsible for 
implementing its cultural industry policies and is the main hub of managing state-led 
research and development projects related to cultural production, its presence in the 
industrial field is important. Alongside its subsidies and other direct support schemes for 
creators and businesses, KOCCA is also crucial to industrial players because its 
extensive research and reports about cultural production are the main resources for the 
Ministry to develop regulations and policies that shape business environments (Song, 
2021). That said, such comprehensive roles and functions of KOCCA in which support 
programs encompass every stage of production and distribution of different cultural 
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genres reflect the state’s legacies of setting the pathway of industrial development 
through various hands-on programs. 
4.4. Conclusion 
Unlike common assumptions that see the state reducing its role and even 
withdrawing itself from its cultural domain in the era of neoliberal globalization, the case 
of Korean cultural industries demonstrates that the state continues to be a major 
stakeholder in cultural production by facilitating and utilizing the market and its elements. 
Since the 1990s, the state recognized the economic potentials of cultural industries and 
initiated a series of masterplans to develop these burgeoning businesses. Combined 
with competent bureaucrats and the state’s various benefits to Chaebols, which were 
major financiers in the economy, the nation’s cultural production that had been run by 
small-scale businesspeople began to be further industrialized. Such a process reflects 
how the Korean state previously developed other industries such as automobiles, 
electronics, and telecommunication by being involved in allocating private and public 
resources under a series of detailed masterplans that presumed the leadership of the 
bureaucracy.  
The findings of the chapter demonstrate that the Korean state utilizes both 
market-oriented neoliberal measures and state-interventionist methods to develop 
cultural industries, depending on the market condition and political orientation of each 
administration. On one hand, the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s introduction of FoFs 
indicates both the reluctance of liberal-progressive administrations to directly intervene 
in cultural production, due to political backgrounds and understanding of neoliberal 
reforms. On the other hand, the establishment of KOCCA in the Lee Myung-bak 
administration exemplifies how conservative administrations approach cultural 
production within the framework of industrial development. Despite their different 
viewpoints and methods with which they implement to develop cultural industries, both 
conservatives and liberal—progressive governments interpret and utilize culture as a 
means of furthering political and economic agendas. The utilization of successful 
outcomes, exemplified by the Korean Wave, demonstrates how the state refuses to 
retreat from cultural industries and is willing to utilize culture to satisfy its needs. As 
contributions of FoFs to cultural production show, the state’s presence in cultural 
industries is important.  
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The findings of this chapter demonstrate that cultural bureaucrats have strived to 
materialize their masterplans of developing cultural industries with hands-on and hands-
off measures. Depending on political, economic, and social situations, they employ both 
direct and indirect methods to exert their influence on cultural production. Along with 
hands-off measures like FoFs and deregulation, public agencies implement and manage 
a variety of programs to support every stage of cultural production. Granted, they are the 
state’s legitimate tools of leading and guiding cultural businesses for the sake of ideas of 
national development that include both political and economic agendas. As the following 
chapter explains clearly, such an attitude of the state and its policy practices of support 




Chapter 5.  
 
Cultural Politics of State-led Development of Cultural 
Industries 
5.1. A Widespread Desire for the Globalization of Korean 
Cultural Products  
Interviews with cultural bureaucrats indicate that the Korean state sets its sights 
on exporting cultural products to foreign markets as its standard of success. They expect 
the development of cultural industries and the following increase of cultural exports will 
expand the Korean Wave and enhance national prestige worldwide, which will contribute 
to the state’s longstanding agenda of joining the ranks of advanced nations. In other 
words, since it provides political and economic benefits to the state, the globalization of 
Korean cultural products has become a golden rule of the state’s cultural policies (Huh & 
Wu, 2017). Indeed, one of the qualification criteria when MCST and its affiliations 
choose recipients of their support programs, both through direct and indirect measures, 
is the potential for export. 
In relation to the economic feasibility of Korean cultural industries, the promotion 
and export of cultural products to foreign markets have been one of the foremost tasks 
for producers and distributors. Like other industries in the Korean economy in which the 
prevailing structure became export-oriented, this is mainly due to the small size of the 
domestic market that prevents manufacturers from gaining effective profit margins and 
investing capital in production. As the nation’s cultural production became more 
industrialized in the 1990s, competition among domestic producers became fiercer. 
Granted, such competitiveness led to genre diversification of media products and the 
production of big-budget films and television series. Thus, it became necessary for major 
companies to seek larger markets to recoup increased costs and expand profits (Shin, 
2009; Chung, 2018). Participant T, who works as a staff member at a film production 
company, briefly described how the size of a small market restricts the studio’s 
performance.  
Let me explain with the animation business. In the US, Pixar and others… 
spend at least 200 billion KRW ($175 million) on producing an animated 
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film. However, [Korean] producers spend at most 5 billion KRW ($4.3 
million) to make a film, usually 3 billion KRW ($2.6 million). They do not 
have other options. It is not because they do not have techniques. It is 
because our market is small (Participant T).  
Korean pop idol music (K-Pop) began to penetrate neighbouring markets like 
China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Taiwan in the late-1990s. A number of K-Pop idols 
became popular in East Asian countries, and this became a major revenue source for 
their agencies. In the 2010s, major K-Pop entertainment houses sought opportunities to 
expand their markets worldwide. Thanks to YouTube and other social media platforms, 
many idols succeeded in promoting themselves in local markets and held a series of 
major concerts in Latin America and Europe (Kang, August 5, 2011; Park, January 4, 
2019). As an outcome, a few K-Pop idols like Blackpink (YG Entertainment), BTS (Big 
Hit Entertainment), Monsta X (Starship Entertainment), and SuperM (SM Entertainment) 
gained decent fandoms in the US, the largest pop music market in the world. In relation 
to this, Participant W explained the necessity of globalizing the market for K-Pop 
production.  
I believe I think it becomes harder for producers to make money in the 
domestic market as it becomes saturated. The number of teenagers will 
decline amid low birthrates and they have other things to entertain 
themselves… For many producers, the Japanese market is understood as 
a place of earning a stable profit if they successfully penetrate the market. 
About the US and European markets, many believe there are people who 
have strong potential to become K-Pop fans (Participant W).  
Similarly, Participant R, a television producer at a K-Pop entertainment agency, 
explained the importance of foreign markets for production companies to accrue profit. 
In terms of making profits, I would like to say approximately 50-50. Let’s 
say, if we spend 10 billion KRW on producing a drama series, we get 5 
billion KRW from the broadcaster and 0.5 billion KRW for product 
placement. The rest, 4.5 billion KRW, comes from selling distribution rights 
to foreign markets (Participant R).  
As Korean cultural products, notably films, K-Pop, and television dramas, are 
recognized as distinctive genres in many Asian markets, the popularity of Korean 
cultural products, as well as their fandoms, have become important factors for producers 
to consider. Not surprisingly, more producers began to prioritize the possibility of export 
and popularity in foreign markets from their initial planning stage. Indeed, more 
production studios are eager to cast K-Pop idols in their films and television series 
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regardless of their performing ability because they expect the fans to consume such 
products (Ahn, October 22, 2019). In relation to this, Participant P, an executive of a 
television production studio with ten years’ experience, described an experience of 
producing a series in which K-Pop idols starred as major cast members. 
It was planned as an export-bound project from the beginning, and we cast 
idols. It went well. Its presales were tremendous, recording the highest 
price. Foreign fans were so excited because its performance in overseas 
markets was remarkable. We made much money as we earned twice the 
production cost (Participant P).  
Since the potential of exports became a top consideration for cultural production, 
it became vital for producers to demonstrate their success in overseas markets to attract 
investments (Ju, 2019). In recent years, this has become more materialized in the form 
of co-production with foreign capital, where foreign investors finance the production cost 
in return for profit distribution or distribution rights in global markets. For domestic 
production, to reimburse the production cost and secure the entry into foreign markets, 
more Korean film and television producers seek coproduction with foreign capitals as a 
high-reward strategy (Yecies, 2016; Park, Lee & Heo, 2019). For foreign stakeholders, to 
invest in Korean cultural businesses appeals to their expectations that Korean products 
would be attractive merchandise easily available in many Asian markets unlike 
Hollywood products that often suffer from cultural discount—a phenomenon in which 
cultural products suffer a devaluation in foreign markets due to differences in 
sociocultural norms and values—and provoke controversies among local audiences 
(DeBoer, 2014; Kim J. O., 2018a).  
Granted, the entry of foreign players brought an influx of foreign genre 
characteristics and styles in cultural production to attract more foreign audiences and 
globalize its outcomes to expand their markets (Lee D-H., 2020). In this regard, the 
Korean Wave and growing demand for Korean cultural products from foreign markets 
provided an increasing incentive for producers to embed hybrid and transnational 
characteristics in their products (Iwabuchi, 2002). Such a market-oriented approach, 
which reduces signifiers of Korean-ness from cultural merchandise and emphasizes the 
universality of their themes, has been expected to attract more foreign audiences and 
investors, as several participants have stated. In relation to this, several research 
participants, both from the public sector and the private sector, pointed out that the 
future of Korean cultural products in the market would be at producing K-Culture (Korean 
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culture) without ‘K’. Participant S, who is a producer and runs a television production 
studio, emphasized the reduction of Korean ‘flavour’ from media products as a 
prerequisite of making the Korean Wave sustainable. 
Maybe in five or ten years, I expect there will be no films or television series 
in which casts solely consist of Korean actors and actresses. We have to 
cast actors and actresses from other cultural powerhouses in Asia—China, 
Japan, and Taiwan—and produce television series aimed at the entire 
Asian audiences… Then either US or Chinese capitals will invest in 
production (Participant S).  
In several cultural genres, developing the nation’s cultural products as hybrid and 
more universal has been considered as an effective strategy for producers. major K-Pop 
labels already have recruited foreign nationals as members of their boy and girl group 
lineups. Apart from K-Pop, Locus Creative Studio, a major animation studio in the 
industry, released Red Shoes and the Seven Dwarfs (2019)—an animated fantasy film 
about the parody of the tale of Snow White) and exported it to 123 countries. Kim 
Hyung-soo, the head of the studio, noted the use of characters and plots from the story 
of Snow White that is familiar with global audiences and its production in English with a 
cast of Hollywood stars as its main success factors. He added that “such a success 
would not be possible if the studio focused on Korean sentiments and characters—which 
would also lower the price (Yoo, July 23, 2019)” in a press interview.  
When being asked about globalization strategies of Korean popular culture, 
many policymakers expressed opinions similar to those of the producers. Participant K, 
a policy analyst of an affiliation of the Korea Communications Commission, explained 
the key to make the Korean Wave sustainable is “making products in which subjects and 
themes are universal so that they can appeal to the global market.” Combined with their 
compulsion to raise cultural exports as the main impetus to expand the business and 
maintain the longevity of the Korean Wave, many research participants stressed the 
importance of producing hybrid products. In relation to this, Participant I explained, 
Hollywood studios can put their enormous budget into Frozen and collect 
revenues from distributing the movie worldwide. We cannot do it like them 
as we have issues like language differences. It is difficult. Then, how can 
we overcome [cultural barriers]? We should encourage the remaking of 
Korean products like Miss Granny (2014) in 10 countries, 20 countries for 
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20 and 30 years.61 If we have good original intellectual property, it could be 
translated into different cultural contexts. Through recognizing and 
respecting cultural differences, we should produce things with universal 
cultural values (Participant I).  
Indeed, producers in the field have strived to develop cultural products that can 
appeal both to domestic and foreign audiences. For instance, broadcasters have begun 
to develop original television formats, “the sum of the essential elements to generate the 
central characteristics of a program in production—a recipe with all the necessary 
ingredients to produce a TV program (Ju, 2019, 97)” and license them to foreign 
broadcasters. As an outcome, the country succeeded in exporting several formats, 
including I Can See Your Voice (CJ ENM) and The Masked Singer (MBC), to foreign 
broadcasters.62 Considering that a format is “rooted in cultural values that transcend the 
national (Waisbord, 2004, 368)” where “global audiences can paradoxically feel at home 
when watching them (ibid., 378)”, the recent success of licensing deals shows how the 
nation’s creators approach the international market with products that can appeal to 
audiences with universal and transcultural elements such as emphases on family, the 
desire of fairness and justice, and so on.  
A similar phenomenon could be found in the popular music industry as well. The 
nature of K-Pop production and its outcomes are already hybrid and difficult to pinpoint 
Korean-ness that reflect traditional and unique local characteristics. K-Pop, as a 
distinctive music genre in the pop world, could be characterized as a highly visual 
dance-based blending of musical sounds and genres with high production value. Such 
elements are heavily influenced by both American – notably African American, pop 
 
61 Miss Granny is a comedy-drama film about a woman in her 70s experiencing unexpected time 
travel. The film had more than 8.6 million admissions in the box office. After its success in the 
domestic market, a series of remakes has been made, including a Chinese remake (20 Once 
Again) and a Vietnamese remake (Sweet 20) in 2015, a Japanese remake (Sing My Life) and a 
Thai remake (Suddenly Twenty) in 2016, and an Indonesian remake (Sweet 20) in 2017. 
Alongside Asian markets, it contracted a remake deal with German producers (Kil, October 6, 
2015).  
62 I Can See Your Voice is a music game show franchise produced and broadcast by MNet, a 
cable channel owned by CJ ENM. Premiered its first season on 2015, the broadcaster signed 
license deals with more than 10 broadcasters worldwide, including RTL of Germany, BBC One of 
the United Kingdom, and Fox of the United States which all premiered their first season shows in 
2020. Meanwhile, The Masked Singer is also a music game show franchise made by Munhwa 
Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), a Korean terrestrial broadcaster. The format was exported to 
more than 40 broadcasters, including Australia (Network Ten), Belgium (VTM), France (TF1), 
Italy (Rai1), Mexico (Las Estrellas), Russia (NTV), Spain (Antena 3), the United Kingdom (ITV), 
and the United States (Fox), which all began to broadcast their local series in 2019–2020. 
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music genres such as rhythm and blues and hip-hop, and a Japanese idol management 
model that consists of a multiple year contract, traineeship that mentors potential idols in 
music, acting, dance, and public relations, and strong control over celebrities’ every 
aspect of public image, etc. (Anderson, 2020; Jin, 2020c). Moreover, as part of their 
strategies to attract international audiences, entertainment agencies have recruited 
foreign adolescents to form idol groups. Additionally, they collaborate with foreign artists 
and producers for songs and albums by K-pop stars. In relation to this, Participant X 
firmly asserted the need for making Korean popular culture to appeal both domestic and 
international markets as a hybrid genre. 
We have to discover talents and recruit more artists from foreign markets... 
Amazon and Apple do not introduce or highlight something American. They 
are just doing their businesses and providing services. We have to dismiss 
such a compulsion [of promoting cultural products as ‘Korean’]. Let’s say, 
a number of K-Pop songs performed by idols are composed by foreign 
composers…If we emphasize cultural pureness, then there is no future. We 
should strive to make it so our genres can be adopted in other markets 
(Participant X).  
The prioritization of export has made producers restructure their production 
systems to suit foreign market characteristics. For instance, aimed at simulcasting in 
Korea and China to prevent illegal distribution, the Korean Broadcasting System 
(KBS)—the nation’s public broadcaster and the distributor—and its co-production partner 
Studio New pre-recorded a television melodrama series Descendants of the Sun (2016). 
This was due to the Chinese authority’s regulations which requires pre-screenings of all 
television programs before their broadcasting. As the majority of Korean television series 
are produced alongside the broadcast schedule, to produce the entire series before the 
scheduled broadcast was a big challenge for producers. Thanks to their efforts, 
producers could regain much of the production cost—13 billion KRW ($11.3 million)—
including 4.8 billion KRW ($4.2 million) from iQIYI, a Chinese online video platform, in 
return for simulcasting the series in China (Ko, March 25, 2016). In addition to this, 
Netflix, which has co-produced several Korean films and television with local production 
studios, also urged them to accept its book-length rigid production protocols in return for 
its investment, which is not common for local producers who are used to a more flexible 
environment (Yoon, January 18, 2018).  
The presence of Korean cultural products in the global market in the era of the 
Korean Wave has been significant (Jin, 2019). Then, what does the Korean Wave mean 
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to producers? When being asked about the impacts of the Korean Wave on cultural 
trade, Participant Q, a producer at a broadcaster who has been involved in both 
production and overseas distribution for almost 30 years, recalled their experience in 
selling Korean television programs for the first time. 
[Before the Korean Wave], Korean television series were considered as 
‘one of them’ and I felt we were the third wheel between North American 
and European televisions. Now, I feel that Korean cultural products are 
evaluated as a major brand and make me think we are a major player in 
global cultural production. Like Parasite, which won Palme d’Or at Cannes, 
foreign buyers recognize Korean products as something different from 
Western content but valuable all the same (Participant Q).  
Such a sense of achievement expressed by Participant Q cannot be solely 
translated as an economic success of Korean cultural products in overseas markets. 
Rather, it reflects the mentality of Korean cultural producers as second movers in the 
global market, whose products have become on par with those of other front-runners 
such as Japan and the US. Given that many Korean cultural products, from K-Pop idols 
to television entertainment shows, have been understood as imitations of Japanese and 
American popular culture in foreign markets, the recognition from the market as a 
distinctive brand meant a major recognition for creators in the field, regardless of their 
commercial success in the market (Korea Times, June 18, 2018). In relation to this, 
Participant W, who works as a music producer at a major K-Pop label, discussed how 
cultural producers feel about recognition as a success.  
There used to be a time when music producers thought their recognition in 
the Japanese market, like ranking the first place in the Oricon Charts, was 
an indicator of success. Now, the target has changed to the US market, at 
least for major K-Pop agencies. Since Japanese and American [popular 
music] have been major influences on K-Pop, there are desires on the part 
of producers to expand their target to US audiences as a [form of] 
recognition (Participant W).  
Similarly, the state’s drive for promoting cultural exports is more than just an 
economic policy imperative. Rather, arguments for increasing exports have been used to 
legitimize the state’s strong interventions in the market and society to mobilize 
resources, including labour and private capital, for the sake of its political and economic 
interests. For decades, the state has promoted export not only as evidence of the quality 
of Korean merchandise but also as a signifier intended to increase patriotism by 
highlighting the contributions of individuals to the state’s masterplan of national 
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development (Kang, 2011). To justify state-led developmentalism under strong 
leadership as an official ideology, the state is obligated to ensure that citizens do their 
utmost for the nation’s economic development and serve its agenda of national 
development (Rhyu, 2014). Arguing that poverty would see the state self-destruct and 
become subservient to the World powers, the state highlighted the increase of exports to 
the public as the only way of reducing poverty alongside the development of human 
resources.  
That said, individual contributions to increasing export-oriented products were 
interpreted as a form of patriotic behaviour and reflected the utmost dedication to the 
country. In addition, the entire government system has dedicated resources and time to 
increase the export of Korean products and used their recognition in foreign markets as 
a way of inspiring and enhancing national pride among citizens. Given that the nation’s 
economy is structured as export-oriented, the state’s emphasis on promoting exports is 
not surprising. Indeed, every administration has highlighted the importance of export, 
regardless of conservative or liberal-progressive background.63 In this regard, the export 
of products is understood as an important recognition of the quality of ‘Made in Korea’, 
and cultural exports are ideal objects for the state to recognize their political and 
economic achievements. Not surprisingly, considering the state’s long history of 
exploiting culture as a tool of promoting its objectives, such an interpretation of 
promoting cultural exports and the Korean Wave as the nation’s achievements is deeply 
related to ideas of state-developmentalism prevalent in Korean bureaucracy.  
Of course, it is worth noting that such an export-led business model that argues 
to customize media products for foreign audiences may distort or endanger the entire 
ecosystem of cultural production. There are concerns about the subordination of Korean 
media production in the hands of foreign capital (Shin, October 22, 2019). Moreover, as 
producers and distributors are keen to make their products exportable, the industry 
would be polarized between a few large companies that are able to afford the expensive 
 
63 For instance, the government marked and celebrated November 30 as a statutory anniversary 
called “Export Day (currently Trade Day)” in 1961, when the nation’s export profits exceeded 100 
million USD. Every year, the president attends the ceremony and confers medals to 
businesspeople whose companies have exported more than 500 million USD. As the size of 
national economy increased, the Korean government re-marked December 5 as “Trade Day” in 
2012 when the amount of annual export exceeded 1 trillion USD. Hosted by the Ministry of Trade, 
Industry, and Energy, the ceremony is one of few events in the business world that the head of 
state celebrates annually. 
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salaries for A-list performers and top directors and screenwriters that are well-known in 
foreign markets and smaller firms that would not be able to bear such costs (Kim, 
September 19, 2019). Last but not least, as the majority of increased production costs 
are spent on paying top celebrities, there has not been much improvement in the 
production environment, which questions the sustainability of cultural production (Ahn, 
July 3, 2018). Participant P explained how the Korean Wave has worsened the 
production environment, where only a few famous celebrities and cultural workers saw 
significant benefit while most staff struggled due to the increased production cost and 
the potential profit, and continued working in poor conditions, including unpaid overtime, 
job instability, the lack of protection, and so on. 
There has been high inflation in the production cost. After Winter Sonata 
(2002), the first [Korean Wave] was led by the Japanese market. But the 
sensation was gone soon after. Then, the second one was triggered by 
China, but now it is gone. But the production cost increased several times 
as the salaries of A-list actors and actresses, top screenwriters and 
directors have jumped. Arguing that the market became larger, they 
demanded higher wages… It makes sense only when foreign markets are 
brisk. This made producers and broadcasters suffer (Participant P). 
Also, dependence on foreign markets would be a double-edged sword for 
producers considering their unpredictable nature. At times, cultural imports provoke 
political and social controversies in recipient countries as they can be understood as 
sensitive issues to local audiences as well as state authorities. This means that cultural 
exports are vulnerable to external factors such as political tensions between countries. 
For instance, in 2017, China—one of the largest importers of Korean cultural products—
suspended imports of Korean media products and restricted its local companies from 
cooperating with Korean companies when the Korean government deployed the US’ 
THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile system to defend itself from the 
North Korean threat. Arguing that the missile system would detect some of the Chinese 
territory, Chinese authorities unofficially retaliated by banning cultural imports alongside 
other unofficial measures that restricted activities of Korean companies—such as the 
ban of Chinese tourism to Korea and boycotts against Korean goods in China (The 
Economist, October 19, 2017). Termed Hanhanryeong (限韩令, the doctrine of restricting 
the Korean Wave), Chinese countermeasures put many Korean producers at risk. In 
effect, the amount of film and television export to China fell by 55% and 75% 
respectively in 2017 compared with the previous year (Korean Foundation for 
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International Cultural Exchange, 2018; 2019). In relation to this, Participant R recalled 
how it jeopardized their company directly as well as the industry more broadly. 
We signed a contract with a Chinese online platform for exporting two 
television programs. But the Chinese counterpart just broke contracts due 
to Hanhanryeong. We could not even receive compensation for our loss 
because it was argued that the order from the Chinese government should 
be considered as an uncontrollable event same as natural disasters…The 
loss was significant and resulted in our CEO and other executives being 
laid off. Other than television production, we had to cancel all concerts [of 
K-Pop stars affiliated to the company]. It was a nightmare. Small 
companies would not survive with such a financial loss (Participant R).  
Despite some concerns over the system, the implementation of an export-led 
business model in cultural production has become irreversible. The small size of the 
domestic market saw creators and entrepreneurs in cultural industries turn to foreign 
markets and a number of stakeholders—businesspeople, celebrities, and a few top 
directors and screenwriters—have gained huge profits from exporting cultural products. 
Triggering the Korean Wave, cultural exports expanded the size of the cultural industries 
and granted creators the ability to produce cultural goods with bigger budgets along with 
investment from private and foreign capital. As the possibility of export has become the 
most important value in terms of investment, domestic producers and distributors strive 
to reduce the Korean cultural characteristics of their productions and substitute more 
universal values believed to be appealing to global audiences.  
Meanwhile, state authorities strongly endorse and often urge creators and 
entrepreneurs to consider foreign markets when they plan and produce their cultural 
products. Indeed, many state-funded programs for cultural production are customized to 
support cultural exports by funding promotional activities in foreign markets, hosting 
international exhibitions and markets like BCWW and ACFM, and other financial and 
technical supports. While the state’s all-encompassing efforts of increasing the number 
of cultural exports are deeply connected to its strategies for managing and expanding 
the Korean Wave, such bureaucracy is criticized for being preoccupied with its objective 
of raising exports as key performance indicators that can instantly indicate achievement. 
This often leads bureaucrats to focus their support on ‘ready-made’ production 
projects— that already have high expectations in the commercial market—so that they 
can show off their possible export to foreign markets as achievements. This method can 
improve bureaucrats’ productivity in the eyes of the budget authority, media, and 
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politicians, but does little in terms of diversifying genres and strengthening the 
production capability of different stakeholders in the field. Most of all, such short-termism 
and window dressing of the bureaucracy neglect other production projects that need 
support.  
5.2. Ready-made Content Only: The Window dressing of 
Bureaucracy 
Thanks to the Korean Wave, the contribution of cultural industries to the national 
economy has become more significant as the amount of cultural exports exceeded those 
of home appliances, and became the 13th largest export category—the largest export 
among non-manufacturing business in 2018 (Export-Import Bank of Korea, 2019). In this 
regard, the Korean Wave, as much of its contemporary popularity is primarily driven by 
foreign audiences, can be explained as a successful outcome that is aligned with the 
nation’s longstanding export-driven economy. It also demonstrates how the state’s 
visions and initiatives of developing cultural industries in collaboration with Chaebols and 
other major private capital have made the state’s presence persist in the cultural domain 
as a major stakeholder. While admitting that much of the success of Korean cultural 
products in the market is owed to the creativity and entrepreneurship of individual 
creators and businesspeople who have striven to pioneer new markets and produce new 
products, this indicates the state’s overall direction and contribution to promoting cultural 
businesses and that the potential in the international market has been validated and 
achieved expected results.  
Based on a premise that the state’s presence in cultural industries is substantial, 
it is important to know how producers recognize the state’s role(s) in the field. While 
much cultural production is increasingly driven by market mechanisms that seemingly 
contradict the state’s engagement, the state continues to exert its power in the field with 
direct and indirect measures in the name of the development of cultural industries. In this 
regard, by examining how the state’s approach and its methods are interpreted and 
understood by producers, whose activities become more dependent on foreign and 
market forces, the state’s impacts on producing and distributing cultural products can be 
interrogated. Also, participant reflections on the state and bureaucracy may provide 
insight and lead to a better understanding of both the state’s contributions and its 
instrumentalization of the Korean Wave.  
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All participants from cultural production positions had experience working with 
public authorities. While most of them agreed that MCST and its affiliations offered a 
number of support programs for producers and distributors to promote cultural 
production, their responses were mixed when asked for an evaluation of their 
experiences. Some participants recognized the Korean government’s programs are well-
organized compared to its rivals such as Japan and several Asian countries. In detail, 
Participant Q had a good opinion of state-supported schemes for funding airfare, setting 
up booths at foreign exhibitions, and translation services when companies sought to 
pioneer new markets, all provided by KOCCA and other government agencies. In a 
similar vein, Participant T recalled how their project benefited from state programs. 
Whenever our directors and executives met investors, they always asked 
whether we could finish the project and make it happen. They seemed 
anxious and reluctant to finance our project. Our seniors told us that it was 
more difficult for them to raise the first 5 billion KRW than to collect the rest 
of our production cost—15 billion KRW. To attract investment, we needed 
some amount of initial investment which would reassure other investors 
and put their money toward our project. We already had an award-winning 
scenario—the grand prize from MCST—and we already got some support 
from KOCCA. Such recognition from the state gave investors some 
reassurance that the project would be finished (Participant Q).  
Alongside the state’s measures toward tax benefits and financial supports 
including FoFs, some participants acknowledged how the state recognized their cultural 
work and became supportive when they were attempting to attract investors. Participant 
X, a cartoonist whose works have been adapted as television series and films, explained 
that the state’s recognition for their works became useful when they met venture capitals 
to ask for investment. As long as they did not know details of the industry, X recalled the 
state’s recognition gave investors a strong impression of X’s portfolio. In relation to this, 
Participant U, a colleague of Participant T who deals with marketing and promotion of 
films in the studio, detailed how state support benefited their project. 
Our scenario got first place in the National Competition [hosted by MCST]. 
Then we received support from a research and development program of 
KOCCA for three years. We also attracted a 0.9 billion KRW investment 
from KOFIC to develop and support our production. Finally, we also applied 
to a head-hunter program from the Institute for Information Communication 
Technology Planning and Evaluation [a public institution that manages 
research and development of information and communication technologies 
under the Ministry of Science and ICT] when we recruited a director from 
164 
overseas—it supported their cost of living and salary. All these programs 
helped us to offset our costs (Participant U).  
In spite of benefits and contributions to cultural production, however, many 
participants pointed out that the bureaucratic management of supporting programs often 
undermined the state’s effort to promote cultural production. Most of all, several 
participants emphasized the lack of expertise on the part of cultural bureaucrats in the 
field. At times, the way that cultural bureaucrats implemented policies and 
communicated with the field has frustrated their counterparts in the industries, resulting 
in out-of-touch policies and creators becoming reluctant to work with them. For decades, 
the nation’s bureaucracy system has aimed at nurturing generalist bureaucrats rather 
than specialists, as part of the state’s efforts to centralize bureaucratic capacity and 
concentrate the executive power (Kim, 2020). While this was an effective measure for 
preventing some common issues such as trained incapacity of bureaucrats—which 
refers to an idea that certain education and training may prevent individuals from 
performing their abilities beyond their knowledge system—many interviewees including 
Participant S criticized generalist bureaucrats who did not recognize the unique 
characteristics of the culture industry.  
We often go to seminars held by KOCCA. I agree that the state provides a 
variety of support programs and research and development programs. 
What I want is that bureaucrats should develop their expertise in cultural 
production. Also, I believe it is important for them to know how the field 
operates… There was one time that I called KOCCA to ask something, and 
a staff member replied “I don’t know. Please contact the cultural ministry.” 
Then I called MCST, but the officer said “I am new here. Please call me 
tomorrow.” So, I just contacted a lawyer (Participant S).  
Participant S’ response seems contradictory to the previous explanation of the 
bureaucratic system in Korea. Again, competent bureaucracy has been an impetus of 
the Korean developmental state (Kim, 2020). In the Korean context, bureaucrats, who 
undertake the Public Administration Examination, have been considered as leaders in 
society through recognition of their abilities. Moreover, the way that they implemented 
effective policies was a linchpin of economic development. Likewise, cultural 
bureaucrats are not only involved in planning and designing effective policies but also 
mobilizing resources and effectively allocating such resources to stakeholders, whose 
roles were essential to developing cultural industries (Lee, 2019a). Indeed, Participant 
O, a professor who has participated in many advisory committees for the MCST, 
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highlighted the expertise of Korean cultural bureaucrats in understanding both the 
mechanism of cultural production and up-to-date data about industries. O added that the 
professionalism of MCST’s staff is better than those of other ministries.  
Despite their competence in designing support projects and allocating budgets, 
there are several reasons that the expertise of cultural bureaucrats has been brought 
into question by industrial figures. As bureaucracy functions based on existing 
regulations and legal frameworks that require a substantial amount of deliberation and 
approval by the legislature and other authorities, there is limited opportunity for 
bureaucrats to respond to rapid changes in industries and the needs of various 
stakeholders promptly. Since the dynamics of the cultural industries have become more 
complex and multilayered, so have said actions expected of cultural bureaucrats. While 
the state is asked to continue developing innovative strategies for promoting cultural 
industries and expanding their markets, such complexities often made bureaucrats 
reluctant to introduce new and radical initiatives that might cause outrage from industrial 
stakeholders. In relation to this, Participant X, who has experience working with state 
authorities for years, said that “bureaucrats should be more active in adjusting clashing 
interests among industrial players.” Also, Participant O exemplified this with their 
explanation of the Ministry’s advisory committee system. 
Based on my experiences, I believe the main objective of an advisory 
committee is to minimize the number of complaints [from the field]. 
Whenever MCST introduces a new policy framework, some always accuse 
bureaucrats of ignorance about reality. Then, the committee’s mission is to 
gather different opinions… But this does not lead to better ideas as there 
are too many voices. Then, it becomes harder [for bureaucrats] to develop 
differentiated schemes or innovative ideas. At often times, this ends in 
bureaucrats reiterating current or previous frameworks or revising existing 
policy frameworks at the most (Participant O). 
In addition to this, as part of the nation’s bureaucracy, cultural administrators are 
also subject to norms and logics of the bureaucratic system that emphasizes rigid 
procedures and stability in implementing policies in pursuit of minimizing risk. At times, 
this tendency becomes red tape—an idiom describing conformity to formal rules that are 
often expressed by excessive, rigid, and redundant procedures. Filling out excessive 
paperwork, requiring approval from various people prior to confirmation or submission, 
and other miscellaneous rules, such practices overtask workers in the field who are 
interested in receiving state support, are all examples of red tape faced by cultural 
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bureaucrats. In relation to this, Participant X urged the state to reconsider its way of 
executing and managing support programs so that more people in the field would benefit 
from state-funded schemes. 
When we apply to state-funded projects and receive a 100 million KRW 
subsidy. Then we need to attach all the details of expenditures and relevant 
receipts and upload them to the system. There are some creators who quit 
projects as the amount of paperwork is excessive. I understand that we 
need to submit details of spending and other stuff because the money is 
from taxpayers. So, some companies have staff only dedicated to 
paperwork… At least there should be some system that could support how 
to do paperwork so that individual creators or small companies would be 
able to apply and get support from the public (Participant X).  
In relation to the norms and logics of bureaucracy, interviewees also indicated 
various types of empty formalities prevalent in the nation’s bureaucratic system, such as 
strict protocols and structural hierarchies, which contribute to the window dressing by 
cultural bureaucrats. Participant X recalled an experience of visiting several international 
events with cultural officials and how their activities and behaviour were restricted by 
rigid bureaucratic orders that were incompatible with general practices in the field.  
I went to Angoulême [International Comics Festival], Comic-Con in San 
Diego, New York, and the London Book Fair [with bureaucrats]. But I think 
that they didn’t understand the event…When I first went to Angoulême, 
everybody came without dress codes and met creators and buyers. Only 
staff from KOCCA stood up at their booth with full business attire. They 
dressed up because the Minister was coming. It was breathtaking… If they 
want to encourage their staff, they should have visited their counterparts 
like the head of the organizing committee (Participant X). 
Regarding window dressing, participants also criticized how state authorities paid 
greater attention to issues that would catch the public’s attention and produce results in 
a short time, rather than tackling underlying problems. At often, this would lead the 
Ministry to focus on several key figures in the cultural industries by emphasizing 
achievements or criticizing controversies that needed quick correction. Individuals I 
spoke with such as Participant X worried that such an approach driven by short-termism 
would result in real issues that the majority of creators and entrepreneurs experience in 
the field being ignored.  
Most of the so-called large corporations do their jobs to adhere to legal and 
regulatory frameworks to protect rights and revenues of creators. Problems 
come from middle-sized firms. State authorities should investigate disputes 
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and issues that creators suffer from these companies… However, 
whenever the Office of the President, MCST and other ministries host 
meetings, I felt that they only discuss a few major stakeholders in the 
industry since they are well known to the public. Also, media would not 
cover misconducts by medium-size firms that affect more creators who 
struggle to make ends meet (Participant X). 
Such an attitude on the part of cultural bureaucrats, who pay more attention to 
major productions or projects that are well known to the public, can be seen in instances 
where bureaucrats focus their budget on cultural production. Several participants 
expressed their discontent with state-funded projects as public authorities have focused 
their support on cultural productions with high export potential. The prioritization of 
exports, which has been a long-standing objective and the Geist of the Korean 
developmental state, is reconfirmed in the state’s funding schemes to support the 
production of cultural goods. In spite of private investments from both domestic and 
foreign markets, popular projects with high export potential also receive additional 
support from the state over smaller productions and minor-league producers, 
exacerbating the inequality gap between major and minor cultural producers. In relation 
to this, Participant P questioned the rationale behind state-funded programs.  
Whenever I apply to KOCCA’s programs, a question goes through my 
mind— “what is the program about?” [KOCCA’s] money does not go to 
projects where it is needed. It goes to projects with major corporations, top-
class screenwriters and directors, A-list actors. They are going to make 
fortunes without KOCCA’s supports. I am curious about the selection 
criteria. Is it performance-based? Do supported projects have to always be 
successful? Of course, it is great if all goes well…But why does [KOCCA] 
supports them?... I think it is because they are likely to export their products 
to foreign markets and earn lots of money (Participant P). 
While the nation’s cultural policy scope broadened to diverse genres of cultural 
industries and adopted more expansionist policies, the state continued to set up its own 
goals that are often independent of what the industry expects. Such a tendency, in which 
state authorities tend to highlight a small number of leading figures in the field, is an 
elitist approach that reflects a bureaucratization of the cultural sphere (Girard, 
2002[1978]). Considering the Korean state’s long-standing strategy of industrial 
development that concentrates resources on a few leading corporations or individuals to 
maximize the efficiency of policies in a short time, this approach reconfirms that the 
same kind of management traditions and structure of the government system applies to 
the state’s cultural management (Cummings & Schuster, 1989). Even if cultural 
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bureaucrats have strived to avoid censorship and propaganda after the nation’s 
democratization, they still have mandates of satisfying public expectations and 
producing tangible results with available budgets—including producing world-class 
cultural products (Cummings & Katz, 1987). However, as Participant X said, this 
approach may conceal or overlook more structural matters in the field including 
employment circumstances, unfair contracts between individual creators and agencies, 
and other issues in production and distribution for the sake of window dressing for 
bureaucrats.  
Window dressing by cultural bureaucrats based on the ‘almighty export principle’ 
becomes more problematic when the Ministry connects its support for cultural production 
with the Korean Wave. As the state prioritizes the export of cultural products to foreign 
markets and promotes the expansion of the Korean Wave worldwide, it may provoke 
antipathy towards Korean popular culture (Joo, 2013).64 Indeed, Participant P raised 
concerns over the state’s excessive emphasis on the boom of Korean cultural products 
and an overinterpretation for the sake of its political and economic goals.  
It makes foreign audiences feel “Aren’t we spending too much money [on 
Korean products]?”, “Are we become subjugated by Korean culture?”, “Is 
our culture infiltrated?” Let us say if too many Chinese television dramas 
are imported to Korea and the Chinese media and state argue ‘Chinese 
television conquers the Korean market’. Nobody would like it, but that is 
[what] the [Korean] state and media have done for the decade… I think we 
need to change our attitude [on the Korean Wave] if it means foreigners 
like the same cultural products as us (Participant P).  
With MCST as the central figure, the Korean state had provided a number of 
support programs for cultural production. MCST and its affiliations such as KOCCA and 
KOFIC offered a variety of programs for all phases of cultural production—from planning 
to overseas distribution. They also implemented various policy packages for supporting 
start-ups and small-size companies, from mentorship to workspace provision. Apart from 
Fund of Funds (FoFs), there are several ways that creators and companies could benefit 
 
64 In relation to this, MCST established the Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange 
(KOFICE) in 2003, a public agency to promote cultural exchange between Korea and other 
countries. Participant A, who works at an affiliation of MCST, explained that a major mission of 
this organization is to address antipathy towards the Korean Wave from imported countries with a 
series of cultural exchange programs, including co-hosting overseas volunteering by well-known 
celebrities with companies in the industry. In relation to this, Participant N also expressed that the 
moderation of potential anti-Korean sentiment should be a task of MCST.  
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from the state assisting with production costs, including low-interest loans from state-run 
banks, credit guarantees from public institutions, and other direct funding from public 
agencies. Many research participants from industrial backgrounds agreed that such 
support for cultural production from the Korean state outperforms that of other state’s 
roles in numerous other cultural industries.  
However, much of the way that cultural bureaucrats manage these supporting 
schemes is subject to mechanisms and norms of the nation’s bureaucratic system. The 
findings of interviews indicate that shortcomings of the bureaucratic system such as 
excessive paperwork, complicated administrative procedures, and other hurdles 
necessary to work with state authorities reduced the effectiveness of state-funded 
programs. In addition to this, the issue of window dressing in implementing cultural 
industry policies in the field reinforces the idea that the state (as well as bureaucrats) 
exploits cultural production as tools for accomplishing various political-economic goals. 
By prioritizing the potential of exports when selecting state funding recipients and 
publicizing the sponsoring or regulation of a few major stakeholders in the industries, the 
state demonstrates its interest in low-risk high-reward returns. Such a way of managing 
available support programs discourages small-size businesses and individual creators 
seeking to attract investments from raising their production costs. In contrast, it benefits 
major cultural production projects with a high potential of success in the market in the 
name of promoting the Korean Wave.  
In short, with expectations of expanding the Korean Wave and promoting cultural 
exports, cultural bureaucrats opt for the low-risk route of supporting ‘ready-made’ 
products with a high chance of success in foreign markets. Combined with the window 
dressing of cultural bureaucrats—that only consider showing off their achievements to 
the public by exploiting ready-made content of producers, this is a highly instrumentalist 
approach as the state chooses to support cultural producers who would satisfy the 
Korean state’s long-cherished political-economic desire of joining the ranks of advanced 
nations through maximizing exports. Since the popularity of cultural goods boosts the 
nation’s global image and also promotes the exports of other industries, to support 
cultural production becomes an incentive-driven decision for the Korean state. However, 
the promotion of the Korean cultural industries by the state does not benefit or positively 
impact all creators and producers in the field. The following section illustrates how the 
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state understands cultural industries as a means of accomplishing its political-economic 
initiatives through a discussion of the 2008–2017 blacklist scandals.  
5.3. Blacklist Scandals and Gookppong: Dark Sides of the 
State’s Hyper-instrumentalist Approach to the Cultural 
Industries  
Since the mid-1990s, the Korean state has put its emphasis on culture in 
economic development. Unlike other state governments that strive to protect their 
markets from globalization, the Korean state aimed at promoting the globalization of 
Korean cultural products. Expecting that the global popularity of Korean cultural products 
would benefit its long-cherished mission of improving the national image and increasing 
export of domestic products, the state introduced various policy frameworks and support 
programs to strengthen cultural businesses in the global market. To strengthen these 
capital-intensive and risky businesses in a short period of time, the state’s leadership 
and ability of mobilizing resources were necessary (Jin, 2011b; Drab-Kurowska, 2018). 
In this regard, while it requested major conglomerates in the market to invest in cultural 
production, the state established several public agencies to materialize its support in the 
form of providing proper education and training for creators and entrepreneurs, funding 
for production and distribution of cultural goods and services, and the construction of 
infrastructure, etc. as a patron (Jin, 2020a; Lee, 2019a).  
The Korean state’s strategies reconfirm that many mechanisms of the 
developmental state—where the state strongly intervenes in economic development by 
controlling and allocating resources through extensive regulation and planning—are still 
prevalent in the nation’s industrial policies. They also demonstrate how the state 
understands cultural products as sources of profit and as a means of promoting the 
nation among the global community. In that sense, the way that the state has intervened 
in its cultural development is far from what some advocates consider state 
interventionism in culture, where the expectation is placed on the state to safeguard the 
democratic nature of cultural development through regulating market players (Raboy, 
Bernier, Sauvageau & Atkinson, 1994). In other words, the Korean state’s interventionist 
approach to developing its cultural production is highly motivated by market values and 
diplomatic virtues of cultural exports.  
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This approach, in which the state presumes culture as a means of accomplishing 
the state’s vision of becoming an advanced country, neglects other intrinsic values of 
cultural products which cannot be converted to market valuation or subject to political 
consideration. In effect, many governments strive to instrumentalize their cultural 
resources as substitutes for their retreat from the public sector following neoliberal 
reforms (Yúdice, 2003). While the Korean state does exploit its cultural production for 
the sake of its political-economic initiatives, it also pressures cultural businesses to 
produce things that would satisfy the state’s needs. This is well-demonstrated through 
the recent blacklist scandal that accused conservative administrations of restricting 
access to state support for opposition-leading creators and entrepreneurs. 
In detail, conservative administrations led by President Lee Myung-bak (2008–
2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013–2017) blacklisted a number of celebrities and staff in 
cultural businesses and restricted them from getting the state’s support. After the 
inauguration, the Lee administration believed the nation’s cultural politics had been 
dominated by so-called ‘left-leaning figures’ and demanded state authorities suspend 
funding on various production projects (Kim & Kim, February 20, 2017). This 
materialized after several anti-government protests led by liberal-progressive activists in 
2009. The National Intelligence Service (NIS), the nation’s chief intelligence agency, ran 
a task force to select and manage left-wing celebrities. As an outcome, the task force 
selected 82 individuals and put pressure on public agencies and media corporations to 
suspend support for their production activities. The number of blacklisted personnel 
skyrocketed to 9,273 during the Park administration (MCST, 2019d).65 During their years 
in power, state authorities conducted preliminary screenings on applicants for state-
funded projects and excluded those who had been blacklisted. A research participant 
(who requested to not have the Participant’s name associated with the following 
comment), who was blacklisted during the Park administration shared their experience 
with the application process:  
I wanted to apply to a state-funded program when I tried to set up a 
company. One day, our vice-president told me that they had received a 
phone call from KOCCA saying that “it would be difficult [to receive the 
 
65 After two years of probing into the scandal, MCST (2019d) announced that 8,229 people were 
blacklisted by the Park administration because they had endorsed liberal-progressive political 
leaders in elections and issued statements criticizing the administration’s response to the Sewol 
ferry disaster in 2014, which resulted in the death of 304 people.  
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funds] because of the research participant.” I never told this story to others. 
Our company wanted to get the state’s support and I was a major 
stakeholder. But they said [we would not be able to get support] because I 
was the second-largest stakeholder (Participant’s information is 
anonymized). 
Controversies over blacklisting cultural luminaries is not a recent phenomenon in 
the Korean mediascape. During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, several celebrities 
accused the government of blacklisting them because of their conservative political 
backgrounds (Park, July 12, 2010). In terms of appointing heads of cultural 
organizations, conservative artists accused the administration of favouring people who 
were members of Korea Peoples’ Art Federation (KPAF, Minyechong in Korean), an 
organization of artists with progressive backgrounds (Lee, 2019a).66 In this context, 
Participant O explained how the nation’s cultural politics are ideologically polarized. 
I want to point out there is a huge ideological gap among cultural producers, 
unlike other countries. When there is a turnover of power, all cultural 
organizations and public agencies [relevant to cultural industries] become 
reorganized. This is not only limited to pure arts. It happens in every cultural 
genre; films, animation, comics… Cultural governance is highly politicized 
and ideologically divided as if a microcosm of Korean society (Participant 
O). 
In contrast to liberal-progressive administrations, Lee and Park administrations’ 
blacklisting had been systematically conducted by state authorities. Despite its 
ineffectiveness in the field which is driven by market logics, the administration’s attempt 
to block people with perceived anti-government backgrounds from state support and 
restrict their activities is highly unconstitutional and supra-legal. Indeed, many of those 
blacklisted by the Lee administration expressed how much they had suffered from the 
 
66 Founded in 1961, the Korea Federation of Cultural and Arts Organizations (Yechong in 
Korean), the nation’s largest artist organization, endorsed the state’s mission to cultivate a statist 
mentality of self-reliant and modernization of the public through reviving traditional cultural values 
and critically assessing foreign culture. Being critical of the state’s statist hegemony, artists who 
strove to practice political progressivism in their cultural practices and were devoted to 
democratic movements established the Korea People’s Artist Foundation (Minyechong) in 1988. 
Concerning favoritism of supporting Yechong within the bureaucracy, the Roh administration 
reorganized the existing Korea Culture and Arts Foundation to the Arts Council Korea (ARKO) in 
2005 to prevent the state’s direct influence on subsidies and promote the arm’s length principle of 
supporting arts. Suspicious of Roh’s introduction of the committee system as an attempt to 
privilege progressive artists, Yechong strongly criticized the administration’s plan (Lee, 2019a). 
Indeed, the amount of state subsidies on Minyechong, with a membership of 100,000 people, 
increased from 50 million KRW in 1998 to 2.2 billion KRW. In contrast, its supports on Yechong, 
which had a membership of 1.2 million people, increased from 580 million KRW to 1.9 billion 
KRW in the same period (Kim, March 2, 2017).  
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exclusion as well as the lack of explanation for such negative treatment. For instance, 
Moon Sung-keun, an actor and a liberal-progressive politician who was blacklisted by 
the Lee administration, expressed his feelings to the press that he felt astonishment the 
blacklist had been revealed and described the practice as beyond deplorable (Kim, 
September 19, 2017). Kim Mi-hwa, a comic actress and comedian who also had been 
blacklisted, demanded individuals and groups responsible for the blacklist be held 
accountable to prevent such a practice from reoccurring (Kim, September 15, 2017). 
Even Bong Joon-ho had been blacklisted by the Lee and Park administrations due to 
plots with the anti-American sentiment, incompetent governments, and left-wing 
messages in his films. In a press conference, he expressed that the lifetime of 
conservative administrations “was such a nightmarish few year that left many South 
Korean artists deeply traumatized” and “many are still reeling from the trauma (Jung, 
May 18, 2017).”  
Believing that the hegemony of cultural politics had been overwhelmed by so-
called left-wing figures, conservative administrations sought ways to support pro-
government figures. According to a series of classified documents written by the Office 
of the President during the Lee administration, the administration had plans for 
concentrating state funding toward conservative artists, laying off staff with anti-
governmental backgrounds from public agencies, and encouraging enterprises to invest 
in cultural infrastructures dedicated to pro-government personnel.67 So-called 
‘whitelisting’, the administration argued that the state would institutionally favour pliant 
artists and creators that aligned with its political agenda. Many of its plans were 
materialized during both the Lee and Park administrations (Kim & Kim, February 20, 
2017). In relation to this, Participant V, a film producer who runs a production studio, 
expressed how the state’s special treatment of artists and celebrities who supported the 
administration’s political stance made people feel a sense of self-deprivation.  
Let’s say I am blacklisted. But I am not sure the reason why my project fails 
to attract investment and cast actors and actresses: Is it because of the 
 
67 In relation to this, the Lee administration pressured heads of MCST’s affiliations who had been 
appointed by the Roh Moo-hyun administration to resign from their positions. In-chon Yu, an actor 
who served as Lee’s culture minister, argued that those who had similar political backgrounds 
with the previous administration should resign even if their tenure were guaranteed. Indeed, after 
Lee’s inauguration, several figures who had led cultural organizations like Yoon Soo Kim (the 
National Museum of Contemporary Arts) and Jeongheon Kim (Arts Council Korea) were removed 
from their posts (Lee & Roh, February 21, 2011).  
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blacklist? Or does it lack artistic value or is not entertaining? Basically, most 
films go down like lead balloons… Since it is difficult to succeed, I would 
think ‘what was my mistake?’ rather than ‘am I blacklisted?’ In contrast, 
there are films that make me think ‘what the fuck…both the film and the 
narrative are shit. But how come it could attract such a high budget?’ Then, 
it becomes suspicious. In terms of equality of opportunity, privilege is 
another word for disadvantage (Participant V).  
Given that much of the industry is driven by market mechanisms, it is worth 
questioning the impacts of the state’s blacklist in cultural production. Based on 
conversations with colleagues, Participant V explained the blacklist would be devastating 
for cultural workers who are occupied with producing less commercial and more artistic 
cultural genres, saying that “since their outcomes do not expect profits from the market, 
their budget depends on public organizations.” However, when being about potential 
damage to cultural activities in the production of commercial cultural goods, the 
participant, who had been blacklisted three times by the government, shook their head 
and said, 
No. I thought [state authorities] worked so hard [in a sarcastic tone]. 
Because if you wanted to blacklist someone and make it effective, you 
should have targeted a few figures and caused them real damage. But they 
blacklisted thousands of people… It does not make any sense. I want to 
ask [authorities] whether they really knew these people.  
Admitting that the impact of the blacklist on commercial cultural markets would 
be hard to measure, Participant V explained how the field is influenced by commercial 
logics determined by multiple stakeholders, including producers, distributors, and 
audiences. According to the Participant, this made the administration’s covert efforts of 
forcing out blacklisted people from cultural production difficult.  
Let’s say, Song Kang-ho [a Korean actor] is a blacklisted performer, but 
audiences come to see his movies. The state cannot force audiences not 
to come to see his movie. Of course, it might give some directions to Korea 
Venture Investment Corporation (KVIC), saying ‘Do not finance films in 
which Song appears’, but it cannot dictate [KVIC] and other investors. It 
cannot intimidate KVIC and investors with measures like suspension of 
their business. At least, I don’t believe there has been a serious impact on 
cultural production (Participant V).  
The Blacklist scandals during conservative administrations laid bare how the 
state continues to instrumentalize popular culture as a political tool. By suppressing 
those who do not follow their political stances, the state attempted to instrumentalize 
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popular culture to serve its interests. In a similar vein, it utilized the Korean Wave to 
celebrate international recognition that enhances the nation’s international dignity (Heo, 
2015). Dubbed Gookppong (jargon referring to the promotion of extreme national pride 
in English), the nation’s politicians, as well as bureaucrats, interpreted the success of 
Korean cultural products as evidence of how the nation’s dignity and status in the global 
community have improved to citizens. At times, they have employed the term Korean 
Wave and several cultural products to give the population a sense of pride and show off 
the strength of the nation’s political and cultural power worldwide (Kim & Jin, 2016; Kim 
& Lee, 2018). For them, the success of Korean popular culture merchandise in the 
international market could be appropriated as a signifier of nationalism by promoting 
national glory even if many cultural products are already hybrid and transnational. As 
Participant C says below, such a phenomenon became intense during conservative 
administrations as they strove to inspire national pride among the public.  
Under the presidencies of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, 
conservative administrations sought ways of implementing ideas of 
advancing the nation into policies. With the Korean Wave and cultural 
products which raised awareness in the global community, both attempted 
to cultivate self-confidence among the population by delivering messages 
of ‘how we are great in cultural businesses.’ They exploited the Korean 
Wave and cultural products with global popularity to mobilize Gookppong 
in the population. They appropriated the Korean Wave as recognition of the 
nation’s achievement throughout the past decades (Participant C).  
In this regard, Korean cultural products and their global popularity became major 
sources for the Korean state to inspire national pride among its populace while also 
satisfying mechanisms of both commercialism and globalization (Volcic & Andrejevic, 
2011). Given the Korean Wave’s status as a media product that takes pivotal roles in 
representing national identity and carries a reputation in the global community of ‘hitting 
the jackpot’, such products are ideal materials for the state to raise patriotism and 
cultivate national pride. Combined with its dedication to strengthening soft power, the 
Korean state consumes the Korean Wave and relevant cultural products. By doing so, it 
can continue to sustain one of the key objectives of cultural policies—to govern citizens 
by providing a collective and national imperative for revisiting and nurturing a sense of 
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belonging—in the era of neoliberal globalization where cultural products are increasingly 
marketized and transnational (Miller & Yúdice, 2002).68  
Indeed, the interpretation of this global cultural phenomenon and cultural 
products as global recognition of Korea’s achievements is already prevalent within the 
bureaucratic system as well as among cultural producers. Despite their marginalized 
position in the government system where logics of developmentalism prevail in 
budgeting mechanisms, cultural bureaucrats pride themselves on the success of Korean 
popular culture by identifying with how it promotes national pride worldwide. Given their 
backgrounds of implementing cultural policies that recognize cultural and artistic 
creativity and their social values, such a sense of accomplishment could not be solely 
interpreted as expressions of desire to create market profits. In relation to this, 
Participant H described how MCST’s bureaucrats responded to the Korean Wave.  
Like the arts, cultural products have more meaning than making money. 
Their success leads to promoting our culture and eventually raised the 
nation’s prestige in the global community. Since cultural products are vital 
to improving national image, cultural bureaucrats have a strong vocation 
for promoting cultural industries (Participant H).69  
In that sense, unlike other countries such as the US where cultural bureaucracy 
is rather decentralized and dispersed and subject to opinions and interests of various 
stakeholders in the field (Redaelli, 2020), and where bureaucrats are reluctant to 
 
68 In relation to this, nation branding becomes a useful strategy for the state to motivate its 
population, whose lives are overwhelmed by transnational and commercial mechanisms, through 
recreating and exploiting specific national images that “means to be nationally competitive and 
nationally competitive for globalization (Aronczyk, 2013, 10)”. As society and its norms are further 
commercialized and national borders become blurred among citizens thanks to neoliberal 
globalization, each nation-state has to ‘brand’ itself to appeal to its population as customers 
(Aronczyk, 2013; Kim & Lee, 2018). 
69 It is worth noting that Korean media also tend to interpret the success of Korean cultural 
products in the global arena as an indicator of national pride and a major recognition from the 
global community to the nation’s achievements. When Pinkfong, a Korean education company 
released the musical animation Baby Shark on YouTube, based on a song that originated from an 
American campfire chant, it attracted billions of viewers worldwide (7.1 billion views as of 
November 16). Thanks to this success, the company hosted a concert tour in the US and began 
to co-produce animation series with Nickelodeon, a US cable television channel. Despite 
controversies over the copyright of the song Baby Shark, mainstream Korean media praised 
Pinkfong and Baby Shark as another sensation of the Korean Wave “like BTS (Park, October 22, 
2019)”. Likewise, Korean media and politicians praised the critical success of Parasite as not only 
a success of Korean cinema but also a milestone in the entire cultural industries signifying the 
Korean Wave becoming increasingly mainstream in the global community (Lee, Kim & Yoon, 
February 12, 2020). 
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intervene directly in developing their cultural businesses as they believe that any state 
intervention would be temporal and necessary (Drab-Kurowska, 2018), Korean cultural 
bureaucrats are instead rather dirigiste and retain substantive power as a major 
stakeholder in the field. In that sense, the blacklist scandal indicates how some political 
figures and bureaucrats continue to understand culture as a tool of propagating the 
state’s objectives even after 30 years of political democratization. It is ironic that 
conservative administrations were accused of reviving an authoritative approach to 
governing culture since it promoted cultural businesses vigorously as the up-and-coming 
industry of the future. While they were eager to commodify individual cultural creativity 
for the sake of the state’s desire to become an advanced country, their exploitation of 
culture in practice was far from promoting creativity (Kim J. O., 2018b). Such an uncanny 
way of governing culture demonstrates an extreme case of how far the state can 
instrumentalize cultural production to accomplish its political and economic objectives.  
5.4. Conclusion 
Interviews from both policymakers and cultural workers clearly demonstrate that 
the Korean state continues to intervene in the development of the cultural industries and 
has pledged its support and management of the future global popularity of Korean 
cultural products. Unlike several cultural powerhouses where market forces take the 
initiative in promoting industries or other countries in which foreign products dominate 
their domestic markets, the Korean state continues to reshape its market and supports 
creators and entrepreneurs in the cultural realm to produce cultural goods and services 
which have enormous political-economic potential. For instance, its funding schemes 
such as FoFs are crucial to many producers in industries as major funding sources.  
As the development of the cultural industries and the expansion of the Korean 
Wave in global communities become more important among policymakers, several 
ministries including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT, currently the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the Ministry of Information and Communication (currently 
divided to the Korea Communications Commission and the Ministry of Science and ICT) 
as well as non-cultural public organizations like the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency (KOTRA), a state-funded agency for promoting exports of Korean goods and 
services, became involved in subsidizing cultural production and promoting Korean 
cultural products overseas. Furthermore, several state-owned banks such as the 
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Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK) set themselves up as patrons of cultural goods 
production. Considering that a majority of cultural production had been done by small-
scale companies that were otherwise incapable of manufacturing blockbuster products, 
the development of cultural industries in a short period of time could not be achieved 
without the state’s leadership and allocation of resources (Chung, 2019; Lee, 2019a). In 
other words, the state was vital to laying the groundwork for cultural businesses and 
their performance in producing and distributing products. 
Indeed, as interviews with participants about the state’s grants and subsidies 
exemplify, even small grants and recognitions from the state could be used as tokens to 
ensure confidence when attracting investment from private capitals. Moreover, 
contributions by state-owned financial institutions such as the Industrial Bank of Korea 
(IBK) for cultural production are significant. Such diverse and comprehensive funding 
schemes for cultural producers, which are provided either directly from state authorities 
or public-private matching funds (FoFs), indicate the state is involved in mobilizing 
private and public resources to support cultural production. Combined with additional 
institutional support managed by KOCCA and other affiliations, the state’s direct and 
indirect funding for producers reaffirms the state’s persistence in its intervention in the 
field through the mobilization and allocation of resources, which are legacy practices of 
the developmental state. 
In terms of exporting cultural products to foreign markets, public organizations 
are involved in promoting cultural exports through various support schemes such as the 
support for translation and dubbing of products into different languages, full or partial 
reimbursement on travel expenses during overseas promotion, and legal support for 
contracts, and organizing international-level exhibitions, etc. In addition to this, KOCCA 
has regional offices in Abu Dhabi, Beijing, Jakarta, Los Angeles, Paris, Shenzhen, and 
Tokyo—all major hubs of global cultural production and epicentres of Korean cultural 
product popularity—to support the promotional efforts of cultural businesses abroad. 
Also, the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), a state-funded trade 
organization under the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, has hosted the Korea 
Brand and Entertainment Expo for years, expecting that the promotion of the Korean 
Wave would benefit both cultural businesses and other industries. Alongside support for 
the activities of businesspeople, MCST also pledged to introduce Korean cultural 
products through its cultural institutions such as the Korean Culture and Information 
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Service (KOCIS) and King Sejong Institutes. Combined with other institutional support 
for exporting cultural products, these examples demonstrate how the state is involved in 
marketing cultural products overseas.  
As discussions of ‘ready-made’ products explain, it is not surprising that such a 
stance on the part of the state often discourages some cultural creators whose work is 
considered to have low export potential. As several research participants with industrial 
backgrounds expressed in the previous chapter, public authorities favour cultural 
production with a high potential of gaining popularity in overseas markets. Based on 
what Participant P said about the state’s preference of supporting only those who 
already have enough resources to produce their works, this demonstrates a tendency of 
bureaucrats to prefer the works of production studios which have experiences and 
expertise in promoting their previous products in foreign markets or whose portfolios 
include A-list performers, screenwriters, and directors well known in the market. This 
also coincides with the reluctance of bureaucrats to take risks when spending taxpayers’ 
money on uncertainty to the risk of their careers. Although public organizations have 
many programs dedicated to promoting the production of start-ups and small companies, 
this becomes another reason why bureaucrats tend to be more attentive to projects 
managed by major production studios or ones that will be distributed by major 
distributors because they are more likely to be exported over other products. Such an 
attitude by the state, which favours ‘ready-made’ cultural products that would correspond 
immediately to its political and economic goals, is linked to criticisms of short-termism as 
well as window dressing of the bureaucracy. 
Controversies over blacklisting anti-governmental creators in the cultural domain 
during Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013–2017) administrations 
further demonstrate how the state’s approach to cultural production can be extremely 
instrumental. Arguing that the nation’s cultural politics had favoured progressive figures, 
they blacklisted and restricted workers and creators from state support. Regardless of 
the effectiveness of their implicit crackdown on anti-government figures, the blacklist 
itself represented how the then-conservative state understood culture through an 
outdated and unconstitutional perspective—as an object of propagating ideologies 
approved by the administration so that culture would contribute to legitimating the state’s 
exercise of power (Kim D., 2018). Meanwhile, the state further instrumentalized popular 
culture by utilizing the international popularity of Korean popular cultural products as a 
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means of inspiring the self-confidence of Korean citizens. Such logic not only contradicts 
neoliberal doctrines that required the state to withdraw from managing the cultural 
industries and acquiesce to market forces but also violated constitutional rights of 
freedom of expression.  
Despite criticisms of short-termism and ‘window dressing’—which accuses 
bureaucrats of only being interested in exaggerating and showing off their achievements 
and performances by favouring ready-made content for their supporting programs—the 
state’s commitment in collaborating with leading enterprises in the market to promote the 
cultural industries strongly reconfirms its obsession over raising export as a hegemonic 
discourse in policymaking, as its emphasis on the Korean Wave and its contribution to 
many of state agendas shows. Considering that the nation’s economy is export-oriented 
due to the small size of the domestic market, the state needs to mobilize all available 
resources to increase overseas export. Not surprisingly, to increase exports has been a 
key component of the Korean state’s macroeconomic planning and a major rationale for 
managing state-led economic development for decades.  
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Chapter 6.  
 
Conclusion 
6.1. The Korean State as the Main Architect and Patron of 
Cultural Industries 
Let’s go back to the story of BTS’ performance at the ‘Korea-France Friendship 
Concert: Echoes of Korean Music’ in Paris—a cultural event hosted by the Office of the 
President to celebrate President Moon Jae-in’s visit to France—introduced in the first 
chapter. As the Korean Wave expanded to different regions, to hold a cultural event 
became part of the official presidential schedule during international trips. In effect, for 
the last decade, the Office of the President and the nation’s cultural ministry have given 
cultural events during the president’s overseas trips, and many K-Pop singers and 
celebrities have appeared in them. A participant (who requested to not have the 
Participant’s name associated with the following comment), who has experience in 
planning cultural events during the president’s international trips, expressed their opinion 
about such exploitation of celebrities for international cultural events:  
State authorities always request K-Pop idols participate in cultural events. 
However, they pay much less than the market price, appealing to patriotism 
[by] saying, ‘you are doing good deeds for the country’… I believe this is 
an extreme version of the state’s window dressing. Despite a turnover of 
political power from conservative to liberal-progressive administrations, 
there is not much difference in exploiting celebrities for the sake of the 
state’s missions without fair compensation. 
The Participant’s remark on the state’s exploitation of K-Pop artists demonstrates 
how the Korean state continues to exploit the popular culture products and artists that 
triggered the Korean Wave. Indeed, the story of BTS’ performance in Paris shows that 
there are ways that the state can still mobilize the cultural domain in an era of neoliberal 
globalization where much of the production and distribution processes as well as 
products have become transnational and subject to (free-)market mechanisms. 
Considering that cultural industries are promising businesses in the nation’s service and 
knowledge-based economy and their outcomes are useful sources to promote the nation 
in the global arena, the state’s willingness to intervene in and exploit popular culture—
notably cultural products that have established a solid foothold in world markets such as 
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BTS, Bong Joon-ho’s film Parasite, The Masked Singer, and Baby Shark—is still present 
and continuous. Due to such an object’s use value and applicability to state objectives, 
the state persists with its engagement in the cultural domain as a patron and a major 
stakeholder even if it does not produce products itself.  
In this context, this research examined the relationship between the Korean state 
and the Korean cultural industries where production and distribution processes are 
driven by global forces and market logics. Based on interviews with twenty-five cultural 
bureaucrats and cultural workers, it investigates the reasons behind the state’s 
persistence in its intervention in cultural production and the various policy methods and 
practices that it utilizes to promote cultural production in accordance with market forces. 
It also explored how cultural workers recognize and negotiate the state’s intervention in 
their work, and from these findings develops an understanding of the characteristics the 
state’s interventions in the cultural domain hold. Furthermore, by exploring the meanings 
of globalization and neoliberal market dynamics in policymaking and policy outcomes, 
the study investigates how the state revisits the process of instrumentalizing culture to 
accomplish its political and economic objectives in spite of the extent to which the 
cultural realm follows the logics of transnational market forces that cannot be fully 
controlled by state authorities.  
The state’s turn to highlighting the potentials of commercial culture—rather than 
conventional approaches that focus on the preservation of traditional culture or 
supporting the high arts—implies the rise of neoliberal imperatives with a market-
oriented mentality in policymaking (McGuigan, 2005). Instead of valuing culture for its 
artistic creativity or communal virtues, the state increasingly gave prominence to the 
economic contributions of cultural products. Moreover, cultural bureaucrats preferred to 
use terms such as ‘the audiovisual industry’, ‘cultural industries’, and ‘creative 
industries’—all of which would imply economic-reductionist models that would exploit 
culture for the sake of market profits (McGuigan, 2016). As noted, the presence of the 
Culture Industry Bureau—which took charge of industrializing popular culture—has 
become the most important team in the cultural ministry. This interpretation, which 
combines culture with the economy, has become prevalent in policy contexts as 
neoliberal imaginaries are normalized in the discourse of policymaking (Valentine, 2018).  
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As part of restructuring the manufacturing-driven economy toward a service-
oriented one, the state employed developmental mechanisms to develop cultural 
industries. As introduced in previous chapters, it intervened in the development process 
with various policy frameworks including the construction of infrastructure, selection of 
certain private stakeholders—notably Chaebols—to expand their business in media and 
cultural sectors, the introduction of a variety of training programs for creators and 
entrepreneurs in the field, the establishment of private-public funds dedicated to 
investing in cultural production, a series of direct subsidies and other support programs, 
etc. Although the state encouraged the private sector to invest in producing cultural 
products through a series of deregulations and available benefits, such measures belied 
their goals of laying the groundwork to develop cultural industries and designing the 
modern foundation that forms the current industrial structure.  
Depending on each administration’s political orientation and attitude on the 
cultural sector, there are significant differences in approaches to the development of 
cultural industries. Conservative governments underlined the success in the global arena 
as stemming from concentrating state support on a few leading companies with high 
potential in overseas markets, while liberal-progressive governments emphasized their 
role of supporting small and medium-size enterprises and safeguarding the right to enjoy 
culture. As conservative and liberal-progressive administrations had different 
expectations from cultural businesses—the mobilization of national pride from successful 
cultural exports and the preservation of cultural diversity with fairer competition in the 
market respectively—the methods each administration employed were different, 
reflecting various political backgrounds and policy objectives.  
In relation to the Korean Wave, conservative and liberal-progressive 
administrations also approached their management of this transnational cultural 
phenomenon differently. Although both political blocs utilized the Korean Wave to 
empower national pride among citizens, conservative leaders utilized this as an 
opportunity of showing off national prestige in the global community while liberal-
progressive politicians sought less robust ways of managing the phenomenon in order to 
not provoke anti-Korean sentiments overseas (Kim & Jin, 2016). In this regard, all the 
measures implemented by the Korean state for cultural production and the Korean Wave 
reflect the different political orientations of each administration.  
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Despite these differences, however, it is worth noting that all administrations 
have been influenced by doctrines of neoliberalism and utilized many neoliberal ideas to 
promote the cultural industries. In general, the implementation of market principles into 
the state system blurs the boundaries between the state and market, private and public, 
and political and commercial in the public sector (Miller & Rose, 2008). Nevertheless, 
neoliberalization of the public sector, including cultural management, does not stop the 
state from intervening in the process. Given that neoliberalism is “a political project 
seeking to extract value from economic processes by acting on political systems and 
structures to transform them to its advantage (Valentine, 2018, 148)”, the state’s 
presence is vital to materialize and implement neoliberal doctrines in the public domain 
as well as society. In the same vein, it legitimizes the state’s continued objective of 
cultural industrialization, the promotion of cultural exports, and intervention in the form of 
facilitating capital accumulation and restructuring fields which are deemed to be less 
profitable or not aligned with the state’s masterplans (Purcell, 2009; Karvelyte, 2018). In 
this regard, the disjuncture between theories of neoliberalism and neoliberalization in 
practice is clearly seen in the development of the Korean cultural industries, even if their 
production and distribution processes are highly marketized and globalized. 
The case of the Korean state’s cultural industries development project and 
promotion of cultural exports suggests that the practice of neoliberalism is subject to the 
state’s interests. Although cultural production is in the hands of the private sector—
including production studios, private capital, and creators—and driven by market 
mechanisms, the state persists in its exploitation of cultural products for the sake of its 
objectives. Unlike neoliberal doctrines that require the state’s withdrawal from cultural 
production, the state retains its authority and governing abilities to promote, manage, 
and even sanction cultural businesses even if much of cultural production becomes 
transnational and operates through market mechanisms. This indicates that the Korean 
state acts in concert with free market mechanisms and ideas of neoliberal globalization 
selectively so that they can serve its political and economic goals (Suh & Kwon, 2014). 
In other words, even the adoption of neoliberal logics and the following implementation 
of market mechanisms to develop cultural industries are subject to the state’s 
preferences if they satisfy its needs.  
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6.2. Globalization of Korean Cultural Products: The Fate of 
Both the State and Cultural Businesses 
Many of the state’s schemes to support cultural production prioritize cultural 
exports. As cultural industries became the up-and-coming business of the nation’s 
knowledge-based economy in terms of the amount of export, it is no surprise that 
cultural bureaucrats regard the potential of export as an overriding consideration when 
they introduce and implement policy measures for promoting cultural businesses. In 
effect, commercial viability in overseas markets has historically and continues to be a 
key priority during application reviews for state-funded programs to support the 
production and distribution of cultural products. Since export has been interpreted as the 
best indicator efficacy of the state’s expenditures in the nation’s bureaucratic system—
which is also a major legacy of the developmental state that institutionally prioritized 
export as the best virtue within the system—cultural bureaucrats were not exempt from 
the influences such interpretations have had on cultural policymaking (Kang, 2011; 
Rhyu, 2014). However, such emphasis on cultural exports when selecting recipients of 
state-funded programs often exacerbate the gap between major production studios, who 
have the ability to recruit A-list performers and staff that are already popular in foreign 
markets, and other producers. As several research participants with industrial 
backgrounds critically observed, this is often linked to bureaucratic ‘window dressing’, 
describing projects and policies that create immediate tangible results that can be 
interpreted and presented as consistent achievements. 
Despite skepticism, however, the globalization of Korean cultural products 
through expanding into foreign markets has been understood as a major strategy for 
producers to recoup their costs and further revenue. Producers and entrepreneurs strive 
to make their products attractive to broader audiences by adding more transnational and 
universal elements to their products. In addition to pre-existing hybrid characteristics of 
popular culture heavily influenced by U.S. and Japanese cultural products, both the 
state’s institutional support for cultural exports and the strong willingness of cultural 
workers to depend on cultural exports influences the desire to appeal to ever broader 
audiences. Due to the small size of the domestic market, many cultural workers consider 
cultural exports to recoup their production costs from the initial stages of production. 
Expecting overseas markets to be major revenue sources, more cultural producers 
utilize various methods to globalize their products—including casting foreign personnel, 
186 
co-production with foreign distributors, and producing their cultural products with 
universal themes to appeal to diverse audience groups worldwide. As noted, all these 
efforts contributed to the hybridization of Korean popular culture to attract global 
audiences. The findings of this research show that efforts to make popular culture 
content appear more universal and hybrid to appeal to larger audiences worldwide are 
strongly endorsed by state authorities that have craved cultural export as a major policy 
objective. 
In effect, the growing presence of the nation’s popular culture worldwide 
becomes useful for the Korean state to show off the nation’s success to the population 
and serves to inspire national pride. Again, given that the state has promoted export as 
the best virtue through which economic actors could contribute to the nation, it is hardly 
surprising that it interprets the amount of export as an object of inspiring national pride 
among the population. Combined with its market values and ripple effects of improving 
the national image in the global community that could benefit other industries who seek 
to export their merchandise, the Korean Wave is an ideal tool for the state to 
demonstrate its political and economic success in the global arena. In relation to this, 
political leaders and bureaucrats highlight how the success of Korean popular culture in 
the global arena verifies the state’s vision of joining the ranks of advanced nations and 
its mission of national development. For cultural bureaucrats, the presence of popular 
cultural products in the global community became a successful recognition for 
themselves to improve their status in the government system. Successful cultural 
products became symbols of national image and tools for the Korean state to expand its 
political power to the region as a means of strengthening its soft power. 
Given the political significance of cultural products as tools for delivering the 
state’s particular values and ideology to other countries, the popularity of Korean cultural 
products in foreign markets becomes useful for the state to attract foreign citizens so 
that their support for cultural products will benefit its goals of expanding political leverage 
in the global community (Mirrlees, 2020). Indeed, as the case of incumbent Moon Jae-in 
administration’s ASEAN-ROK Film Cooperation Organization (ARFO) initiative 
exemplifies, the Korean state utilizes its cultural production to attract the population of 
Southeast Asian countries so that it can consolidate its political and economic presence 
in the region. In relation to this, Participant I explained the state’s motive of introducing 
ARFO as a reciprocal approach to attract local producers. 
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[The introduction of ARFO] was a political decision… If we send Korean 
culture, cineastes, film production systems, and companies overseas, 
there will be revenue… But we want to highlight that our proposal to 
Southeast Asian countries is different from what Hollywood studios have 
done to them. Hollywood did nothing for Korean film production. Did it 
invest in Korean films or co-produce movies with Korean producers? Or did 
it send staff to Korea and train our staff? No. But we are going to offer these 
things to them. We are going to do that and show how our suggestions are 
different from Hollywood’s (Participant I). 
Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Vietnam were among some of the first countries where Korean films, music, and 
television drama gained popularity since the 1990s. In this regard, there have been 
consistent efforts on the part of the Korean state to utilize such popularity to gain political 
and economic influence over the region, including increasing the export of Korean 
merchandise, diplomatic support from ASEAN countries in relation to inter-Korean 
relations and the power dynamics in Northeast Asia between China and Japan, etc. In a 
similar vein, the establishment of ARFO and President Moon Jae-in’s promises of 
strengthening cooperation between the Korean film industry and its counterparts in the 
ASEAN market can be understood as part of strengthening Korea’s soft power in the 
region, as Participant D explained when discussing the implications of Moon’s initiatives. 
Based on the premise that Korea is a key middle-power in the global arena, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already developed strategies of 
strengthening diplomatic relations with middle-power countries [including 
ASEAN and India] … In this regard, to help the development of cultural 
industries in the Southeast Asian region would make a narrative of ‘if Korea 
did it, so as we.’ By making them as ‘partners’, we can make the Korean 
Wave a sustainable phenomenon…Making ‘ASEAN-wave’ is different from 
the previous one-sided approach (Participant D).  
In this regard, despite the increasing power of global market forces in its cultural 
businesses and transnational and universal characteristics of cultural products, the 
Korean state continues utilizing them to wield strong influence over the population and 
the world. Since the 2000s, all administrations have interpreted the Korean Wave and 
popular culture to the public as evidence of the nation’s success in the global community 
to varying degrees depending on their viewpoint of culture (Kim & Jin, 2016). Also, they 
implemented national branding and soft power strategies by utilizing well-known cultural 
products to improve the national image and attract foreign audiences to favour Korea 
and its cultural products (Kim, 2016). This means that the more cultural production 
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becomes globalized, the better it would be for the state to serve its political missions 
alongside economic profit.  
6.3. The State’s Instrumentalization of Popular Culture as a 
Political Tool 
In relation to the political efficacy of Korean popular culture, findings also indicate 
each administration’s strategies for promoting cultural industries and approach to the 
Korean Wave have been different. Depending on each administration’s expectations 
from cultural production and its political backgrounds, conservative governments 
preferred to formulate more hands-on and interventionist measures. Defining the state’s 
role as the control tower leading industrial development for the sake of its political and 
economic missions, they established and expanded existing public agencies such as 
KOCCA so that they could effectively materialize the state's support and guide cultural 
businesses to follow their lead. In contrast, based on skepticism of the state’s 
interference in the cultural domain, liberal-progressive governments employed more 
hands-off measures by highlighting the autonomy of the cultural domain from the state. 
In the name of arm’s length principles, they invited market mechanisms to manage the 
allocation of public resources as exemplified by FoFs.  
Such willingness on the part of the state to appropriate culture to benefit its 
interests has often led to an excessive intervention in cultural production, as blacklist 
scandals during conservative governments exemplify. As long as the state interprets 
cultural products as tools for accomplishing its missions, it often attempted to determine 
detailed directions of producing cultural goods to comply with its needs. While state 
authorities urged producers to follow its guidelines, they also suppressed creators and 
entrepreneurs who disagreed with their political directions. Although administrations’ 
informal measures on blacklisting figures in the cultural domain from the state’s supports 
were against the constitution, controversies of blacklisting hundreds of people and 
restricted them from approaching public resources showed the extent to which the state 
would go to instrumentalize its cultural domain as a means of ruling society (Kim J. O., 
2018b). While the impacts of the state’s blacklists in the commercial market are still in 
question, it withered the artistic creativity of individuals and put many artists and 
performers at economic and social risk.  
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The findings from the analysis indicate that the state’s roles are far from that of a 
bystander. Instead of withdrawing from the cultural domain and letting market forces 
develop and manage cultural production, the Korean state initiated a series of 
masterplans with details of how to promote cultural businesses. Based on its plans, it 
mobilized public resources and encouraged private stakeholders for its project of 
industrializing popular culture. Public agencies materialized the state’s plans into a 
variety of programs that aimed at supporting every phase of the production and 
distribution of cultural products. When Korean cultural products became popular 
overseas resulting in the Korean Wave, state authorities introduced a series of initiatives 
to prevent possible anti-Korean sentiment while they provided institutional support for 
increasing cultural export. Hence, the Korean state has served as an architect of 
designing much of the domestic market and has acted as a major patron of producing 
and distributing cultural goods and services.  
Admittedly, it is important to not overstate the state’s contribution to the Korean 
Wave and Korean cultural industries. All research participants, both policymakers and 
cultural workers, agreed that creativity and entrepreneurship of individual workers have 
been the foremost factor which paved the way for the success of Korean cultural 
industries. It is worth noting that a number of individual creators and junior staff in 
cultural production continually experience heavy workloads and suffer from low salaries 
and poor working conditions. Notably, behind the growing presence of K-Pop in global 
music download stores, there are approximately one million underpaid idol-hopefuls who 
train for months and years hoping for an opportunity to debut. Also, the success of 
Korean films, popular music, and television cannot be explained without the trials and 
errors of numerous cultural producers who initially attempted to penetrate foreign 
markets.  
What this research attempts, instead, is to demonstrate how Korea has and 
could continue to become a cultural powerhouse in the region with a focus on the state’s 
roles. As a second mover that did not have either the infrastructure or capital needed to 
industrialize, its intervention was vital to industrialize popular culture and foster cultural 
exports in a short period of time. Indeed, despite widespread skepticism and criticism of 
its instrumentalist approach to cultural production, cultural workers recognize that the 
state’s participation is still vital for their future. Most of all, the state continues to be one 
of the biggest investors in cultural production as a strong presence of Fund of Funds 
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(FoFs) in film and television production indicates. In addition to FoFs, direct investment 
and credit guarantee from state-owned financial institutions are also important for 
producers to attract other private investors as quality insurance. Last but not least, as 
outsiders from a non-Western culture, they often experience difficulties in promoting their 
animation, films, idols, and television series in foreign markets and exhibitions. For them, 
support from public institutions to finance their promotion costs, broker foreign buyers, 
and develop translations of their works, are vital to globalize their products. Indeed, 
during interviews, many research participants with industrial backgrounds expected 
more support from state authorities to pioneer new markets and finance initial planning 
phases.  
6.4. Looking Forward 
During the investigation of the state’s presence in Korean cultural industries, this 
project identified several areas for future research. First, follow-up studies could be 
conducted to examine further impacts of the state’s policies on cultural production. As 
long as there is no sign of the state’s retreat from cultural production and producers 
strive to pioneer new foreign markets, the state’s interventions in the market will be 
challenged constantly. In particular, how the state responds to an influx of foreign 
capital—including Netflix’s co-production of television and films with Korean local 
production studios and the entry of Chinese capital into the entertainment management 
business—is important to monitor. Since this study focused on the state’s willingness 
and practices of increasing Korean cultural products global appeal, follow-up research 
on the state’s reaction to the entry of foreign capital into the domestic market would be 
helpful to understand the dynamics between state interests and cultural industries who’s 
nature become even more complex with the entry of foreign stakeholders.  
Secondly, while this research focuses on common elements that the state utilizes 
to develop cultural industries based on legacies of the developmental state with export-
oriented strategies that are common to all commercial genres, it is worth studying how 
individual cultural genres understand and evaluate the state’s supports and intervention 
in their production. Considering each genre has unique industrial characteristics and 
different market strategies, to investigate the reactions of each genre to the state’s 
approach to promote and exploit cultural businesses with a more micro perspective 
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would be useful to deepen insights into the state’s instrumentalization of culture and how 
it influences each cultural business and its products.  
Finally, a comparative analysis between cultural powerhouses is recommended. 
While this study focuses on the case of Korean cultural industries, where much of the 
development of cultural industries is driven by state-led initiatives and policy frameworks, 
many states—which have advanced democracy and free-market economies—retain 
different methods to exert their influence on cultural production. In this regard, 
comparative analysis between countries can bring insight and a better understanding of 
the complexity of the relation between the state and players in the global market as well 
as underlying power dynamics between the two forces. This is important as other states 
also try to mobilize cultural resources for the sake of state interests as their approaches 
are subject to political, economic, and sociocultural contexts of individual countries.  
To sum up, throughout this analysis, this research explains how the Korean state 
has intervened in the development process of the Korean cultural industries and what 
imperatives the state utilizes to justify its engagement in supporting the nation’s cultural 
production. Although much of such production and distribution has become transnational 
and subject to market forces as more producers expect to make profits from overseas 
markets, the state persists in its involvement in the process to support producers and 
instrumentalize outcomes. Along with traditional methods of hands-on and interventionist 
measures based on legacies of the developmental state, it has formulated market 
mechanisms into its funding schemes aiming at encouraging more participation of 
private capital and further globalizing cultural products. Most of all, it has been a driving 
force of industrializing popular culture for the last 20 years and endorsed and supported 
efforts by producers to expand the market through the transnationalization and 
globalization of their products.  
The findings of this research demonstrate that it is premature to conclude that the 
state’s power in global cultural industries is in decline as the market is dominated by 
doctrines of neoliberal globalization. In addition to this, the case of the Korean state and 
its relationship with cultural producers indicates that there are many ways the state 
exercises political and economic power rather than implementing a series of ‘defensive’ 
tools to protect domestic markets such as regulating cultural imports through trade pacts 
and subsidizing domestic cultural production. Also, given that mechanisms of neoliberal 
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globalization often require the state’s performance to realize its doctrines, the state 
retains the power to interpret its tenets for the sake of its interests. This legitimizes and 
intensifies the state’s instrumentalist interpretation of cultural products as tools for 
seeking its political expediency and economic profitability in the name of promoting the 
Korean Wave. This also implies that the state (as well as each administration)’s political 
clout can exist in the cultural domain; even much cultural production is driven by (free-) 
market logics and its production and distribution chain has become increasingly 
transnational. However, it is worth noting that protecting political and economic interests 
does not necessarily correspond to protecting the interests of other stakeholders in the 
field and often collides with the state.  
This critical analysis of cultural bureaucrats and cultural workers across the fields 
of Korean cultural industries suggests the need for more subtle and critical approaches 
to investigate the nexus of neoliberal globalization and state interests in cultural 
industries and policies, rather than a linear interpretation of the state’s retreat from the 
market or vice versa. It also expands the discussion of the state’s instrumentalization of 
culture by broadening scopes to the state’s political and statist interpretation of cultural 
products and their transnational popularity as well as how ideas of globalization 
contribute to benefiting state interests. By finding the nexus between state interests and 
neoliberal globalization in cultural production, this study sheds light on how an individual 
state exploits its cultural production to fulfill its political and economic objectives and 
examines how global market forces and their arguments contribute to realizing such 
objectives of instrumentalizing culture for the sake of state interests. Through laying the 
grounding framework that became the contemporary domestic market and revisiting its 
policy mechanisms in accordance with changing market dynamics, the state retains its 
position and interests in cultural production as a merchant, patron, and stakeholder, 
creating a relationship between the state’s political and economic interests in the cultural 
domain and the logics of neoliberal globalization driven by (free-) market forces that are 
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